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Abstract 
 
This thesis studies the relationship between Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) and 
economic growth. Although literature on this matter has increased over the last decade, the 
direct effect of IPR on growth is still a controversial issue. Thus, this effect is certainly not 
completely understood.  
IPR have a dual role on economic growth and several works have been proposing 
arguments for and against IPR. Given this ambiguity, we propose a comprehensive and deep 
overview of the existing theoretical and empirical literature on the subject, systematizing the 
main conclusions related to the relationship between IPR and endogenous growth, and we try to 
uncover the main gaps in the current research agenda.  
Secondly, we develop a general equilibrium endogenous growth model which emphasizes 
the IPR effects on growth, in a scenario of North-South technological knowledge diffusion. In 
line with the literature, we introduce an IPR parameter which makes imitation more difficult. 
We find that, in steady state, the increases in IPR protection result in decreases in the growth 
rate. 
Afterwards, we examine the effect of IPR on economic growth. Using a panel dataset and 
a two-stage estimation procedure, it shows that IPR protection affects economic growth in 
robust terms. In order to avoid some bias caused by the IPR measure, we obtain the IPR value 
residually and then we verify that countries with higher levels of IPR protection have lower 
economic growth rates. Hence, the results confirm a negative impact of IPR protection on 
economic growth. 
In addition, we study the IPR effect on economic growth, in the presence of population 
ageing. Besides, we analyse this relationship in a framework where there is a health care sector. 
We conclude that, by introducing population ageing in the model, there is no impact in the sign 
of the IPR effect on economic growth. However, it affects positively the steady state growth 
rate. Finally, under some conditions, the presence of the health care sector also increases the 
steady state growth rate. 
    
Keywords: North-South; R&D; Endogenous Economic Growth; Intellectual Property 
Rights; Ageing; Innovation; Imitation; Health Care. 
JEL classification: C8, I15, J10, O3, O33, O34, O4, O41, O43.  
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Resumo 
 
 Esta tese estuda a relação entre os Direitos de Propriedade Intelectual (DPI) e o 
crescimento económico. Embora a literatura sobre este assunto tenha aumentado na última 
década, o efeito direto da proteção dos DPI no crescimento é ainda um assunto controverso. 
Assim, este efeito não é totalmente conhecido. 
    Os DPI têm um duplo papel no crescimento económico e têm sido propostos argumentos 
contra e a favor dos DPI. Tendo em conta esta ambiguidade, nós propomos uma revisão da 
literatura teórica e empírica existente sobre o assunto, sistematizando as principais conclusões 
acerca da relação entre os DPI e o crescimento endógeno, e tentamos indicar as principais 
lacunas aí presentes. 
 Em segundo lugar, nós desenvolvemos um modelo de crescimento endógeno de 
equilíbrio geral que enfatiza os efeitos dos DPI no crescimento, num cenário de difusão do 
conhecimento tecnológico entre o Norte e o Sul. Tendo em conta a literatura, nós introduzimos 
um parâmetro de DPI que torna a imitação mais difícil e descobrimos que, no estado 
estacionário, os aumentos na proteção dos DPI resultam em decréscimos na taxa de 
crescimento.   
 Depois, usando um painel de dados e um procedimento de estimação em duas fases, 
mostramos que a proteção dos DPI afeta o crescimento económico de forma robusta. Para evitar 
o possível enviesamento causado pela medida dos DPI, nós obtemos residualmente o valor dos 
mesmos e, posteriormente, verificamos que os níveis elevados de proteção dos DPI estão 
associados a taxas de crescimento económico reduzidas. Deste modo, os resultados confirmam 
um impacto negativo da proteção dos DPI no crescimento económico. 
 Por fim, nós estudamos o efeito dos DPI no crescimento económico tendo em conta o 
envelhecimento da população e a existência do setor de cuidados de saúde. Nós concluímos que, 
ao introduzir o envelhecimento da população no modelo, não há impacto no sinal do efeito dos 
DPI no crescimento económico. No entanto, afecta positivamente a taxa de crescimento do 
estado estacionário. Sob algumas condições, a presença do sector de cuidados de saúde também 
pode aumentar a taxa de crescimento do estado estacionário.     
 
Palavras-chave: Norte-Sul; I&D; Crescimento Económico Endógeno; Direitos de 
Propriedade Intelectual; Envelhecimento; Inovação; Imitação; Cuidados de Saúde. 
Classificação JEL: C8, I15, J10, O3, O33, O34, O4, O41, O43.  
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Chapter 1  
Introduction 
Intellectual Property Rights (henceforward IPR) have been identified as an important 
topic in economics. Therefore, they have gained increasing attention in the academic 
research. It is common to find references in the literature to IPR and/or to the potential 
relationship between IPR and major economic variables. Nevertheless, we can affirm 
that only over the last decade the literature on this subject observed a massive growth. 
Moreover, if we refer to IPR in the specific context of economic growth, we verify that 
the literature is not much and it has significantly increased over the last decade 
(Azevedo et al., forthcoming). However, the relationship between IPR and economic 
growth has not been fully apprehended, and there is no consensus about both the signal 
and the causality beneath this relationship. 
 The purpose of this thesis is to give a significant contribution for the study of the 
relationship between IPR and growth. In order to achieve this major goal, we present 
four essays on this subject. The first essay presents an overview of the existing literature 
(both theoretical and empirical) on this topic. In the second one, a model which allows 
us to analyse the sign of the IPR effect on growth is developed. The third essay tests 
empirically the model proposed in essay two, developing a deep analysis on the 
relationship under study.  Finally, in the last essay, we propose an extension of the 
model offered in the second essay, by introducing ageing population and health care 
sector in the model. The thesis includes six chapters. After these introductory remarks, 
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which give a global summary of the document, the four essays are presented and a final 
chapter concludes and presents further research paths.  
 Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive and deep overview of the existing theoretical 
and empirical literature on the relationship between IPR and economic growth. After a 
brief review on the IPR origins namely in the economic context, we study the main 
theoretical contributions on this same relationship, also enlarging the scope in terms of 
economic performance to innovation and/or welfare,
2
 and we systematize the main 
conclusions. The conclusions about this relationship significantly differ among the 
analysed studies. The differences are not only in terms of the sign of the IPR effect on 
growth (innovation or welfare), but also in terms of the used IPR concept. From our 
deep analysis of all these studies, we claim that the differences on the impact of IPR on 
economic growth are justified not only by the differences in the concept of IPR, but are 
also associated to the fact that, namely in what concerns empirical studies, these use 
distinct samples and methodologies. 
 In Chapter 3, we continue the analysis of the theoretical literature on IPR and 
economic growth, but now specifically focused on the theoretical framework of 
endogenous growth. Specifically, this chapter analysis the sign of the relationship 
between IPR and economic growth. We develop here a two-country theoretical 
endogenous growth model in the presence of technological knowledge diffusion. Based 
on Connolly and Valderrama (2005) and Afonso (2012), we verify the behaviour of the 
growth rate when there are changes in the level of IPR protection.  Relatively to the 
cited papers, we certainly add a much higher focus on IPR. We not only have into 
consideration the existence of IPR but we also attribute to IPR the central role in the 
analysis, that is, we consider IPR as the key element in study. We conclude that IPR 
assume a relevant role in the model and that the growth rate is, in fact, affected by this 
presence.  
 Chapter 4 studies empirically the relationship between IPR and economic growth. 
Thus, we intend to determine the IPR value as well as to check the explanatory power of 
the model presented in the Chapter 3. Additionally, we want to provide a study about 
                                                   
 
2 We do not study only the IPR effect on growth because the existing literature on IPR and endogenous 
growth models was rather scarce in what regards investigation of the direct relationship. 
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the direct effect of IPR on economic growth. In this sense, we use an estimation of the 
model developed in the previous chapter and we add some control variables in order to 
test the robustness of the model. Moreover, we compute in residual terms the IPR value 
associated to the estimated growth rate, which allow us to reduce the bias that exists in 
the literature due to the fact that IPR are measured in very distinct ways.  
 In Chapter 5, the model developed in the Chapter 2 is extended by introducing 
ageing population and health care sector in the analysis. The central aim is to verify 
how the results obtained in the Chapter 2 change when we introduce this phenomenon 
and we find that the sign of the variation in growth rate due to a change in the IPR level 
is not affected. However, we state that growth rate is positively affected by population 
ageing.  
 Chapter 6 comprise the main conclusions of this thesis as well as some 
suggestions for future research. 
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Chapter 2 
Intellectual Property Rights and 
Endogenous Economic Growth: uncovering 
the main gaps in the research agenda 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A preliminary version of this chapter was published in 2012 as ‘Intellectual property 
rights and endogenous economic growth – uncovering the main gaps in the research 
agenda’, in Technological Change, Aurora A. C. Teixeira (editor), ISBN: 978-953-51-
0509-1, InTech, DOI: 10.5772/37768, chapter 3, pp. 45-64. 
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2.1. Overview 
Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) are “the rights to use and sell knowledge and 
inventions” (Greenhalgh and Rogers, 2007: 541), with the aim of guaranteeing adequate 
returns for innovators and creators. There are different types of intellectual property 
protection (Granstrand, 2005): old types such as patents, trade secrets, copyrights, 
trademarks and design rights, and new forms such as breeding rights and database 
rights. Nonetheless, patents are commonly considered as the most important and 
representative IPR (e.g., Besen and Raskind, 1991).  
IPR have a long legal and economic history, since the idea of intellectual property 
was already present in ancient cultures such as Babylonia, Egypt, Greece and the 
Roman Empire. Mokyr (2009) discusses the relevance of the late 19
th
 century, when 
political events created a system which supported an executive that was sufficiently 
well-organised to create a “rule of law” and respect private property rights. This 
argument emerges, in part, in the context of an Industrial Revolution marked by 
important technological improvements, whereby IPR began gradually to be accorded 
more respect.  
Despite this long history, only recently has IPR come to play a central role in 
debates concerning economic policy, being a stimulus for innovation through monopoly 
power (Menell, 1999). This change, related to the pro-patent era, only emerged in the 
20th century – first in the USA and then globally in the world. Beneath this profound 
transformation lay a “deeper, more broad-based and much slower flow of events 
towards a more information- (knowledge-) intensive and innovation-based economy” 
(Granstrand, 2005: 266). Therefore, in this period, knowledge and information assumed 
an important role in economics, which implied important changes in policy-making 
both in developed and developing countries. 
The relationship between IPR, technological change and economic growth is 
ambiguous (e.g., Horii and Iwaisako, 2007; Harayuma, 2009; Panagopoulos, 2009). 
Although knowledge and innovation are crucial for economic growth (e.g., Romer, 
1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Hall and Rosenberg, 2010), if they are (completely) 
free there will be no incentive to invest in new knowledge and inventions (e.g., Arrow, 
1962; Romer, 1990). Thus, the potential need to protect both knowledge and inventions 
emerges, and the discussion of the importance of IPR for this protection function gains 
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relevance. In forming the decision whether to protect or not, a typical trade-off emerges: 
if we protect, only the owner of the knowledge design will use it (for some years she/he 
will have the monopoly power) and so the impact on economic growth will be smaller; 
in cases where no protection exists (which would not allow innovators to be rewarded), 
knowledge will be easily diffused and all adopters will benefit from associated profits 
without having supported the corresponding costs; in the latter case no incentive to 
create new knowledge will exist. Thus a greater diffusion could have a higher economic 
growth impact, but at the same time, the inexistence of a clear incentive could also 
reduce growth enhancement. This issue is only one of the several extant trade-off 
debates concerning the IPR-economic growth relationship.  
The main purpose of this essay is to construct a survey of the theoretical and 
empirical literature on the relationship between IPR, technological change and 
economic growth as well as to expose some of the gaps in the current research. The 
relevance of this task is directly related to the ambiguous role that the literature has 
identified relating to the relationship between these dimensions. After systematization 
of the relevant theoretical literature, we focus on the empirical studies concerning the 
effect of IPR protection on innovation and economic growth. In presenting this 
overview, we intend to analyse to what extent empirical results allow for a consensual 
conclusion, faced as we are with the ambiguity of the theoretical contributions. 
The present chapter is structured as follows. After a brief introduction, Section 2.2 
presents an overview of the relationship between the economics of IPR, innovation and 
technological change. Section 2.3 focuses in detail on the relationship between 
endogenous economic growth and IPR from a theoretical perspective, whereas Section 
2.4 offers an analysis of this relationship, but in empirical terms. Section 2.5 concludes, 
highlighting the main gaps that currently exist in this research agenda. 
 
2.2. The economics of IPR and innovation: an overview  
The conceptualization of IPR as a means of protecting ideas is relatively recent. Several 
international agreements, such as the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 
Trade-Related aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) and the World 
Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) are examples of conventions and/or 
organizations connected with IPR (Senhoras, 2007). 
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IPR, in their various forms, play a crucial role in innovation systems.
3
 Firms 
invest in innovation activities, find new products or new processes and increase their 
profits. To prevent the imitation of their innovations, firms can benefit from IPR 
protection. In this sense, IPR serve as an incentive for innovation, since knowledge has 
the characteristics of a public good (non-excludable and non-rival), and hence is easily 
appropriable. So in the case of IPR, the good is non-rival but becomes excludable. The 
significance of spillovers associated with technological knowledge being widely 
recognized, the related literature clearly stresses the importance of property rights, 
patents and other policies designed to protect innovative firms from spillovers. 
Nevertheless, spillovers are crucial for technology transfer and development (e.g., Hall 
and Rosenberg, 2010). Hence, within this framework, a topic that is frequently 
discussed concerns the optimal patent length and the consequent trade-off between 
dynamic efficiency and static efficiency. 
IPR play an important role not only in the innovation system but also on structural 
dynamics across sectors and countries, and over time. Authors such as Langford (1997) 
conclude that, despite there being some disadvantages, one of the most important 
economic effects of IPR is that they induce innovation, increasing the possibilities of 
technology transfer.  
Resources, competences and dynamic capabilities are addressed within this wider 
broader discussion concerning appropriability. According to Hall and Rosenberg (2010: 
689), “resources are firm-specific assets that are difficult, or impossible, to imitate. 
They are stocks, not flows.” Resources are most likely to be intangibles; they are not 
easily transferred, some examples being intellectual property rights and know how 
processes. As regards competences, they “are a particular kind of organizational 
resource”, since “[t]hey result from activities that are performed repetitively or quasi-
repetitively” (Hall and Rosenberg, 2010: 690). So routines are closely linked to 
competences. The firm’s resources are considered sources of advantage, and in this 
                                                   
 
3 Arrow (1962) was a pioneer in addressing the economics of IPR. However, early authors such as Adam 
Smith, John Stuart Mill and J. W. Goethe had already conceived the patent as a price society must pay for 
discovery, which was fundamental for the unfettered diffusion of useful knowledge. Furthermore, it had 
already been recognized that the complete specification of the patent made the technological details more 
accessible to others (Mokyr, 2009). 
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context, IPR correspond to firm-specific, intangible resources, which are not easy to 
transfer to other firms because it is difficult or even impossible to imitate them.  
According to Mokyr (2009) and others, it is important to pay attention to the 
difference between institutions which stimulate technological progress and institutions 
that support the growth of markets by protecting property rights. In a completely 
unlegislated society, technological progress is less likely. Yet in order for rapid 
technological change to occur, it is necessary to eliminate some property rights. So this 
author is forced to ask “What kind of institutions encouraged technological progress?” 
(Mokyr, 2009: 349). He starts by emphasising the idea that incentives are a requirement 
for inventions and IPR offer incentives for successful inventors. Using the historical fact 
that the number of patents was stagnant until the mid- 18
th
 century, and suddenly started 
growing in the 1750s, the author concludes that IPR show how institutions contributed 
to the origins of the Industrial Revolution. However, Mokyr (2009) also states that the 
main difficulty lies not in whether the patent system has a positive effect on 
technological progress in equilibrium but whether the effect could be sufficiently large 
to explain a considerable share of the acceleration in technological progress that it is 
intended to explain. Furthermore, it is interesting to know whether other institutions 
could have been similar to or even more important than the patent system. Mokyr 
(2009) concludes that, even as far as the historical importance of patents on the 
Industrial Revolution is concerned, the impact is not clear. 
Cozzi (2009) discusses the possibility of innovation and growth without IPR. His 
main line of reasoning is that, since the main engine of economic growth is innovation, 
IPR may not necessarily be crucial for innovation and growth. In other words, although 
the IPR regime allows innovators to be rewarded for their innovations, constituting a 
mechanism whereby they are stimulated to innovate, innovation is still possible in the 
absence of IPR through other means, such as education (see also Greennhalgh and 
Rogers, 2007). Furukawa (2007) and Horii and Iwaisako (2007) also show that 
increasing patent protection against imitation has ambiguous effects on R&D and 
growth.  
Hence, we may question whether the rise in profits associated with a patent 
increases the incentive to innovate. Initially the answer would be that two incentives are 
better than just one (Cozzi, 2009). However, as Cozzi (2009) also mentions, Haruyama 
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(2009) proves that this is not always the case, because in a very populated world, the 
introduction of IPR could have adverse effects on the skill premium, which could 
consequently lead to a reduction in the tacit knowledge incentive and intensify the 
expected capital loss resulting from obsolescence.  
The issue of appropriability is of course related to “profiting from the innovation 
framework” (Hall and Rosenberg, 2010: 698) and to Schumpeter’s concept of creative 
destruction. According to Hall and Rosenberg (2010), to guarantee profits from 
innovation efforts and to protect inventors/innovators from imitators, two possibilities 
are presented: strong natural protection and strong intellectual property protection, both 
of which are related to appropriability regimes. Patents can also be a means of 
protecting inventors/innovators from their rivals and ensuring the generation of profits. 
However, the use of patents is considered imperfect because “they are especially 
ineffective at protecting process innovation” (Hall and Rosenberg, 2010: 700). The 
authors defend that this ineffectiveness is associated, e.g., with the existence of 
considerable legal and financial requirements to prove they have been violated or with 
the presence of weak law enforcement relating to intellectual property Thus patents act 
as an incentive to innovate while at the same time possibly discouraging some 
innovators and therefore reducing knowledge spillovers (Panagopoulos, 2009). 
Therefore, a concave relationship between patent protection and innovation may 
emerge, differing from the relationship advocated by Arrow (1962), which argues that 
stronger patent protection brings about more innovations. 
In brief, some authors criticize the argument that strong patent protection offers 
greater incentives to innovators and therefore increases economic performance. Cohen 
et al. (2000) maintain that the increasing number of patents is not necessarily a sign of 
their greater effectiveness. Both empirical contributions such as those of Hall and 
Ziedonis (2001) and theoretical approaches such as those of O’Donaghue et al. (1998) 
lend support to this latter perspective. Moreover, as also stressed by Panagopoulos 
(2009), Horii and Iwaisako (2005) maintain that stronger intellectual property protection 
reduces the number of competitive sectors. Since it is easier to innovate in these sectors 
than in monopolistic sectors, this study advocates that the innovator tends to be 
concentrated in a smaller number of competitive sectors.  
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Chu (2009b) studies the effects of IPR on the specific framework of 
macroeconomics. He stresses that since it is not possible to meet or recreate ideal 
situations in the real world, market failures can engender the overprovision or 
underprovision of certain resources. In fact, whereas the competitive market or 
Walrasian equilibriums are efficient, leading to the Pareto efficient allocation of 
resources, competitive conditions are difficult to come by in real economies. For 
example, investment in R&D activity has two implications in terms of returns: the 
social return and the private return. Empirical studies in this area (e.g., Jones and 
Williams, 1988, 2000) show that the social return to R&D is much higher than the 
private return. This being the case, R&D, innovation, economic growth and social 
welfare would increase towards the socially optimal level were market failure to be 
overcome. Within this context, Chu (2009b) stresses the relevance of quantitative 
dynamic general-equilibrium (DGE) analyses for studying the macroeconomic 
repercussions of rising IPR protection. He further emphasises that, although some 
empirical evidence points to a positive relationship between IPR protection and 
innovation, this evidence appears to be stronger in the case of developed rather than 
developing countries. Hence, this author maintains that the optimal level of patent 
protection
4
 leads to a trade-off between the social benefits of improved innovation and 
the social costs of multiple distortions and income inequality. In an open economy, 
achieving the globally optimal level of protection demands international coordination 
rather than the harmonization of IPR protection.  
Another interesting question in terms of policy implications is the magnitude of 
welfare gains from changing the patent length towards its socially optimal level. Kwan 
and Lai (2003) found that the extension of a patent’s effective lifetime would lead to a 
significant increase in R&D and welfare. But Chu (2009a) maintains that while the 
extension of patent length beyond 20 years leads to a negligible increase in R&D and 
consumption, the limitation of the patent length leads to their significant reduction. So it 
seems that patent length is not an effective instrument for increasing R&D in most 
                                                   
 
4 Relative to patent policy, there are some instruments that can be used to influence the incentives to R&D 
and innovation, to the extent that they will affect economic growth. One example of these instruments is 
the patent length that establishes the statutory term of patent. Judd (1985) cited in Chu (2009b) argues 
that the optimal patent length is infinite, whereas Futagami and Iwaisako (2003, 2007) maintain, in a 
version of the Romer  model, that the optimal patent length is finite. 
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industries. In line with this argument, patent reform in the USA implemented in the 
1980s focused on other aspects of patent rights such as patentability requirements (the 
invention would have to be new and non-obvious). Nevertheless, O’Donoghue and 
Zweimuller (2004) also show that if the patentability requirements are lowered, there 
will be contrasting effects on R&D and innovation. On the one hand, it becomes easier 
for an inventor to obtain a patent, which increases the R&D incentives. On the other 
hand, the amount of profits generated by an invention would decrease due to its smaller 
quality improvement, so the possibility that the next invention is patentable takes away 
market share from the current invention, decreasing R&D incentives. The policy 
implication mentioned by Chu (2009b) is the ambiguous effect of lowering the 
patentability requirement on R&D and growth.  
Another instrument also discussed in Chu (2009b) is the patent breadth (the 
broadness or the scope of a patent) that determines the level of patent protection for an 
invention against imitation and subsequent innovations. There are two types of patent 
protection: the lagging breadth and the leading breadth. In relation to the former, Li 
(2001), using the Grossman and Helpman (1991b) model, found a positive effect of the 
lagging breadth on R&D and growth; i.e., the increase in protection against imitation 
improves the incentives for R&D. This unambiguous positive effect emerges because 
larger lagging breadth allows monopolists to charge a higher mark-up (Li, 2001).  
According to Chu (2009b), Chin (2007), Furukawa (2007) and Horii and Iwaisako 
(2007) also show that the increase in patent protection against imitation exerts 
ambiguous effects on R&D and growth. Chu (2009b), basing his hypothesis on these 
three works, concludes that if IPR protection has asymmetric effects on different 
generations of households, it can also have a negative effect on innovation. Leading 
breadth is also discussed, underlining the point that increasing leading has opposite 
effects on the incentives for R&D. Once more, Chu (2009b) reports on O’Donoghue 
and Zweimuller (2004) and their analysis of Grossman and Helpman’s (1991b) model 
to show the following: while the profits generated by an invention increase due to the 
consolidation of market power through generations of inventors, leading to a positive 
effect on R&D, the delayed rewards from profit sharing occasion a lower present value 
of profits received by an inventor, thus bringing about a negative effect (the profit 
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growth rate is lower than the interest rate). This negative effect is also known as 
blocking patents (Chu, 2009b). 
To sum up, we can conclude from the analysis of the different studies discussed 
above that the relationship between IPR and economic performance is ambiguous.  
Although the codification of patents and copyright laws, as well as the regulation of 
privileges, emerged in the late 15
th
 century, the concern with the relationship between 
IPR and economic growth only began in the 20
th
 century, gathering pace as time went 
on. The first really relevant studies regarding IPR and growth emerged around the 
1980s or even 1990s,
5
 which corresponds with the emergence of the New Economic 
Growth Theory, also known as the Endogenous Economic Growth Theory, in the 1980s 
(Romer, 1994). The next section discusses and compares these two issues. 
 
2.3. The bridge between IPR and Endogenous Economic Growth: main theoretical 
contributions
6
  
Innovation has assumed increasing importance in economic growth theory. In this 
context, it is consensually recognized as a crucial engine of growth (for example, 
Romer, 1990; Aghion and Howitt, 1992), and many studies have discussed the role of 
knowledge and technology in growth and development (e.g., Hall and Rosenberg, 
2010).  
In particular, some authors focus their attention on the relationship between IPR and 
growth. For instance, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) develop a model of North-
South trade with multinational firms and economic growth in order to formally evaluate 
the effects of stronger IPR protection in developing countries. These effects have been 
                                                   
 
5
 Towse and Holzhauer (2002) have compiled a selection of the most important articles relating to the 
economics of intellectual property, and show that, in essence, they are of 20th century provenance, 
belonging in particular to the 1980s and 1990s. Additionally, on 29th September 2011, in a piece of 
internet research conducted in “SCOPUS”, using “Intellectual Property Rights” and “endogenous growth 
model” as search words (in all text) and collecting only journal articles (including reviews), we obtained 
56 records, the first dating from 1991.  
6 The selection of these studies was based on Towse and Holzhauer (2002), Pejovich (2001), Cantwell 
(2006) and on a thorough search of related literature on several international bibliographic databases, 
including Econlit and Scopus.  
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the subject of intense debate, with one side advocating stronger IPR protection reform
7
 
and the other opposed to this (Taylor, 1994). 
The former view argues that the reform would promote innovation and benefit 
developing countries because it would contribute to more rapid economic growth and 
would accelerate the transfer of technology from developed to developing countries. 
The latter argues that stronger IPR protection would neither accelerate economic growth 
nor transfer international technology more quickly, since it only “results in the transfer 
of rents to multinational corporate patent holders headquartered in the world’s most 
advanced countries especially in the US” (Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010: 13). 
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) also offer an overview of several contributions 
focusing on multinationals and relating to this issue. Glass and Saggi (2002), Sener 
(2006) and Glass and Wu (2007) show an unambiguous relationship between strong 
IPR protection in the South and a lower rate of technology transfer, while Helpman 
(1993), Lai (1998), Branstetter et al. (2006) and Branstetter et al. (2007) reach the 
opposite conclusion. However, according to Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010), it is 
worth mentioning that, in all those previous models, the absence of R&D spending by 
affiliates, which is not empirically sustained, is assumed. Dinopoulos and Segerstrom 
(2010: 14), in an effort to be coherent in considering this empirical evidence, consider 
that “R&D conducted by the affiliates in developing countries is focused on the 
absorption of patent-firm technology and on its modification for local markets.” This 
study finds a positive relationship between stronger IPR in the South and a permanent 
increase in the rate of technology transfer from the North to the South. Additionally, 
this strong protection in the South results in a temporary increase in the Northern 
innovation rate and in a permanent decrease in the North-South wage gap. Hence, the 
same authors conclude that, under these conditions, Southern strong IPR protection 
promotes innovation in the global economy and this explains the faster growth of 
several developing countries compared with the growth performance of typical 
developed countries. 
                                                   
 
7 This reform emerged from the Uruguay Round in 1994, more specifically from the TRIPS agreement, 
whose aim was to establish minimum standards of IPR protection by all WTO members up to 2006. 
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Moreover, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) analyse the long-term welfare 
effects, and at this level some contradictions emerge. In some North-South trade 
models, such as those proposed by Lai (1998), Branstetter et al. (2007) and Glass and 
Wu (2007), patent reform increases the economic growth rate permanently (and 
therefore the consumers must be better than they would be without patent reform). In 
other models, such as in Glass and Saggi (2002) and Sener (2006), patent reform 
permanently decreases the economic growth rate (and consequently consumers must be 
worse). In Dinopoulos and Segerstrom’s (2010) model, growth is semi-endogenous and 
so the long-term welfare effects are ambiguous, because patent reform does not 
permanently alter the economic growth rate. Nevertheless, by combining all the effects 
gleaned from the related literature, the authors find optimistic long-term welfare effects 
in those developing countries with strong IPR protection. Moreover, as regards the two 
possible ways of transferring technology between two countries, FDI (Foreign Direct 
Investment) and imitation, Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010: 15) argue that “the 
effects of stronger IPR protection would depend on how important each mode of 
technology transfer is.” 
Regarding IPR protection in an open economy, Chu (2009b) emphasises three main 
results derived from Lai and Qui (2003) and Grossman and Lai (2004). The first 
indicates that, due to the asymmetries in terms of innovation capability, 
developed/Northern countries tend to choose a higher level of IPR protection than 
developing/Southern countries. The second underlines the fact that if the North’s level 
of IPR protection such as TRIPS were imposed on Southern countries, it would lead to a 
welfare gain (loss) in the North (South). And finally, although TRIPS require the 
harmonization of IPR protection, this harmonization is neither necessary nor sufficient 
for the maximization of global welfare.  
Chu and Peng (2009), quoted by Chu (2009b), also consider the effects of IPR 
protection on income inequality across countries and find that stronger patent rights in 
one country tend to lead to an increase in economic growth and income inequality both 
in domestic and foreign countries. Another result of this research is that TRIPS tend to 
improve or reduce global welfare according to the domestic importance of foreign 
goods. Thus only if these goods were sufficiently important for domestic consumption 
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would the harmonization of IPR protection that the TRIPS require improves global 
welfare. 
Cozzi (2009) also highlights the role of IPR in economic growth in both 
developed and developing countries. Typically, while the developed countries are the 
Northern countries, which create new varieties of goods and services, the developing 
countries are the Southern countries, which have a production cost advantage. In this 
sense, the source of growth is the horizontal innovation of new intermediate products. In 
the case of Northern firms, they may export intermediate goods, they may directly 
invest in the South (through knowledge transfer), or they may grant a licence for their 
product (complete transfer). These firms desire to transfer the maximum possible 
knowledge, but this implies the transfer of more knowledge about their patented goods. 
The Southern firms can try to undertake costly imitation activities, so that in the South 
IPR protection is not complete: the more intensive is the knowledge transfer, the higher 
is the probability of Southern firms imitating their Northern counterparts. The greater is 
the IPR protection, the higher is the equilibrium FDI,
8
 which makes it possible to 
improve the international division of labour. Thus, while very high IPR protection 
implies licensing – this method being the most efficient – very low IPR protection 
induces the firms of the North not to transfer at all, but to produce domestically and to 
export their intermediate goods to the South. The advantage of this last situation is the 
absence of unproductive Southern imitation costs. Cozzi (2009) also maintains that 
different IPR effects can exist: the combination of the general equilibrium effects of 
adverse incentives and wasteful imitation costs implies that the increase in international 
IPR protection is beneficial to the welfare of the South if the initial level of IPR is 
already above a certain threshold. However, in the case of weak protection of initial 
IPR, the increase in protection might be dangerous for Southern consumers.  
Globalization, inequality and innovation are phenomena crucially associated with 
IPR. Spinesi (2009) extended Dinopoulos and Segerstrom’s (1999) work on 
Schumpeterian economic growth, by studying the relationships between all those 
dimensions. Among others issues, Spinesi (2009) emphasises that IPR achieve a similar 
                                                   
 
8  The relationship between IPR protection and FDI is also analysed by Chu (2009b): technological 
transfer between Northern and Southern firms occurs to a significant extent via FDI. 
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result even in the presence of constant returns to scale. This result is advantageous 
because it would also apply in the case of firms competing a la Bertrand. Moreover, he 
finds that, while horizontal innovation has a positive level effect, it is vertical 
innovation that sustains the growth effect. 
Panagopoulos (2009) explores the relationship between patent breadth and 
growth, by studying how patent breadth affects innovation and output. This study finds 
an inverted U-relationship between patent protection and growth.  
From the different studies mentioned above, we conclude that there is no consensus 
regarding the relationship between IPR and economic growth, including within the 
specific theoretical framework of endogenous growth literature. In Table 2.1 we offer a 
systematization of this theoretical literature.  
  
 
1
9
 
Table 2.1: The impact of IPR on innovation and growth: a synthesis of the theoretical literature 
IPR conceptualization Author (date) Net final effect 
Patents 
Scherer (1977); Koléda (2008) On innovation: 0  
Tandon (1982); David and Olsen (1992) On welfare: + 
Merges and Nelson (1994) On technological progress: - 
Taylor (1994) On economic growth: + (symmetric protection) and – (asymmetric protection). 
Michel and Nyssen (1998); Goh and Oliver 
(2002); Iwaisako and Futagami (2003) 
On economic growth: +   
Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) 
On economic growth: + (finite patent length) and – (infinite patent length); a patent strategy with 
a finite patent length is optimal. 
Naghavi (2007) 
On South welfare: + (if attract foreign investment in less R&D intensive industries or if they 
stimulate innovation in high technology sectors). 
Dinopoulos and Kottaridi (2008) 
On economic growth and on income distribution: + (if each country selects the level of patent 
enforcement optimally, with the North having an incentive to choose stronger IPR protection than 
the South).  
Eicher and Garcia-Peñalosa (2008); Chu 
(2009a) 
On economic growth: 0  
Panagopoulos (2009) On economic growth: a concave relationship.  
Index of Patent Rights from Park (2008) Chu (2010) On economic growth: +; on income inequality: 0  
Patent length and breadth; protection trademarks; 
copyrights and trade secrets; and the degree of 
enforcement. 
Kwan and Lai (2003)     On economic growth: optimal degree of IPR protection.  
Copyright  
Novos and Waldman (1984) On social welfare: +  
Landes and Posner (1989) On welfare associated with a given work: -  
Patent length and breadth; copyright policy  
Furukawa (2007) 
 
On economic growth: - (when the impact of accumulated experience on productivity is large 
enough, an inverted U relationship is suggested). 
Increase in imitation costs Stryszowski (2006)   On economic growth in technologically lagging countries: 0  
  
 
2
0
 
 
Glass and Saggi (2002); Mondal and Gupta (2008) 
     
On innovation and on FDI: -   
Mondal and Gupta (2009); Connolly and Valderrama 
(2005) 
On welfare: + (both in North and in South, although the marginal welfare gain is higher in the former 
than in the latter) 
Wu (2010) On innovation: +  
Tariffs; Increase in the costs of imitation 
 
Datta and Mohtadi (2006) On South’s economic growth: tariffs (-); IPR (-) 
Imitation intensity 
Mondal and Gupta (2006); Glass and Wu (2007); 
Zhou (2009) 
On innovation: 0  
Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010)  On innovation: +  
Imitation probability and the return of 
innovation. 
 
Horii and Iwaisako (2007) On economic growth: 0  
Royalties  Saint –Paul (2008) On welfare: + 
N/a Furukawa (2010) On innovation: inverted U  
N/a: not applicable; 0: ambiguous or inconclusive net effect; +(-): positive (negative) net effect. 
Own elaboration.                                  
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As mentioned above, the relevant theoretical literature points to both positive and 
negative effects of patent protection on innovation (Chu, 2009b). For example, 
Furukawa (2007) and Eicher and Garcia-Peñalosa (2008) refute the idea that stronger 
IPR protection is always better. Using an endogenous growth model with costless 
imitation, Furukawa (2007) proves that IPR protection cannot increase economic 
growth, whereas Eicher and Garcia-Peñalosa (2008) support the idea that the 
relationship between IPR and economic growth is ambiguous. Iwaisako and Futagami 
(2003), Mondal and Gupta (2006) and Futagami and Iwaisako (2007) identify two 
opposite effects on this relationship. Wu (2010) presents inconclusive results that 
depend on such features as the countries’ level of development or the channel of 
technology transfer. Scherer (1977) also maintains that patents involve an impact that 
depends on such factors as the market position of the innovator, the features of the 
technology (whether it is easy or difficult for it to be imitated), the cost, the risks and 
the potential payoffs from innovation. Furukawa (2010) and Panagopoulos (2009) find 
an inverted-U relationship between IPR protection and innovation (and economic 
growth). Kwan and Lai (2003) and Connolly and Valderrama (2005) argue that IPR are 
important to R&D investment and welfare.  
Table 2.1 is also helpful in showing that different authors use different concepts of 
IPR. Some of them (Scherer, 1977; Tandon, 1982; David and Olsen, 1992; Merges and 
Nelson, 1994; Taylor, 1994; Michel and Nyssen, 1998; Goh and Oliver, 2002; Iwaisako 
and Futagami, 2003; Futagami and Iwaisako, 2007; Naghavi, 2007; Dinopoulos and 
Kottaridi, 2008; Eicher and Garcia-Peñalosa, 2008; Koléda, 2008; Chu, 2009a; 
Panagopoulos, 2009) limit the definition of IPR to one of their forms – patents 
(considered as the most important form of IPR, as discussed above). Others use distinct 
definitions, e.g., Glass and Saggi (2002) and Mondal and Gupta (2008, 2009), who 
define IPR as the rise in the imitation cost. Connolly and Valderrama (2005) give a 
similar definition, assuming that imitators pay a licence fee which is similar to an 
increase in the fixed cost of the imitative research; Kwan and Lai (2003) consider IPR 
part of the imitation rate which can be influenced by some factors such as patents, 
trademarks, copyrights and trade secrets; Furukawa (2007) also defines IPR as a mixed 
measure of patent and copyright; Glass and Wu (2007) associate the measure of IPR 
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with imitation intensity, whereas Dinopoulos and Segerstrom (2010) define IPR as a 
reduction in the exogenous rate of imitation. 
Despite these different ways of defining IPR, we do not find evidence of 
significant differences in terms of the results obtained. In fact, we have two studies in 
the table that achieve the same results using different measures of IPR: Furukawa 
(2007) and Panagopoulos (2009). Both suggest an inverted U relationship between IPR 
and economic growth, although the former defines IPR as a mix of patent and copyright 
measures, while the latter defines IPR only as patents. Furukawa (2010) also finds the 
same relationship although he does not define IPR.  
Two of the articles in Table 2.1, Stryszowski (2006) and Mondal and Gupta 
(2008), compare their assumptions and/or conclusions with other studies – some of 
them also analysed in the present work. Stryszowski (2006) identifies and discusses 
studies which maintain that strong IPR protection is beneficial for innovating economies 
(e.g., Connolly and Valderrama, 2005). However, this study also highlights works that 
have found negative effects of IPR protection on lagging economies, based on the 
existence of a mechanism in which strong IPR protection tends to raise consumer prices 
and to diminish trade benefits that could be essential for developing economies (for 
example, Helpman, 1993). Mondal and Gupta (2008) discuss several studies based on 
their distinct assumptions concerning the innovation framework (quality ladder 
framework versus product variety framework), and the alternative ways of treating 
imitation and of strengthening IPR protection, etc. Following this they present the 
assumptions of their own model, characterized by the use of a product variety model, a 
North-South model with endogenous innovation, imitation and multinationalisation, 
where innovation activities are set as costly and there is an endogenous rate of imitation. 
Lai (1998) gives a close approximation to the latter, except for two features: the 
endogenous imitation rate in the South, given that imitation is considered costly; and the 
introduction of two kinds of labour in the South – skilled and unskilled. In line with 
these two distinct assumptions, the results achieved are also different from Mondal and 
Gupta’s (2008). 
To sum up, we can state that the studies presented in Table 2.1 do not show a 
pattern regarding the relationship between IPR and economic growth (via welfare, for 
instance). From this table we can also state that patents are the most widely used 
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measure of IPR in theoretical works. Hence, at this stage, we state the existence of two 
main gaps in this literature: the scarcity of studies, so that a potential research line 
would be to dig more deeply in this field; and the excessive focus on patents as an IPR 
measure, which neglects the potential impact of other instruments, such as copyrights, 
which are crucial for the development of specific ICT industries such as information 
technology and software. 
In the next section we develop an analysis of the empirical studies concerning this 
same relationship between IPR and endogenous economic growth. 
 
2.4. IPR and Endogenous Economic Growth: where do we stand? Insights from 
the empirical literature 
After the systematization of the relevant theoretical literature in the previous section, we 
focus on empirical studies into the effect of IPR protection on innovation and on 
economic growth. In this review (cf. Table 2.2), we intend to show whether the 
empirical results permit us to reach a sustainable conclusion, faced as we are with the 
confirmed ambiguity of the theoretical contributions. 
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Table 2.2: The impact of IPR on innovation and growth: a synthesis of the empirical literature 
Measure of IPR Methodology Sample 
Author 
(date) 
Net estimated effect 
Park and Ginarte (1997) Index of Patent Rights
9
 
Econometric 
analysis – 
Seemingly 
Unrelated 
Regressions (SUR) 
Cross-section of countries for the period 1960-1990.  
Park and 
Ginarte 
(1997) 
+  
Econometric 
analysis – cross 
section  
48 countries for the period 1980 and 2000 (Sources: World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO) and Penn World Table 6.1) 
Xu and 
Chiang 
(2005) 
Econometric 
analysis – panel 
data 
 
64 developing countries
 
over the 1975–2000 period (Sources: World Development 
Indicators and Statistical Yearbook by UNESCO (UNESCO, 1995, 1997, 2000); 
patent data come from the United States Patent and Trademark Office Website) 
Chen and 
Puttitanun 
(2005) 
 
79 countries and four sub-periods: 1975-79, 1980-84, 1985-89 and 1990-94.  
Falvey et al. 
(2006) 
+ (for low-income and high-
income countries) 
80 countries for the period 1970–1995. (Sources: PennWorld TableMark 6.1, updated 
version of Summers and Heston, 1991; UNCTAD, 2005; World Bank, 2005; Ginarte 
and Park, 1995; Easterly and Sewadeh, 2005; Hall and Jones, 1999; and Barro and 
Lee, 2000). 
Groizard 
(2009) 
Ambiguous: 
+ 
(FDI is higher for countries 
with stronger intellectual 
property protection). 
- 
(Negative relationship 
between IPR and human 
capital indicators). 
                                                   
 
9 This index is a simple sum of the scores attributed to each of the five categories of patent rights (score from 0 to 1) on a scale of 0 to 5, with a larger number 
indicating stronger patent rights. The five IPR categories are the patent duration, the coverage, the enforcement mechanisms, the restrictions on patent scope and the 
membership in international treaties. 
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69 developed and developing countries over the period 1970–1999 (Sources: World 
Bank’s World Development Indicators, 2001; Jon Haveman website; OECD’s 
International Trade by Commodity Statistic (Historical Series, 1961–1990); 
International Trade by Commodity Statistic, 1990–1999; and Barro and Lee, 2001, 
database). 
Falvey et al. 
(2009) 
Nonlinear: 
(Depends on level of 
development, the imitative 
ability and the market size of 
the importing country). 
Ginarte and Park (1997) Index of Patent Rights
10
 
 
Econometric 
analysis 
50 countries (Sources: Ginarte and Park, 1997; Sachs and Warner, 1995; Hofstede, 
1984 and UNESCO, 1998). 
Varsakelis 
(2001) 
+ 
32 countries for the period between 1981 and 1990 (Sources: Ginarte and Park, 1997; 
Esty et al., 1998; United Nations, 1999; Word Bank, 2000; Barro and Lee, 2000; 
Heston et al., 2001 and Pick’s Currency Yearbook and World Currency Yearbook, 
several years). 
Kanwar and 
Evenson 
(2003) 
Eight indexes:
11
 index of patent rights 
constructed from Ginarte and Park (1997) and 
Park and Wagh (2002); index of copyrights; 
index of trade-marks; index of parallel import 
protection; index of software rights; index of 
piracy rates; index of enforcement provisions and 
index of enforcement in practice.  
41 countries (Sources: Penn World Tables (Version 5.6a), World Bank Development 
Indicators and UNESCO’s Statistical Yearbook). 
Park (2005) 
Patent rights index data (Park, 2001) 
Semiparametric 
model 
21 countries for the period 1981 and 1997 (Sources: World Bank World Development 
Indicators, 1999; and UNESCO). 
Alvi et al.  
(2007) 
Patents  
Econometric 
analysis 
Firms in the chemical, drug, electronics and machinery industries  
Mansfield et 
al (1981) 
Japanese and U. S. patent data on 307 Japanese firms (Sources: Japan Development 
Bank Corporate Finance Database, Kaisha Shiki Ho R&D, JAPIO, CASSIS CD-ROM, 
RAI patent database and Hoshi and Kashyap, 1990). 
 Sakakibara 
and 
Branstetter 
(2001) 
0 
4 countries 
 
(manufacturing sector divided into 12 subgroups) between 1990 and 2001 
(Sources: OECD STAN, EPO and PERINORM). 
Blind and 
Jungmittag 
(2008) 
+ 
                                                   
 
10 This index was constructed for 110 countries in the period between 1960 and 1990. Moreover, it is constituted by five categories: extent of coverage, membership in 
international patent agreements, provisions for loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms and duration of protection. Similarly to Park and Ginarte (1997), this index 
extends from zero to five and its overall value is obtained by the weighted sum of the values of the five categories.  
11 For the first three indexes (relative to patents, copyrights and trade-marks) the index consists of four sub-categories: coverage, duration, restrictions and membership 
in international treaties. Enforcement can also be included as a sub-category (such as in Ginarte and Park, 1997) but it was considered useful to separate this sub-
category and treat it as another index. 
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Impact of patent reform
12
 
 
16 countries over the 1982-1999 period (Sources: U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(BEA) Survey; World Intellectual Property Rights Organization (WIPO)). 
Branstetter et 
al. (2006) 
 
N/a (property rights) 
68 developed and developing countries between 1976 and 1985 (Sources: World 
Development Report 1988, Summers and Heston, 1988; World Bank, 1990; and 
Scully and Slottje, 1991). 
Torstensson 
(1994) 
N/a: not applicable; 0: ambiguous or inconclusive net effect; + (-): positive (negative) net effect.  
Own elaboration.  
                                                   
 
12
 “Each reform can be classified according to whether or not it expanded or strengthened patent rights along five dimensions: 1) an expansion in the range of goods 
eligible for patent protection, 2) an expansion in the effective scope of patent protection, 3) an increase in the length of patent protection, 4) an improvement in the 
enforcement of patent rights, and 5) an improvement in the administration of the patent system.” (Branstetter et al., 2006: 14). 
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As we have seen above, according to the theoretical literature, patent protection 
generally has positive and negative effects on innovation (e.g., Chu, 2009b). However, 
empirical studies usually find a positive effect, which according to Chu (2009b) is 
explained by the domination of the positive effects over the negative ones. As we can 
see in Table 2.2, the empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship between IPR 
protection and innovation although with some ‘restrictions’ in the sample. For instance, 
the positive result is true only for developing countries (Falvey et al., 2009; Chen and 
Puttitanun, 2005). At a first glance, we could expect the opposite result. However, while 
some works, for example Park (2005) and Kanwar and Evenson (2003), generally find a 
positive effect, Chen and Puttitanun (2005) explain that, on the one hand, lower IPR can 
facilitate imitation, while on the other hand, innovation in developing countries 
increases in proportion to greater IPR protection. Moreover, these authors state that the 
optimal degree of IPR protection may depend on the country’s development level. 
Furthermore, Falvey et al. (2006) find evidence of a positive effect between IPR and 
economic growth for both low and high-income countries, but not for middle-income 
countries. According to the latter, the positive relationship between IPR and economic 
growth in low-income countries cannot be explained by the potential fostering of R&D 
and innovation, but by the idea that stronger IPR protection promotes imports and inner 
FDI from high-income countries without negatively affecting the national industry 
based on imitation. 
Hence, when the division between developed and developing countries is 
considered, the effects of patent rights on R&D are rendered ambiguous: for instance, 
according to Chen and Puttitanun (2005), in developing countries there is a positive and 
significant relationship between IPR protection and innovation, while according to Park 
(2005), there is an insignificant effect of IPR protection on R&D. Chu (2009b), in 
giving a plausible explanation for this contrast emanating from empirical analyses, 
points to the fact that developed countries are typically close to the technology frontier, 
and that consequently economic growth in these countries requires original innovations, 
while developing countries are normally further away from the technology frontier, thus 
enabling economic growth to be driven by the reverse engineering of foreign 
technologies. Therefore, stronger patent rights, which discourage the reverse 
engineering of foreign technologies, can asphyxiate the innovation process in 
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developing countries. Chu (2009b) emphasises that the increase in the level of patent 
protection by policymakers is similar to giving more market power to monopolists, 
which intensifies the deadweight loss. The author recalls Nordhaus’ (1969) contribution 
in stating that the optimal level of patent protection should trade-off the harmful effects 
of IPR protection on society, even when stronger patent rights are growth-enhancing, 
against the welfare gain from innovation. Hence, distortionary effects of IPR protection 
could emerge. The latter author also emphasises that, when skilled and unskilled 
workers are assumed, strong patent protection increases the return to R&D and the wage 
of R&D workers.  
Through analysing the net effect of the IPR on economic growth we can state that 
it is not easy unequivocally to draw conclusions regarding the sign of that effect, despite 
the prevalence of the positive sign (cf. Table 2.2). We find evidence of both a positive 
sign and a negative sign. Possible explanations, beyond the focus on a patent index for 
measuring IPR (as also highlighted by Chu, 2009b, which mentions that it is not clear 
how each type of patent rights influences innovation on empirical grounds), are: the fact 
that some studies do not analyse the direct effect between IPR and economic growth; 
the adoption of different methodologies and of distinct samples. Hence, the gaps already 
mentioned when discussing the theoretical contributions clearly emerge here in 
association with the empirical studies. Once again, insufficient analysis, even more 
striking at the empirical level, and the excessive focus on patents as means of IPR 
measurement are evident. 
 
2.5. Concluding remarks   
This study supports the conclusion that there is no clear relationship between IPR and 
economic growth. Theoretical literature indicates that IPR protection has positive, 
negative or even ambiguous (or inconclusive) effects on innovation. 
After a thorough review of this theoretical literature it has been possible to identify 
some gaps in the research agenda. Firstly, in general, this research does not study the 
direct and net effect of IPR on economic growth. In fact it only analyses the relationship 
between IPR-induced factors and economic growth, or the impact of IPR on other 
economic indicators such as welfare, technological change, FDI, R&D, innovation, etc. 
This happens because a standard argumentation is adopted, maintaining a strict 
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relationship between these elements and economic growth. For instance, Mondal and 
Gupta (2006: 27) point out that “[t]echnological change plays the most important role in 
determining a country’s rate of economic growth. Strengthening the Intellectual 
Property Rights (IPR) is an important factor that motivates technological change”. 
Furthermore, Koléda (2002: 1) argues that “[i]nnovation is an important source of 
economic growth”. Mansfield (1986: 173) holds that “[t]he patent system is at the heart 
of our nation’s policies toward technological innovation.” Secondly, there is a 
disproportionate focus on patent measurement as a proxy for IPR, and thirdly, it is clear 
that there is a scarcity of studies in this field, particularly in empirical terms. 
Despite the divergence of results regarding theoretical studies, most empirical 
studies find a net positive effect, which means that positive effects of IPR protection 
outweigh the negative effects. A possible explanation for this is that the empirical 
measure of patent protection, which is typically used, is just a summary of the statist ics 
relating to the different categories of patent rights and so it is not clear how each type of 
patent rights influences innovation on empirical grounds (Chu, 2009b). 
From the above, we consider that more research on this specific topic is crucial in 
order to further advance our understanding of the relationship between IPR and 
economic growth on a worldwide scale, and to be able clearly to go beyond the strict 
modelling frame. 
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Chapter 3 
Endogenous growth and intellectual 
property rights: a North-South modelling 
proposal 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A modified version of this chapter was accepted for publication in Economic Modelling 
with the title ‘Endogenous growth and intellectual property rights: a North-South 
modelling proposal’, DOI information: 10.1016/j.econmod.2013.12.021.  
  
32 
 
 
 
 
 
  
33 
 
3.1. Overview 
There is a broad consensus in the literature regarding the understanding of innovation as 
vital for economic growth (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 
2004; Acemoglu and Akcigit, 2012). Moreover, Intellectual Property Rights (hereafter 
referred to as IPR) are recognized as relevant for understanding innovation and thus 
emerge as a crucial determinant for economic growth analysis (e.g., Gould and Gruben, 
1996; Glass and Saggi, 2002; Sener, 2006; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010). 
According to Falvey et al. (2009) and Chu et al. (2012), we would expect a 
positive impact of stronger IPR on economic growth. Indeed, increasing patent 
protection raises the R&D incentives and improves technological progress, which in 
turn decreases economic growth volatility, proving that a superior patent breadth leads 
to a higher expected growth rate. Additionally, it is common among empirical studies to 
find a net positive effect between IPR protection (measured by a system of patents, for 
instance) and innovation. In fact, the empirical evidence suggests a positive relationship 
between this kind of protection and innovation, despite certain characteristics of the 
sample, such as the type of countries in the study (for instance, the above result is 
significant mostly for low and high income countries but not for middle income 
countries), may bring some bias into the analyses (for a detailed analysis of such 
differences see Azevedo et al., 2012).  
Within the literature on economic growth, important contributions to the field of 
IPR have been made in juxtaposition with international trade. Several questions have 
emerged, such as: what is the optimal enforcement of IPR in a North (South) open 
economy? What are the effects of introducing IPR into a North-South endogenous 
growth model? These questions are in line with our research aims for this chapter, as 
will be made clear below. 
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Several papers have used a North-South endogenous growth setup to deal with the 
above mentioned questions, specifically in terms of what is the optimal enforcement of 
IPR protection. Sá et al. (2009), for example, discuss this topic in relation to a small and 
developing open economy, analysing whether there should be no enforcement on the 
one hand or complete enforcement on the other. Their results point to the dominance of 
a positive relationship between IPR enforcement and welfare, albeit showing that, when 
departing from weak protection choices, some exceptions may be found. Wu (2010) 
observes that there is no consensus in the literature on the relationship between IPR 
protection and economic growth, since this relationship relies on the development level 
of the country, which imposes different necessities of innovation and imitation that 
affect the impact of IPR protection. Mondal and Gupta (2009) also propose an 
endogenous growth model that analyses the effects of IPR protection on economic 
growth, concluding that a strategy of strengthening IPR in the South may lead to 
welfare gains in both the North and the South (although the marginal welfare gain is 
higher in the former than in the latter), which leads to a rise in the Northern innovation 
rate and a decrease in both the Southern rate of imitation and the South-North wage in 
the new steady state equilibrium. Thus, this strategy has a positive effect on the steady 
state equilibrium growth rate in both countries. 
In this chapter, we aim to understand the effect of introducing IPR protection into 
a North-South endogenous growth model and it is important to stress that our goal is to 
study this effect only within endogenous growth models. Therefore, we don’t take in 
consideration the other kind of models. Despite the important contributions that have 
been emerging to this research framework, the analysis is still in its infancy. In order to 
assess this latest evidence, we conducted a simple bibliometric exercise to gain a more 
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quantitative picture of the research patterns concerned with IPR in the specific 
framework of Endogenous Growth Models (EGM). This exercise is based on two 
datasets gathered from the bibliographical database SciVerse Scopus.
13
 Our first dataset 
was obtained using the terms “Endogenous Growth Model” (EGM) as search words (in 
all fields and choosing article and review as document type), whereas the second dataset 
was gathered from a similar search using the terms “Intellectual Property Rights” and 
“Endogenous Growth Model” simultaneously (EGM+IPR). The first set encompasses 
2004 articles, while the second only comprises 71 articles.
14
 
Figure 3.1 represents the temporal evolution of the number of published articles 
broadly about EGM and specifically about EGM+IPR. Articles on EGM (alone) have 
been appearing since 1991, whereas the first year in which we find published articles 
concerning both IPR and EGM is 1998. This comprehensive search, whose first 
recorded entry is in 1998, sustains the argument that the analysis of IPR in the context 
of endogenous growth models is a rather new research field. Furthermore, despite the 
visible and sustained increase in EGM related research from 1995, the number of 
publications relating to EGM+IPR has remained almost stable over the years in focus. 
As Figure 3.1 shows, the relative weight of EGM+IPR in total EGM is small, with 
a peak occurring in 2012. However, there is no clear evidence of growth in relation to 
                                                   
 
13 Scopus is the largest abstract and citation database of peer-reviewed literature and quality web sources, 
having been designed and developed for over 500 users and librarians internationally. This dataset 
includes the abstracts and references of 15,000 peer-reviewed journals from more than 4,000 international 
publishers 
(http://www.elsevier.com/wps/find/bibliographicdatabasedescription.cws_home/705152/description#desc
ription, accessed on 22th October 2012). 
14 This search procedure is unrestricted and comprehensive in the sense that the engine searches in the 
whole text. Even so, it is important, bearing in mind that any bibliometric exercise bares a limitation 
concerning the impossibility of the chosen keyword being able to embrace the whole research in analysis 
(in our case, IPR and endogenous growth models related research). 
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this weight in the analysed time period. Faced with the fact that this line of research has 
only recently been undertaken, we argue that there are still important caveats that have 
to be dealt with, and in this chapter we intend to contribute to limiting their scope, our 
original aim and main motivation being to explain the IPR enforcement effects on 
growth, in the presence of North-South technological knowledge diffusion. 
 
Figure 3.1. Number of published papers by year 
As starting points for our modelling proposal, we consider Connolly and 
Valderrama’s (2005) and Afonso’s (2012) studies, both using a similar endogenous 
growth framework, which propose analogous building blocks in their models and  
achieve interesting results. 
Nevertheless, these two articles report distinct results. Connolly and Valderrama 
(2005) focus on welfare and growth within a dynamic argument, arguing in favour of 
free trade, particularly from the point of view of developing countries. Afonso (2012) 
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also focuses on technological knowledge diffusion issues, but in relation to the 
dynamics of wage inequality. 
Thus our framework is based on Connolly and Valderrama (2005) and Afonso 
(2012), but we also draw on some studies specifically oriented towards IPR within 
EGM, such as those of Mondal and Gupta (2009), Sá et al. (2009) and Wu (2010). As in 
the first two studies, we also consider a model consisting of two economies (North and 
South) and three productive sectors in each economy: final goods, intermediate goods 
and designs (R&D sector). However, in comparison with Afonso (2012), we drop the 
hypothesis of distinct types of labour, and we do not consider transportation costs 
separately as in Connolly and Valderrama (2005). Moreover, we introduce a new 
parameter into the probability of imitation, in order to capture the effect of IPR 
protection, since it is an adequate procedure for showing that IPR enforcement aims at 
constraining imitation. Our main motivation is to contribute to overcoming the present 
gap in the literature on endogenous growth, given that most of the related literature, as it 
has been shown above with the bibliometric account, has treated IPR protection as a 
secondary issue or it has dealt with the relationship between IPR protection and other 
things, essentially between IPR protection and innovation (e.g., Helpman, 1993; Lai, 
1998; Yang and Maskus, 2001; Akiyama and Furukawa, 2009).  
Connolly and Valderrama (2005) make reference to IPR, but commence their 
analysis by assuming the absence of both domestic and international IPR enforcement. 
Afterwards, they introduce IPR, which force Southern imitators to pay a license fee to 
Northern innovators, and model them simultaneously as an increase in the imitative 
research fixed cost and a reduction in the fixed cost of innovative research. The authors 
show that the presence of IPR can positively affect both Northern and Southern welfare 
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and argue that, in a world where growth is driven by technology and Southern research 
affects that developed in the North, Southern nations can benefit from some degree of 
IPR to foreign firms. Additionally, they state that the imposition of a low level of IPR 
leads to superior steady state growth rates compared with Southern trade liberalization 
alone. Moreover, they show that the gain associated with the increase in IPR is greater 
for both countries, as long as the South remains open to imports of Northern 
intermediate goods. 
Afonso (2012) does not ignore IPR, but does not explicitly model them either. For 
instance, the author argues that the investment in a blueprint can only be claimed if 
profits are positive within a given period in the future and if this is guaranteed by both 
costly R&D and internal patents enforcement, that is, a national IPR system which 
protects the leader firm’s monopoly of that quality good internally though not 
worldwide, while simultaneously spreading learned knowledge to other national firms 
in line with Connolly and Valderrama, 2005). 
Connolly and Valderrama (2005) and Afonso (2012) introduce IPR enforcement, 
but deal with this issue in a simplified manner because their main purpose was not to 
discuss IPR. Hence, departing from modelling frames similar to these studies, we intend 
to focus our research on IPR. As mentioned above, we introduce a new parameter into 
the probability of imitation, which is treated by following the consensual position in the 
literature, that IPR protection makes imitation more difficult (e.g., Park and Lippoldt, 
2005; Nair-Reichert and Duncan, 2008; Trommetter, 2010; Ivus, 2011). Nevertheless, it 
is important to stress that there is no agreement regarding the best way to introduce IPR 
into this type of model (see, for example, Mondal and Gupta, 2009; Sá et al., 2009; Wu 
2010). 
  
39 
 
Lastly, our results are related to the IPR literature (see Chu, 2009b). This literature 
considers that the IPR effect on economic growth is unclear. That is to say, while some 
studies identify a positive relationship, others identify negative or inconclusive results. 
However, our results are in line with Helpman (1993), Taylor (1994), Datta and 
Mohtadi (2006), Furukawa (2007) and Eicher and Garcia-Peñalosa (2008), who refute 
the idea that stronger IPR are always better.  
Our work is not original neither in terms of model and mathematical formalization 
nor in terms of results, if we refer to each one of them separately. This work is not the 
only one examining the IPR in the context of product cycle model. For instance, Lai 
(1998), Yang and Maskus (2001) and Akiyama and Furukawa (2009) also use a North-
South product cycle model but they employ a different mathematical formalization and 
they study, in particular, the effects of IPR on innovation while we use a mathematical 
formalization similar to Connolly and Valderrama (2005) and Afonso (2012) to observe 
the effect of IPR protection in economic growth. In addition, this is not the only study 
which finds a given sign for the relationship between IPR and economic growth. 
According to the previous statements, there are works which find either a positive, a 
negative or an inconclusive relationship between IPR and economic growth, as we also 
conclude in Azevedo et al. (2012). In the quoted work, we verify that the great part of 
the papers about IPR does not study directly this relationship or this result is not their 
main goal. Then, our motivation is to study the mentioned relationship using a 
mathematical formalization similar to Connolly and Valderrama (2005) and Afonso 
(2012) to find a relationship between IPR and economic growth, though. Therefore, this 
work distances itself from the others because we use a different framework, a different 
mathematical formalization, which is not original but was not applied before with this 
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aim.  In this sense, our contribution to the literature, our novelty, is to develop an EGM 
with IPR protection and to try to check the sign of this relationship using a different 
approach from the ones which have had this purpose. 
The present chapter is structured as follows. After a brief introduction, Section 3.2 
presents the setup of the model. Section 3.3 focuses in detail on the equilibrium and 
Section 3.4 concludes.  
 
3.2. Setup of the model
15
 
We assume two economies with three sectors: intermediate goods, final goods and 
designs (R&D sector). The former sector operates in a monopolistic competition 
scenario, whereas the latter two operate under perfect competition. In particular, the 
R&D sector is closely associated with the intermediate goods sector: when successful, 
R&D activities result in innovations in the North and imitations in the South, and as in 
Romer (1990), provide inputs to the intermediate goods sector. In turn, quality adjusted 
intermediate goods and labour are inputs into the final goods sector. Thus, we use a 
standard quality ladder model, which, by considering two countries, also follows the 
contributions of authors such as Grossman and Helpman (1991b), and Barro and Sala-i-
Martin (1997). The final good is consumed and the fraction that is not consumed is used 
in R&D activities or in the production of intermediate goods. 
 
3.2.1. Final goods sector 
In the production of the competitive final good, we have established some particular 
premises: (i) there is a fixed number of intermediate sectors, J; (ii) only the top quality 
                                                   
 
15 The model will be solved in a more detailed way in the Appendix A.1. 
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good will be sold under limit pricing; (iii) the quality of each good rises with successful 
innovations; (iv) each quality upgrade can be considered as a step further up the ladder 
and the dimension of each step shows the dimension of quality upgrades. Technological 
knowledge is thus incorporated into intermediate goods and economic growth in each 
country is determined by technological developments in the quality of available inputs, 
independently of the country of origin. Final good can be produced both in North 
(country i=N) and in South (country i=S), by perfectly competitive firms, and the 
constant returns to scale production function at time t is: 
  ( )      
 ∑ (  (   ))
    
   ,   {   }, (3.1) 
where: 
  (   )   
  (   )  (   ). (3.2) 
The exogenous productivity level is given by a positive variable Ai, which 
depends on the country’s institutions, related, for example, to government services, 
property rights and tax law; we assume      . The labour input used in the 
production of the final good is represented by   ,   [   ] being the labour share. 
  (   ) is the quality adjusted intermediate good j at time t. q, an exogenously fixed 
constant larger than 1, expressing the size of each quality improvement achieved by 
each success in R&D. The steps of the quality ladder are represented by k, with greater 
k indicating greater quality. The quality adjusted rank of j will increase from 1 (q
0
=1) to 
q
1
 with the first innovation, to    with the second and to     with the   
th
 innovation, 
which is used due to the profit maximizing limit pricing by the monopolist producers. 
The quantity   (   )  of j is used along with labour to create   ( ) . (   )  is the 
aggregate intermediate goods input share. 
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In whichever country, for a given   ( ) and  (   ), the implicit demand for each j 
by the representative producer of i
th
 final good is: 
  (   )    [  (   )
  ( )
 (   )
]
 
 
   (   )
[
   
 
]
, (3.3) 
where   ( ) is the price of the final good i and  (   ) is the price of intermediate good j. 
Replacing   (   )  in equation (3.2) with equation (3.3), using the resulting 
expression in equation (3.1), and substituting   ( ) by the    and  (   ) by the limit 
prices presented in the next subsection, the supply of final good in each country is: 
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   . (3.6) 
    is the Northern aggregate quality index; thus, aggregate production in both 
countries depends on   , since limit pricing with free trade guarantees that only the 
highest quality technology will be used. Consequently, even when an intermediate good 
is produced in the South, its quality level is the same as the prime Northern quality 
level. 
In a scenario of perfect competition, the marginal cost,  , matches the price of 
the final good, p; i.e.,       . In this sense, the marginal cost of producing an 
intermediate good is not dependent on its degree of quality and is similar across all 
domestic sectors. We normalize to one the Northern marginal cost,     , and we 
assume that the arguments yield equilibrium marginal costs that are larger in the North 
than in the South,       . 
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3.2.2. Intermediate goods sector 
What will the country producing the intermediate goods used in the production of final 
goods be? The answer depends not only on trade barriers, but also on each country’s 
degree of technological sophistication. As the North is technologically more advanced, 
it is the innovator in pushing the world’s technology frontier further. However, we 
consider that the South may improve its domestic technological knowledge by imitating 
Northern technology, at least until the gap is eliminated.  
When the knowledge of how to produce an intermediate good is internally 
available, this intermediate good can be produced using the final goods production 
function.The marginal cost of producing an intermediate good is the same as the 
marginal cost of producing the final good,   . We assume that            , 
which allows the South to produce the same quality level, k, at a price lower than its 
Northern competitor. This makes it possible for a successfully imitating Southern firm 
to capture the international market. 
Additionally, we consider that within a country the knowledge of how to make a 
good is free.
16
 Distinguishing between domestic IPR and international IPR, we suppose 
that the former are protected. That is, the innovator is domestically protected by a 
system of domestic IPR, and in a set of Schumpeterian creative destruction, continues as 
the best quality producer. However, our focus is on international IPR, which appear to 
                                                   
 
16 There are countries that simultaneously have enforced patents which protect the lead firm’s national 
monopoly of a specific quality good and the associated knowledge. Hence, the other national firms cannot 
use this knowledge without any cost to themselves. 
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protect the innovator Northern country from foreign copies. Hence, from now on, we 
mention IPR protection to refer to international IPR protection.
17
 
Following the contributions of Barro and Sala-i-Martin (2004, Ch. 7) and Afonso 
(2012), according to the demand in equation (3.3), the monopolist intermediate goods 
firms maximize their profits throughout the optimal price, given by the following mark-
up: 
 (     )   (   )    
 
   
  (3.7) 
which is constant over time, across firms and for all quality degrees. The nearer   is to 
zero, the lower is the mark-up and thus the less room there is for monopoly pricing. 
The kind of competition handled by the firm influences the expected profits. 
There are three types of firms: Northern firms facing Northern competition,    ; 
Northern firms facing Southern competition,    ; Southern imitating firms facing 
Northern competition,   . Thus, there are J sectors,              ,
18
 and bearing 
in mind    and    (the probability of successful innovation and imitation, respectively, 
which will be presented in Subsection 3.2.3), we assume, such as in Connolly and 
Valderrama (2005), that entry and exit into     ,     and    is given by: 
 ̇     (    )    [     (    )  ]    (3.8a) 
 ̇     (        )  [(    )     (    )]    (3.8b) 
 ̇  (    )     
 
    
 
      (3.8c) 
                                                   
 
17 Relatively to the articles that we quote in terms of IPR discussion, it is important to highlight that the 
great part of them make the analysis especially in terms of international protection. However, we also 
consider some articles which discuss IPR internally because we consider that some of their conclusions 
and analysis are important to our study and to understand some issues about the IPR protection. 
18 We fix J = 1, so that n’s will be the share of the Southern market kept by each group (Connolly and 
Valderrama, 2005). 
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Thus, Northern firms challenging Northern rivalry select a limit price slightly 
below q times the lowest price at which the preceding innovator could sell, as the good 
is q times more productive than the precursor. MCN=1 is the lowest price at which the 
preceding innovator could sell in the North and (     ) is the lowest price at which 
the good could be sold in the South, as it is subject to Southern tariffs on intermediates 
and ad-valorem transportation costs,    . Thus Northern firms facing Northern 
competition,    , have two limit prices:             for national sales and 
   
 
  (     )  for sales to the South.
19
 At these limit prices, world sales of all 
obsolete technologies will be wiped out. Similarly, Northern firms challenging Southern 
competition,    , have limit prices         (     ) internally and    
 
      
in a foreign country. Southern firms,   , always face Northern competition and impose 
limit prices   
 
   for sales abroad and          for home sales. In each 
intermediate good, the firm with the highest quality employs pricing to remove sales of 
lower quality. If  (   ) is greater than     , the leader will use the monopoly 
pricing. However, if  (   ) is less than      , the leader of each industry will use 
the limit pricing to capture the total market. In Connolly and Valderrama (2005), the 
leader in each industry uses limit pricing to remove sales of lower quality.
20
 Innovations 
are drastic, so the dimension of quality upgrades is large enough for a firm in the North 
to control the international market with a unique quality level upgrade over a Southern 
                                                   
 
19 “This holds if  (   )   . If instead,  (   )   , then Northern firms will use monopoly pricing” 
(Connolly and Valderrama, 2005: 13). 
20 Even without internal IPR protection, the presence of any determined cost to mimic will successfully 
exclude domestic copy of a national product. 
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imitation, (  
(     )
   
) .21  A firm in the South can win the worldwide market by 
imitating the leader in the North (and fixing a smaller price). Hence, there is a Vernon-
type product cycle (e.g., Vernon, 1966) whereby production moves from the North to 
the South with successful imitation, and back to the North with new innovation. 
 
3.2.3. R&D sector 
Economic growth is boosted by R&D activities. Firms decide the amount of resources 
to apply, based on the expected present value of profits from successful research, which 
depends on the probabilities of innovation and imitation. In the North, R&D activities 
lead to the emergence of innovative blueprints for manufacturing intermediate goods, 
which improve their quality. In an intermediate goods sector j, currently at quality level 
  (   ),   (   ) represents the probability at time t that the (  (   )   )
th
 innovation 
will occur and will follow a Poisson process. Similarly, we also consider that these 
designs are internally protected through IPR and that the leader firm in each j (that is, 
the one holding the latest patent) uses limit pricing to guarantee monopoly. The 
probabilities of successful innovation and imitation are essential to R&D, as the profit 
yields accruing during each period t to the monopolist and the duration of the monopoly 
power contribute to the value of the top patent. These probabilities creatively extinguish 
either the extant top design (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992) or the production in the 
North (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991a, Ch. 12) influencing the monopoly duration. 
  (   ) is given by: 
                                                   
 
21 There are different scenarios of drastic innovations in the literature (for example, the General Purpose 
Technologies, usually christened GPT) but, in the present work, we will not discuss these. 
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  (   )    (   )   
  (   )  
     
    (   )  (3.9) 
where   (   ) is the flow of final good resources in the North allocated to R&D in j, 
which defines our setup as a lab equipment model (e.g., Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991); 
   
  (   )  (with     ) denotes learning by previous domestic R&D, as a positive 
learning effect of accumulated public knowledge from earlier successful R&D (e.g., 
Grossman and Helpman, 1991a, Ch. 12; Connolly, 2003);   
     
    (   )  (with 
    ) is the adverse effect (cost of complexity) caused by the rising complexity of 
quality upgrades (e.g., Kortum, 1993, 1997; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2007).
22
 
Since the South is less developed, though not by too great a margin, we consider 
that there are intermediate goods for which      , implying that there are a number 
of top qualities produced in both countries even without international trade (i.e., for 
which      ). The existence of international trade allows the South to gain access to 
all the best qualities so that it becomes an imitator, increasing the instantaneous 
probability of successful imitation of the top quality   (   ) in j,   (   ), given by 
  (   )     (   )   
  (   )
  
   ̃ 
  
  (   )
  
 
 
(
 
 ̃
)
   
 
          (   )  
  
   
 ̃      (   )
(   )
   (3.10) 
where   (   ) represents the flow of domestic final good resources allocated to R&D in 
intermediate good j,    
  (   ) denotes the learning-by-past imitations (and we assume 
                                                   
 
22  As will become clear later on, the technical reason for the existence of the production function 
parameter   in equation (3.9) is the complexity cost, which along with the positive learning effect exactly 
balances the positive influence of the quality rung on the profits of each top intermediate good firm. In 
this sense, βN reflects a positive spillover effect from past experience and ζN is a fixed cost of innovative 
research. 
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that         and      , i.e., we consider that the learning-by-past imitations is 
lower than the learning-by-past innovations). In a similar way, according to the 
empirical findings of Mansfield et al. (1981), the fixed cost of imitation    is supposed 
to be smaller than the innovation cost   . In line with Connolly and Valderrama (2005), 
the cost of imitation  
   ̃
 
  
 is affected by two new factors. Firstly, it depends positively 
on the sector j South/North technology ratio  ̂ , and indicates the increasing cost of 
imitation as Southern technology approaches Northern technology. Therefore, there are 
decreasing returns to imitation since the group of goods that can be selected for 
imitation diminishes. In this context,   influences the speed with which the cost of 
imitation increases as the technology gap drops.
23
 Secondly, the cost depends negatively 
on the interaction between the two countries,  . This is quantified by the South’s 
openness to imports of intermediate goods, M, scaled by the aggregate Northern 
technological level,    ∑  
  (   )(   )
 
 
   . Once the imitation cost increases and the 
technology gap between North and South decreases, both the probability of imitation 
and the probability of innovation are modified during transition towards the steady state. 
Also in equation (3.10),   [   ]measures the degree of IPR enforcement in the 
South,
24
   (
 
  
)
 
 and  ̃  
   (   )  
   (   )  
 
  
  
  ̂  (with    ̃   ). Hence, we fix a 
negative relationship between δ and   (   ): the greater the parameter  , the greater the 
degree of IPR enforcement in the South and the smaller the probability of successful 
                                                   
 
23 Once the experience obtained from imitation rises one-to-one with  ̂,   has to be greater than 1 for the 
probability of imitation to decrease as  ̂ rises. This assures a smooth transition. 
24 As stressed previously, we intend to understand in what form IPR should be treated in an endogenous 
growth model but there is no a consensus in the literature about the best way to introduce IPR in a model. 
However, the most part of literature argues that IPR make imitation harder and then, we establish a 
negative relation between IPR and imitation. 
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imitation. Moreover, we consider that the smaller is the distance to the technological 
frontier (the higher  ̃) the more these countries will implement IPR laws.  
In general, developed countries have higher levels of IPR protection (e.g., Lai and 
Qiu, 2003; Grossman and Lai, 2004; Naghavi, 2007; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 
2010). Nevertheless, it seems that in future research it will be necessary to verify 
whether the North has implemented IPR laws more or less rigorously compared with the 
South, since some other issues emerge from this discussion. For instance, it is 
interesting to analyse the causality effects that may here be involved: are developing 
economies less developed because they have weaker institutions, which also implies 
inability to apply stronger enforcement of IPR laws, or do these less developed 
countries fix a low level of protection, having also a low enforcement of IPR laws, 
because they intend to stimulate imitation in order to grow faster? We should bear in 
mind that some studies state that the relationship between the degree of IPR and 
innovation is not linear: it has an inverted U-shape (e.g., Furukawa, 2007, 2010; 
Panagopoulos, 2009). 
Following this line of reasoning, Kim et al. (2012) empirically study not only the 
importance of the strength of IPR, but also the type of IPR suitable for distinct levels of 
economic development. The main conclusion of this study is that patent protection 
influences R&D intensity, and thus affects economic growth. Moreover, the results 
show that patent protection improves innovation (and hence economic growth) in 
countries where there is the capacity to develop innovative R&D. Thus, according to 
Kim et al. (2012), on the one hand R&D has a positive effect on economic growth in 
high income countries and in those middle income countries that use intellectual 
property protection to reward imitative and adaptive R&D, while on the other hand 
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petty patents or utility models are positively linked with the R&D intensity of middle to 
low income countries. 
The results of Xu and Chiang (2005) state that high income countries enjoy both 
internal technology and foreign technology, which is included in imported capital 
goods, whereas middle income countries benefit from technology spillovers from both 
foreign patents and imported capital goods. Finally, low income countries receive 
essential benefits from foreign patents. Moreover, they conclude that government 
policies regarding IPR protection and trade openness have significant effects on foreign 
technology spillovers in middle income and poor nations. In undertaking this study, the 
authors use the index of patent rights constructed by Ginarte and Park (1997), (whose 
value varies from zero to five, where zero is the weakest and five is the strongest value), 
as the measure of IPR and we can verify that, in the sample, the US – North – has the 
highest value of IPR (4.55), while Indonesia – South – has the lowest (0.64). If we place 
the values in ascending order, it is possible to confirm that in general Southern countries 
have lower levels of IPR protection, whereas Northern countries have higher levels. 
 
3.2.4. Consumers 
We assume that the Northern consumer makes consumption and savings decisions so 
that he/she can maximize the present value lifetime utility:
25
 
   
{     
   }   
∫  (  ̅) 
   
 
 
   (3.11) 
                                                   
 
25 Note that the model is not without drawbacks since we consider some assumptions, similarly to Afonso 
(2012), that simplify the model. However, we believe they do not affect significantly the conclusions 
because these issues are not in discussion in the present work. We can underline two of these unrealistic 
assumptions: infinitely-lively agents maximize lifetime utility and full employment of labour both in the 
North and in the South. 
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 (  ̅)  (
  ̅
     
   
)  (3.12) 
  ̅    
   
    
  (3.13) 
 ̇              (3.14) 
          
 
  
 
  (3.15) 
 (  ̅) is the instantaneous utility function with a constant intertemporal elasticity of 
substitution (CIES), where   ̅  is the Northern composite good,   defines the inverse 
intertemporal elasticity of substitution and     is the homogeneous subjective 
discount rate.  
Equation (3.13) is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator that describes the Northern 
composite good,   ̅ , in terms of Northern and Southern final goods,    and   
 
, 
respectively, both consumed in the North (  means foreign or exports). In the same 
equation, parameter   corresponds to domestic expenditure-share.  
The return to assets,   , in the North is   , and the wage rate is   . One unit of 
labour is supplied inelastically during every period. The path of the value of assets,  ̇ , 
is represented in equation (3.14) as being the difference of labour and interest income 
minus Northern consumption expenditures,    (the budget constraint that is expressed 
as savings=income–consumption). The total Northern expenditures,   , are described in 
equation (3.15). 
As in Connolly and Valderrama (2005), and Obstfeld and Rogoff (1996), the 
consumption-based price index,  ̅ , is characterized as the minimum expenditure,   , 
so that the composite good index,   ̅   , for a given set of prices: 
 ̅  (
  
 
)
 
(
  
 
   
)
   
 (3.16) 
From standard calculations, we obtain two expressions for consumer demands: 
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 ̅ 
  
  ̅ (3.17) 
  
 
 (   )
 ̅ 
  
   ̅  (3.18) 
If we transfer these expressions to the household utility maximization problem, 
we arrive at the usual expression for consumption growth (the standard Euler equation): 
 ̇ 
  
  ̅̂   
 
 
(   
 ̇ 
  
  ) (3.19) 
The problem of the Southern consumer is absolutely symmetric: 
   
{   
    }   
∫  (  ̅) 
   
 
 
   (3.20) 
 (  ̅)  (
  ̅
     
   
) (3.21) 
  ̅    
    
  
  (3.22) 
 ̇              (3.23) 
          
 
  
 
  (3.24) 
Assuming that both countries spend the same income share on the goods produced 
in the North,      , the resulting expression for the Southern households’ demand 
is: 
 ̅  (
  
 
 
)
( )
(
  
   
)
(   )
 (3.25) 
  
 
  
 ̅ 
  
   ̅ (3.26) 
   (   )
 ̅ 
  
  ̅ (3.27) 
Additionally, hypothetically, the relative price of the South’s final good always 
adjusts to balance trade: 
   
  (     )  
 
    
 
      
 
    
 
      
 
    
 
     
 
(     )  
  (3.28) 
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3.3. General Equilibrium 
After describing the countries’ structures in our modelling setup, we go on to compute 
the equilibrium dynamics of technological knowledge which is responsible for 
economic growth in cases where neither labour nor human capital accumulation exist. 
The effects caused by the interaction between the North and South, deriving from 
international trade of intermediate goods, occupy an important position in the dynamics 
general equilibrium. 
The dynamic general equilibrium, and thus the particular case of the steady state, 
is defined by the path of resources allocation and prices, such that: (i) consumers and 
firms solve their problems; (ii) R&D free-entry conditions are met; and (iii) markets 
clear. 
 
3.3.1. Equilibrium R&D 
The expected current value of the flow of profits to the producer of j,  (     ),26 relies 
on the profits at t,   (     ) , on the equilibrium interest rate and on the expected 
duration of the flow (i.e., expected duration of research leadership).   (     ) depends 
on      ,    ,    ( ),    ( ),    (     )  and   (     )  and thus on trade. For 
example, the expected duration of the imitator’s leadership depends on   (     ), which 
is the potential challenger, since the Southern entrant competes with a Northern 
incumbent. Thus,   (     ) is: 
  (    ̅  )  ∫   (    ̅  )
 
 
   [ ∫(  ( )    (    ̅  ))  
 
 
]    (3.29) 
where   (     ) using an imitation of the top quality k is: 
                                                   
 
26 I.e., V(k, j, t) is the market value of the patent or the value of the monopolist firm, owned by consumers. 
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  (    ̅  )  (   )
      (   )(   ) 
  
[(     )  ( )  
    (         )  ( )(  
   
     
)
   
] (3.30) 
Differentiating equation (3.29) using Leibniz’s rule, we obtain the dynamic 
arbitrage equation: 
  ( )    (    ̅  )  
 ̇ (    ̅  )
  (    ̅  )
 
  (    ̅  )
  (    ̅  )
  ̇(  ̅  ) (
   
 
)     (3.31) 
 
Plugging equation (3.31) into the free entry R&D equilibrium condition, 
  (   )  (   )    (   ), and solving it for   , we obtain the equilibrium probability of 
successful innovation. Since the probability of successful innovation drives the 
technological knowledge progress, equilibrium can be transferred to the path of 
Northern technological knowledge, from which free trade in intermediate goods also 
allows the South to benefit. The relationship turns out to yield the well-known 
expression for the equilibrium growth rate of   : 
 ̂    ( 
(   )     ). (3.32) 
 
3.3.2. Steady state 
Bearing in mind Afonso (2012), we assume that, as both economies have access to the 
same technology of final goods production and to the same state-of-the-art intermediate 
goods through free trade, the steady state growth rate is also the same. This means that, 
through Euler equation (3.19), the steady state interest rates are equal in both economies. 
 Additionally, following the same contribution, we consider that the 
instantaneous aggregate resources constraint in the South, for instance, is   ( )  
  ̅( )    ( )    ( ), where   ( ) represents total resources, the composite final good; 
  ̅( )  denotes aggregate consumption;   ( )  is aggregate intermediate goods;   ( ) 
refers to total resources employed in R&D. That is, the aggregate final good is used for 
consumption, production of intermediate goods and R&D. So the steady state is 
characterised by constant growth,   , common to both countries, and is driven by 
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available (Northern) technological knowledge progress (whose steady state growth rate 
is equal to the steady state growth rates of each variables), 
    ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̅̂ 
 
  ̅̂ 
 
 
 
 
(    ) (3.33) 
⇒ in particular 0
~ˆ* Q and sector shares    ,     and    will be constant.
27
 
Hence, the steady state growth rates of both countries depend exclusively on 
Northern technological progress, while the North remains the lead innovating country. 
Additionally, international trade and the succeeding risk of losing the market for a 
certain intermediate good to Southern imitation implies that the Northern rate of 
innovation depends on the Southern rate of imitation. 
In steady state, 
 ̇ (   ̅  )
  (   ̅  )
  ̇(  ̅  ) (
   
 
)     and thus, bearing in mind equation 
(3.10), equation (3.31) becomes: 
  
    
  
   
 ̃ 
   
(   ) 
  
[(     )  
   
    (         )  
 (  
   
     
)
   
]     (3.34) 
Equation (3.34) shows that the available (or Northern) technological knowledge 
progress: 
(i) hinges on the returns to innovation, which in turn rely on terms of   ,   
  
   
 ̃ 
   
, 
through inter country competition in intermediate goods. That is, the positive level 
effect from N to S (the access to the top quality intermediate goods increases production 
and thus the resources to imitative R&D) feeds back into N, affecting    by creative 
destruction; 
                                                   
 
27  Moreover, from the entry-exit conditions, equations (3.8a)-(3.8c), it is possible to obtain the 
expressions for the steady state decomposition of intermediate goods sectors into these three categories 
(see Appendix A.2.). 
  
56 
 
(ii) is independent of its scale, since it is not affected by the rung of quality k. Indeed, 
the positive influence of the quality rung on profits and on the learning effect is exactly 
offset by the negative influence on the complexity cost;
28
 
(iii) is dependent on the market size effects. 
Taking into account equations (3.32), (3.33) and (3.34), we can reach the steady 
state interest rate: firstly, we put equation (3.34) into equation (3.32) in replacing  , 
secondly we use equation (3.33) into the obtained equation replacing  ̂ 
  and finally we 
solve this in order to   . Indeed, since steady state prices of non-tradable and tradable 
goods are constant as well as the growth rate of available technological knowledge, see 
equations (3.32) and (3.34), the common steady state interest rate,   , is obtained: 
   
{  
  
   
 ̃ 
   
(   ) 
  
[(     )  
   
    (         )  
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]} ( (   ) 
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(3.35) 
Now, we can easily achieve the steady state growth rate by using the previous 
expression in the Euler equation (3.19): 
   
 
 
[
 
 
 
 
(
 
 
{  
  
   
 ̃ 
   
(   ) 
  
[(     )  
   
    (         )  
 (  
   
     
)
   
]} ( (   ) 
  
  )  
 
 
 
 (   ) 
  
   
 
 
)
 
 
  
]
 
 
 
 
 (3.36) 
The common steady state growth rates imply the persistence of a steady state 
North-South gap in technological knowledge. While total convergence in available 
technological knowledge is immediate with international trade (level effect), domestic 
levels may not converge totally; i.e.,   
  may stay below one. 
                                                   
 
28 This is crucial for a symmetric equilibrium (on asymmetric equilibrium in quality ladder models and its 
growth consequences, see Cozzi et al., 2007). 
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While evaluation of equation (3.35) or equation (3.36) requires solving for 
transitional dynamics through calibration and simulation, we can, however, emphasize 
six ways, in addition to the level effects, through which the trade influences, in opposite 
directions, steady state growth. 
The first way in which trade influences steady state growth is the positive 
catching-up effect on the probability of successful imitation. The advantages of 
backwardness are only obtained in the presence of trade. Through the feedback effect, 
the probability of successful innovation is also affected and thus the steady state growth 
rate. 
The second way is the positive spillovers from the North to the South. Each 
innovation in the North tends to lower the cost of imitation by the South because the 
backwardness advantage is strengthened with each improvement of the technological-
knowledge frontier. 
The third way is the positive effect arising from market enlargement, which 
encourages R&D activities by effecting the respective profitability. 
The fourth (counteracting) channel is the monopolistic competition mark-up. The 
monopolist in the North loses profits with the entry into trade: the average mark-up is 
smaller under trade. The reason for this is that in pre-trade successful innovators are 
protected from international competition. Once engaged in trade and imitation becomes 
profitable, profit margins in the North are reduced, which discourages R&D activities. 
The fifth way through which trade affects steady state growth, counteracting as 
well, is that firms in the South have to support the R&D cost of state-of-the-art 
intermediate goods, possibly several quality rungs above (and thus more complex) their 
own experience level in pre-trade. 
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The sixth way through which trade affects steady state growth, also counteracting, 
is by IPR; i.e., by increasing the IPR enforcement, the steady state growth rate 
decreases. In terms of steady state comparative static, and differentiating (3.36) with 
respect to IPR parameter ( ), we achieve  
    
(   )
  
  
   
   ̃     ̃ 
   
( 
    
(   )
  
  
   
   ̃ )     and thus 
   
  
    The rise in IPR makes imitation costly in the South, 
and as a result the probability of successful imitation decreases. Through the feedback 
effect, this rise also has a negative effect on the steady state probability of innovation, 
which supports the literature that argues that the IPR effect on economic growth is not 
always positive. 
Moreover, as we have discussed above, this effect can be ambiguous. On the one 
hand, there are studies that argue for a positive relationship between IPR enforcement 
and economic growth (see for instance Falvey et al., 2009, and Chu et al., 2012), while 
others present a negative one, a result dependent on certain features or even an 
inconclusive result (see, e.g., Datta and Mohtadi, 2006; Horii and Iwaisako, 2007; 
Furukawa, 2010). On the other hand, in general, empirical evidence suggests a positive 
effect of IPR on economic growth (see Azevedo et al., 2012). However, this evidence 
can be justified by the empirical measure of patent protection most commonly used 
(e.g., Chu, 2009b).  
In this sense, we can say that the result is still pending. In the next section we will 
present the main conclusions of the chapter and discuss the possibility of following 
some research avenues in the future. 
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3.4. Concluding remarks 
The relationship between IPR and economic growth (or innovation) has been 
increasingly analysed in recent years, and IPR have become a common field of 
discussion in the literature relating to economic growth. However, the existing literature 
presents different results regarding the effect of IPR on economic growth, and some 
studies present distinct results under some constraints. Hence, we can conclude that this 
link is not clear.  
In this chapter, we have emphasized the importance of analysing IPR within an 
endogenous growth theoretical framework. Using as our motivation a brief account of 
the development of IPR literature, we have analysed the most commonly used 
mechanisms for introducing IPR into a model in an effort to better understand the 
connection between IPR and economic growth. Our general equilibrium endogenous 
growth model considers an IPR parameter in the function of the probability of imitation. 
We have also checked the sign of the effect of IPR enforcement on economic growth 
and have discussed the differences between our result and those reported in the related 
literature. 
In particular, by introducing the IPR parameter into the probability of imitation 
function, we have made imitation more difficult; i.e., we have reduced the probability of 
imitation. Additionally, in the same function, we have introduced a negative 
relationship between the distance of each country from the technology frontier and IPR 
enforcement. This distance had a positive effect on the probability of successful 
imitation because the higher the distance of the country from the technology frontier 
(i.e., the lower is  ̃), the higher the probability of imitation,   . In the end, we found that 
IPR enforcement impacted negatively on the steady state growth rate. 
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Our main result is not in line with the most common results concerning the 
empirical evidence on the topic (see Azevedo et al., 2012). However, the existing 
literature is not consensual as regards the IPR effect on economic growth. 
In this context, it should be stressed that our aim in this chapter is not to impose 
the true sign of the relationship between IPR and economic growth but to develop an 
endogenous growth model in which IPR are introduced and in which they play a central 
role in the analysis.  
This analysis suggests that there is much more work to be done in this field. In 
future research, it would be interesting to analyse, for example, the nature of the sign 
found differentiating (3.36) with respect to IPR parameter ( ), because it can actually 
rely on countries’ development level. Hence, it would also be useful to discuss the 
different degrees of IPR protection according to the countries’ levels of development. 
The main argument supporting this idea is that each country, according to its stage of 
development, can have different necessities of innovation and imitation, so it will also 
have different needs in terms of IPR protection. 
Another interesting study for future investigation is to verify whether, in 
countries where IPR laws do exist, they are strictly/effectively enforced, because 
afterwards it will be easier to understand the way in which the causality between IPR 
enforcement and economic development occurs. It will be easier to investigate whether 
these countries are less developed since they abide more strictly the IPR laws, or 
whether on the contrary these countries do not adhere to IPR laws (for instance, because 
their institutions are weaker) or arrange a low level of protection to imitate the others in 
order to achieve more development. However, the latter case may lead to the opposite 
result and may be a possible cause of sluggish development in those countries which lag 
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behind. Hence, it would be useful to ascertain what kind of countries most respect IPR 
enforcement.
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Appendix A 
A.1. Solving the model 
Starting from the production function,   ( )      
 ∑ (   (   )  (   ))
    
   , and 
differentiating it in order to   (   ) yields 
   ( )
   (   )
   (   )  
    (   )(   )  (   )
  . 
If we define the profit of a final goods producer as 
     ( )  ( )       ∑  (   )  (   )
 
   , 
each final goods firm solves the following maximization problem and respective first 
order condition (FOC):  
   
  (   )
  ⇒ 
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 [  ( )  ( )      ∑  (   )  (   )
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Solving the previous expression in order to   (   ), we obtain the equation for the 
implicit demand for each j by the representative producer of i
th
 final good: 
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Putting the previous expression into the production function and replacing the 
prices, we obtain the supply of final good in each country, respectively: 
(i) for the North, 
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(ii) for the South: 
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The monopolist profit can be described by  (  (   ))  ( (   )   )  (   ) . 
Assuming that        ,       and         we can write the profit of the 
Northern monopolist intermediate goods firm as 
 (  (   ))  ( (   )   )  (   ) 
( ) (  (   ))  ( (   )   )  [ (   )
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]
 
 
   
(   )(
   
 
)  
Then, we can describe their maximization problem and the respective FOC as 
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When   
 
   
, firms use limit pricing rather than monopoly pricing,   
 
   and  
         in the Southern case, the profit of the Southern monopolist intermediate 
goods firm is given by 
  (     )  ( (   )     )  (   ). 
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We assume that the expected current value of the flow of profits to the producer of j 
is given by 
  (    ̅  )  ∫   (    ̅  )
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]  , 
and if we differentiate the previous expression using the Leibniz’s rule, we obtain the 
dynamic arbitrage equation: 
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As, in steady state, 
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Considering that   (   )   , for the previous expression to be true implies that 
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Taking into account the previous equation and the expressions for   (    ̅  ), 
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in equilibrium, 
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Moreover, knowing that the Northern aggregate quality index is described by 
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   , we can obtain the well-known expression for the equilibrium 
growth rate of   : 
    ∑   (   ) ( 
(    )(   )(   )
   
  (   )(   )
 )
 
   
 
( )      (   ) [ 
(   )
   ]    
( )
   
  
   (   ) [ 
(   )
   ] 
( ) ̂    (   ) [ 
(   )
   ]  
Bearing in mind: 
 ̂    (   ) [ 
(   )
   ], 
  
    
  
   
 ̃ 
   
(   ) 
  
[(     )  
   
    (         )  
 (  
   
     
)
   
]    , 
    ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂  
 
 
(    ) and 
 ̂ 
 
 {  
  
   
 ̃ 
   
(   ) 
  
[(     )  
   
    (         )  
 (  
   
     
)
   
]    } ( 
(   )
   ) we have 
  
67 
 
 
 
(    )  {  
  
   
 ̃ 
   
(   ) 
  
[(     )  
   
    (         )  
 (  
   
     
)
   
]    } ( 
(   )
   ) 
( ) {  
  
   
 ̃ 
   
(   ) 
  
[(     )  
   
    (         )  
 (  
   
     
)
   
]    } ( 
(   )
   )  
 
 
(    )  
Solving it in order to   , we get the steady state interest rate common to both 
economies: 
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Putting this equation into the Euler equation (3.19), we obtain the interest rate for 
both countries: 
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A.2. Steady-state decomposition of intermediate goods sectors into Northern firms 
facing Northern competition,    , Northern firms challenging Southern 
competition,    , and Southern firms,    
 Given the exit-entry conditions, equations (3.8a)-(3.8c), and the steady state 
conditions, namely, the fact that, in steady state,    ,     and    will be constant, 
i.e.,  ̇    ̇    ̇   , we can obtain the decomposition of intermediate goods sector 
in each one of these three categories: 
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Chapter 4 
Economic growth and intellectual property 
rights: an empirical study 
  
  
70 
 
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
71 
 
4.1. Overview  
The importance of innovation to economic growth is commonly acknowledged in the 
literature (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004; Park, 2005; 
Falvey et al., 2006; Cozzi, 2009; Acemoglu and Akcigit, 2012). However, in theoretical 
terms, the role of Intellectual Property Rights (henceforth IPR) in this relationship is not 
clear. 
Since innovation (technological knowledge) is partially non-excludable, domestic 
protection of IPR increases the domestic degree of excludability of the results of R&D. 
In turn, international enforcement of IPR, by protecting innovative R&D only, would 
prevent imitation R&D, and technological knowledge diffusion through this mechanism 
would be adversely affected. The relationship between IPR and economic growth may 
be analysed in two different ways: the IPR effect on economic growth and the impact of 
economic growth on the level of IPR protection. In the present work, we only focus on 
the first causality. 
International IPR seem to be important to innovation and growth because, as 
devices to protect innovations, may operate as an incentive (e.g., Gould and Gruben, 
1996; Glass and Saggi, 2002; Sener, 2006; Dinopoulos and Segerstrom, 2010) 
Nevertheless, the relationship between the degree of protection and innovation may be 
nonlinear; the IPR effect on economic growth is not necessarily positive and it may 
depend on the development level of countries (e.g., Chen and Puttitanun, 2005; 
Furukawa, 2007; Chu, 2009b; Falvey et al., 2009). In the empirical literature it is 
frequent to find a positive and significant IPR effect on innovation and/or economic 
growth (e.g., Chen and Puttitanun, 2005; Falvey et al., 2006), although this result is not 
always clear for both developed and developing countries.  
Park and Ginarte (1997) provide a systematic study of how long-run economic 
growth is affected by patent protection. They highlight that although the existing 
literature clearly recognizes the importance of innovation for growth, only a small 
number of studies have empirically investigated the effects of institutions that stimulate 
innovation, namely those responsible for IPR. Recognizing the need of a quantitative 
measure for the intensity of IPR in each country, the authors construct an index of 
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patent protection in 60 countries from 1960 to 1990, and use it to study the impact of 
IPR on economic growth.
29
 They conclude that IPR affect economic growth indirectly 
by increasing Research and Development (R&D). Ginarte and Park (1997) construct the 
index for 110 countries and for the same time period, and use it to understand what are 
the main determinants regarding the protection strength of patent rights in these 
countries.  
Park (2008) extends Ginarte and Park (1997), updating this study up to 2005 and 
enlarging the analysis to 122 countries. The indexes presented in Park and Ginarte 
(1997) and Ginarte and Park (1997) have been used by several other studies (e.g., 
Versakelis, 2001; Kanwar and Evenson, 2003; Chen and Puttitanun, 2005; Xu and 
Chiang, 2005; Falvey et al., 2006; Groizard, 2009; Falvey et al., 2009).  
Chen and Puttitanun (2005), studying 64 developing countries, estimate a positive 
effect of IPR on innovations and propose a U-shaped relationship concerning the 
relationship between IPR on economic development. Falvey et al. (2006) also conclude 
that the effect of IPR enforcement on growth depends on the level of development. 
More specifically, they show that IPR have a positive and significant effect on 
economic growth in low and high income countries, but not in middle income countries. 
Blind and Jungmittag (2008) analyse 4 European countries and 12 sectors, and estimate 
a more linear result, sustaining that the stocks of patents and of technical standards 
contributed significantly to economic growth in the 1990s. 
Chu (2009b) emphasizes that, in order to analyse the effects of IPR enforcement 
on innovation, the majority of empirical works employ a cross-country regression 
analysis and measure national IPR protection as the index of patents constructed by 
Ginarte and Park (2007) and extended by Park (2008). Moreover, using an index or 
other type of measures, most empirical contributions on IPR use patents to measure IPR 
(e.g., Azevedo et al., 2012).  
Until 2000, as Park (2005) states, there was a small number of econometric works 
within this framework of analysis because, at that time, measures or indexes of patent 
                                                   
 
29 This index registers values from zero to five, where higher values denote stronger levels of protection, 
and it is constituted by five categories: coverage, membership in international patent agreements, 
provisions for loss of protection, enforcement mechanisms and duration (with each category assuming 
values from zero to one). 
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rights were relatively scarce. Additionally, empirical growth studies were not able to 
grade the influence of other kinds of IPR (for instance, copyrights and trade-marks) on 
growth because the available IPR indexes were commonly associated with patent rights. 
In order to overcome this gap, Park (2005) develops and includes indexes of other types 
of IPR and analyses their impact on productivity growth. More recently, Samaniego 
(2013) uses various property rights indicators such as patent enforcement, copyright 
enforcement, rule of law (which includes, for instance, trust in governmental 
institutions, perceptions of freedom from corruption) and a measure of physical 
property rights protection. 
Moreover, most studies do not analyse directly the effect of IPR on economic 
growth. Rather, they study this relationship indirectly investigating, for example, the 
impact of IPR on R&D (e.g., Versakelis, 2001), on innovation (e.g., Chen and 
Puttitanun, 2005), on knowledge spillovers (e.g., Samaniego, 2013) and on trade (e.g., 
Falvey et al., 2009). Contributions such as Versakelis (2001) and Kanwar and Evenson 
(2003) find that the enforcement of patent protection has a positive impact on R&D 
intensity, which, in turns, has a positive effect on innovation. Kanwar and Evenson 
(2003), using the arguments related with weak and strong protection, discuss the 
potential distinct impact concerning development levels. For example, the authors point 
out that one of the benefits of weak IPR protection, particularly in developing countries, 
is the cheap purchase of technological knowledge through imitation. In what regards the 
advantages of strong IPR protection, the authors find evidence sustaining that it 
promotes innovation in more developed countries, namely in some industries such as 
pharmaceuticals and chemicals. Park (2005), using a sample of 41 nations, does not 
conclude that IPR stimulate productivity growth, but sustains that their enforcement 
promotes R&D activities. The author also stresses the differences between countries 
with distinct development levels, reinforcing the argumentation above by Kanwar and 
Evenson (2003).  
Falvey et al. (2006) conclude that the positive impact of IPR enforcement on 
innovation also impinge positively on economic growth since the relationship between 
IPR protection and growth engages two effects: the effect of protection on innovation 
and the effect of innovation on economic growth. The authors argue that, for high 
income countries, the stronger their IPR protection, the faster their economic growth. In 
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what regards low income countries, they stress that the positive relation between IPR 
and economic growth is not explained by the encouragement of domestic R&D and 
innovation, but rather is due to the fact that stronger IPR incentives imports and inward 
Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) from developed countries, without negatively 
influencing the internal industry of these countries, mostly dependent on imitation. 
Finally, concerning middle income countries, Falvey et al. (2006) find that IPR 
enforcement has not a significant effect on growth, which may result from two opposite 
effects: a positive one related with trade and inward FDI and a negative one connected 
with the slow diffusion of knowledge and the disincentive of imitation. Additionally, 
and in order to sustain the previous result, the authors point out that despite these 
countries do not usually innovate in significant terms, they have skills to perform 
imitation activities.  
Alvi et al. (2007) also find a positive impact of patent protection on R&D, but 
the intensity of this relationship slows down when a specific threshold is achieved. 
About the differences among countries, Park and Ginarte (1997) have earlier 
shown that stronger IPR protection increases economic growth. Moreover, although 
R&D has a positive impact on growth rates of both developed and developing countries, 
IPR are important for R&D activities in developed, but not in developing countries. The 
explanation for this result, according to the authors, is that a substantial part of the R&D 
sector in less developed countries is allocated to imitation and also that R&D efforts 
react here to different motivations (such as cultural rewards) when comparing with 
more developed countries. In this sense, these countries may be more interested in 
encouraging a stronger IPR protection as their economies develop and shift from 
imitative to innovative R&D.  
In line with Ginarte and Park (1997), the vast majority of published empirical 
papers states that more developed countries tend to have stronger protection and the 
patent protection levels are influenced by the country’s level of R&D act ivity, market 
environment and international integration (which are connected with its development 
level). In particular, it seems that in order to increase the levels of patent’s protection in 
countries weakly protected, it is important to first promote a considerable research base. 
A deep analysis of the major works about the empirics of IPR and economic 
growth highlights a lack of consensus on main results, which seems to be mostly 
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associated with differences in the variable used to measure IPR, the structure of the 
data, the countries and time periods included in the samples and the estimation 
techniques. 
Additionally, and as mentioned above, the majority of the empirical literature 
does not study the direct effect of IPR on economic growth. Hence, our main motivation 
with the present work is to analyse this relationship based on a model developed by 
Azevedo et al. (forthcoming), and to determine the IPR value associated with the steady 
state growth rate. We intend to empirically analyse this result, also checking for 
differences between countries with different development levels. We do not need to use 
any measure of IPR in the empirical analysis because we first estimate the value of the 
growth rate and only then obtain the value of IPR, using a two-step estimation 
procedure. From the second stage estimation, we gather the estimations of all variables 
and parameters. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. After this brief introduction, 
Section 4.2 presents a systematization of our previous modelling work that both offers 
the motivation for the present study and the needed theoretical framework. Section 4.3 
details the empirical analysis. In Section 4.4, we present the obtained results. Finally, 
Section 4.5 concludes.  
 
4.2. Theoretical baseline model: endogenous growth and IPR in a North-South 
model 
In this section, we systematize our previous study (Azevedo et al., forthcoming) that 
proposes a North-South model, with three sectors (the final goods sector, the 
intermediate goods sector and the R&D sector), and firms engaged in step-by-step 
innovation.  
Relatively to the final goods sector, we consider the following production 
function: 
  ( )      
 ∑ (   (   )  (   ))
    
   ,   {   }, (4.1) 
where    is the exogenous productivity level which depends on each country’s 
institutions such as government services, property law and tax law (  is higher in the 
North because we assume that institutions are better in the North),    is the labour input 
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used in the production of the final good (  [   ] is the labour share in the production), 
   (   )  (   ) is the quality adjusted intermediate good   at time   (we assume that 
 (  ) expresses the size of each quality improvement achieved by each success in 
R&D, the steps of the quality ladder are represented by   and   is the quantity of   used 
along with labour to create the final good being that (   )  is the aggregate 
intermediate goods input share). In each country, for a given price of the final good 
(  ( )) and of the intermediate good ( (   )), the implicit demand for each   by the 
representative producer of     final good is given by: 
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]
. (4.2) 
Replacing the price of final goods by the marginal costs and the price of 
intermediates by the limit prices (presented below) in equation (4.2), introducing it into 
equation (4.1) and after some mathematical manipulations, we obtain the supply of the 
final good in each country: 
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(4.5) 
where     represents the Southern tariffs on intermediates and ad-valorem 
transportation costs and   denotes marginal cost . 
With respect to the intermediate goods sector, we consider three kinds of firms: 
Northern firms facing Northern competition,    , Northern firms facing Southern 
competition,    , and Southern firms (imitators) which always face Northern 
competition,   . The sum of the weights associated to each type of firm is equal to  , the 
number of sectors. Moreover, we assume that each kind of firm fixes two limit prices, 
one for domestic sales and another for sales abroad; therefore, there are six limit prices: 
          ,    
 
  (     ) ,    
 
  (     ) ,    
 
     ,   
 
   and 
         (the prices with the index   represent the price in a foreign country).  
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For the R&D sector, it is important to underline the expressions for the probability 
of innovation and the probability of imitation, respectively: 
  (   )    (   )   
  (   )  
     
    (   )  (4.6) 
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   (4.7) 
Where   (  ) is the flow of final goods in the North (South) allocated to R&D in 
 ,    
  (   )  (   
  (   ) ) denotes the learning-by-past innovation (imitation) - we 
assume that        and       because we consider that the learning-by-past 
innovations is higher than the learning-by-past imitations.   
     
    (   )  is the 
adverse effect (the cost of complexity) caused by the rising complexity of quality 
upgrades. 
  
   ̃
  
 
  (   )
  represents the cost of imitation which depends not only on    
(the fixed cost) but also on   (the interaction between the two countries, which is equal 
to (
 
  
)
 
, depends on the South’s openness to imports of intermediate goods, M, and on 
the aggregate Northern technological level,    ∑  
  (   )(   )
 
 
   ) and on  ̃
 (the 
sector   South/North technology ratio, where  ̃  
   (   )  
   (   )  
 
  
  
  ̂ ,    ̃    and 
  denotes how quickly the cost of imitation raises in the presence of decreases in the 
technological-knowledge gap). Finally,   [   ]  measures the degree of IPR 
enforcement in the South. We introduce the last effect in two ways: firstly, we fix a 
direct negative relationship between the IPR parameter and the probability of imitation 
(the higher the parameter  , the higher the degree of IPR enforcement in the South and 
the lower the probability of successful imitation); after, we establish a negative but 
indirect relationship between   and   (   ) through  ̃ (the smaller the distance to the 
technological frontier, that is, the higher  ̃, the more these countries will implement IPR 
laws, the lower the probability of imitation). These relationships between   and   (   ) 
can be justified by the following arguments: there is a broad consensus that IPR inhibit 
imitation and, in general, developed countries have higher levels of IPR protection. 
The consumers’ problem is standard: the Northern consumer makes consumption 
and savings decisions in order to maximize the present value lifetime utility: 
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Where  (  ̅) is the instantaneous utility function with a constant intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution (CIES),   is the discount rate,   ̅  is the Northern composite 
good,   defines the inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution and     is the 
homogeneous subjective discount rate. Equation (4.10) is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator 
that expresses the Northern composite good,   ̅ , in terms of Northern and Southern 
final goods,    and   
 
, respectively, both consumed in the North. In the same equation, 
parameter   corresponds to domestic expenditure-share. The return to assets,   , in the 
North is    and the wage rate is   . One unit of labour is supplied inelastically during 
every period. The path of the value of assets,  ̇ , is represented in equation (4.11) as 
being the sum of labour and interest rate income minus Northern consumption 
expenditures,   . In turn, the total Northern expenditures,   , are described in 
expression (4.12). 
For the South, the problem is symmetric: 
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  (4.17) 
where      , that is, we advocate that both economies consume the same amount 
on the goods produced in the North. 
In addition, we consider that the consumption-based price is the minimum 
expenditure,   , when the composite good index,   ̅   , for a given set of prices is 
given by  
 ̅  (
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(
  
 
   
)
   
. (4.18) 
From usual calculations, we obtain two expressions for consumer demands: 
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  ̅ (4.19) 
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If we consider these expressions in the household utility maximization problem, 
we arrive at the usual expression for consumption growth (the standard Euler equation): 
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  ), (4.21) 
and, for the South, the problem is similar.  
Relatively to equilibrium R&D, we consider the usual derivations and compute 
the equilibrium growth rate of     as: 
 ̂    ( 
(   )     ). (4.22) 
Bearing in mind the characteristics of the steady state and after some 
mathematical manipulations, we obtain an equation that shows us the steady state 
probability of innovation: 
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Knowing that, in steady state, the following equality is verified: 
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Then, considering (4.22), (4.23), (4.24) and after some mathematical 
computations, the steady state interest rate is obtained: 
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  (4.25) 
Now, we can easily achieve the steady state growth rate by using the previous 
expression in the Euler equation (4.21): 
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  (4.26) 
Differentiating the previous expression with respect to the IPR parameter ( ), we 
reach a negative relationship between the steady state growth rate and the IPR 
protection, i.e., 
   
  
  . This result means that by increasing IPR protection, the steady 
state growth rate decreases. In other words, in steady state, an increase in the IPR 
enforcement (  ) leads to a decrease in the growth rate, which is common to both 
countries (   ). 
 
4.3. Methodology and data 
4.3.1. Empirical approach 
Departing from expression (4.26), we aim to check the explanatory power of the 
proposed model and estimate the IPR value associated with the steady state. This 
expression is composed by several parameters and three variables:   ,   and  ̃. Hence, 
in order to implement an empirical verification, we need data about labour ( ), quality 
of institutions ( ) and technological-knowledge gap ( ̃  ). 
In this sense and bearing in mind that    (     ̃), we estimate the following 
equation: 
        ( ̃  )
  
                  
(4.27) 
where     denotes the dependent variable,    represents the country,   is the year,    
represents the constant term of the econometric model, which encompasses the values 
of the parameters of expression (4.26) (the unknown intercept for each entity - country), 
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 ,   and   are the coefficients for the independent variables and     represents the error 
term.  
  
4.3.2. Data 
The data for our work was, in general, gathered from the World Bank. Our database 
corresponds to a panel which includes 34 countries
30
 with different levels of 
development, namely developed (13) and developing countries (21), and two time 
periods: 1996-2011 and 2002-2011. Similarly to Hudson and Minea (2013), we consider 
two groups of countries: developed and developing countries. This classification is 
based on the World Bank list of economies
31
 and data for low,
32
 lower middle, upper 
middle, high income OECD and high income non-OECD countries. For simplification, 
we refer to the lower middle and upper middle income countries as developing countries 
and both the OECD and non-OECD high income countries as developed countries.  
Comparing the above categories with the United Nations (2012) countries’ 
classification
33
 we can verify that, in general, low income countries are classified as 
developing countries (but few are classified as economies in transition). However, the 
opposite is not true, that is, there are several developing countries, which are not 
classified as low income countries. Much of them are middle income countries and 
some of them are high income countries (non-OECD). The OECD high income 
countries, normally, correspond to the developed countries. 
 
4.3.2.1. Data on the economic growth rate 
                                                   
 
30 Developing countries: Lower middle income (Bolivia; Egypt, Arab Rep.; Guatemala; India; Indonesia; 
Moldova; Paraguay; Ukraine; Zambia), Upper middle income (Bulgaria; Chile; China; Colombia; Costa 
Rica; Malaysia; Mexico; Peru; Romania; Russian Federation; South Africa; Thailand). Developed 
countries: High income, nonOECD (Hong Kong SAR, China; Malta; Singapore), High income, OECD 
(Australia; Canada; Estonia; Hungary; Israel; Italy; Japan; Switzerland; United Kingdom; United States). 
31 World Bank, http://www.healthsystemsglobal.org/Portals/0/files/World_bank_list_july2012.pdf 
accessed in March, 2013. 
32 In our database we do not consider any low income country due to missing data. 
33 http://www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wesp/wesp_current/2012country_class.pdf, accessed in 
January, 2013. 
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The economic growth rate is represented by   and corresponds to the annual rate at 
which a country’s income increases. Data on growth rate is from World Bank.34 We use 
here the annual percentage growth rate of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) at market 
prices based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars. 
 
4.3.2.2. Data on the technological-knowledge gap 
The technological-knowledge gap (  ̃  ) expresses the technological distance to a 
certain country, which, in our case, is the USA. Data about the technological-knowledge 
gap is from the World Bank. Specifically, we choose high-technology exports (as a 
percentage of manufactured exports) as a proxy for the technological-knowledge gap. 
We transform the data in order to express it as a distance (in logarithm). We expect a 
negative sign for the coefficient associated with  ̃ , since, according to the related 
literature (e.g., Fagerberg, 1987), the higher the  ̃ , the lower the technological-
knowledge gap and the lower the economic growth. Moreover, as Zilibotti (2010) 
stresses, when a country catches up with the technological-knowledge frontier, 
innovation becomes its main engine for growth. 
 
4.3.2.3. Data on Labour 
Labour, denoted by   is used in the estimation of the production of the final good. Data 
on labour is also from the World Bank. We use total labour participation rate (in 
percentage of total population ages 15+). The effect of labour on growth is not clear. 
For example, Mankiw et al. (1992) state that most empirical literature, supported by the 
Solow model, indicate a negative relationship concerning the impact of labour force 
growth on economic growth. Motley (1997) sustains that a continuing growth in labour 
force participation may induce a faster growth in the labour supply and, consequently, 
in potential GDP. However, the author also concludes that labour supply does not only 
rely on the participation rate, but on other factors such as the average time spent at 
work, the length of the workweek and the demographic structure of the population. 
Hence, Motley (1997) stresses that GDP growth should be explained instead by 
                                                   
 
34  Data about economic growth rate, technological gap and labour gathered from the World Bank, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/, accessed in May, 2013. 
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productivity growth. More recently, Zuleta and Alberico (2007) show that the impact of 
changes in labour supply can depend on economic structure of the economy. The 
authors sustain that a reduction in labour supply may affect negatively the current 
output, although the magnitude of the decrease depends on the relative capital 
endowment of the economy. Furthermore, despite this negative effect on current output, 
a decrease in the number of workers can affect positively the growth rate of the country. 
Moreover, beyond the structure of the economy, Zuleta and Alberico (2007) highlight 
other potential determinants of the effect of changes in labour supply on economic 
growth such as factor prices, labour income and interest rates.  
 
4.3.2.4. Data on the quality of institutions 
The quality of countries’ institutions,  , is related with several dimensions such as 
government services, property rights and tax laws. In order to construct a proxy for the 
quality of institutions, we use the Worldwide Governance Indicators of the World 
Bank,
35
 which are constituted by six aggregate indicators: voice and accountability, 
political stability and absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, 
rule of law and control of corruption. We build a composite indicator where these 
indicators are the different dimensions considered. To do this construction, we follow a 
methodology similar to the one underlying the construction of the Human Development 
Index (HDI). Each indicator can change between -2.5, for the worst, and 2.5, for the 
best performance of institutions. In this context, we use the computation ratio 
            (    )
    (    )
 and we calculate the six indexes or dimensions. Then, to achieve the 
composite indicator (GOV) we compute a simple arithmetic average: 
                         
 
 . We attribute equal weights to each dimension to avoid bias 
and we compute the logarithm of GOV.  
We anticipate a positive signal for the coefficient of GOV because the related 
literature sustains a positive relationship between the quality of institutions and 
economic growth (see, for example, Gradstein, 2003, for a detailed analysis on the 
impact of the quality of institutions on economic growth). Valeriani et al. (2011), for 
                                                   
 
35 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home, accessed in May, 2013. 
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instance, conclude that institutional quality has a positive and significant effect on 
economic growth for all institutional indicators in analysis. They also conclude that this 
result is different for developed and developing countries, but only in terms of the size 
of the impact.  
 
4.3.2.5. Data on the control variables 
We insert a set of control variables in our econometric model in order to test the 
robustness of the estimation. We consider variables frequently used in the existing 
literature such as openness, investment, initial funding available for R&D expenditures, 
government consumption, education and economic freedom.  
 
Openness 
According to several authors, it is useful to insert a measure of openness as a control 
variable (e.g., Versakelis, 2001; Chen and Puttitanun, 2005; Branstetter et al., 2011; 
Kim et al., 2012; Hudson and Minea, 2013). We use the sum of exports and imports of 
goods and services (share of GDP) as the measure of openness, OPEN, and the data is 
gathered from the World Bank.
36
 In line with the empirical literature on this issue (e.g., 
Harrison, 1996), we expect a positive sign for this coefficient. However, although at a 
first glance if a country is open to international market, it can benefit from, for instance, 
knowledge and technology transfers, this effect is not consensual and it can be related to 
the countries’ development level (e.g., Moskalyk, 2008). For example, Chen and 
Puttitanun (2005) defend that there can be arguments both for a negative and a positive 
effect of openness on IPR. Hudson and Minea (2013) find a negative effect of openness 
on innovation and Yanikkaya (2003), using a large number of openness measures, 
shows that the effect of trade liberalization on growth is not always clear. Moreover, 
this author states that trade barriers can be positive for economic growth (namely for 
developing economies). Nevertheless, among the several measures used in this study, 
the author considers that the sum of exports and imports as proportion of GDP is the 
most elementary measure of trade amount (trade openness), and shows that economies 
will grow faster if they have higher trade shares. 
                                                   
 
36 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/, accessed in October, 2013.  
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Investment  
We consider two measures of investment in our empirical study. Firstly, we use the 
gross capital formation (GCF) (as a percentage of GDP), following Falvey et al. (2006), 
Apergis et al. (2007) and Kim et al. (2012). GCF is composed by expenses on 
increments to the fixed assets of the economy (such as machinery and construction of 
roads, schools, commercial and industrial buildings), net changes in the degree of stocks 
and net acquisitions of valuables. Both Falvey et al. (2006) and Apergis et al. (2007) 
expect a positive sign for the estimated coefficient of this variable and both find a 
positive and statistically significant effect of investment on economic growth. Park and 
Ginarte (1997) also obtain a positive sign for the impact of investment on growth. 
Secondly, we use the electric power consumption (kWh per capita) as a proxy for 
infrastructure, INFRA, as in Hudson and Minea (2013). According to these authors, the 
presence of good infrastructures may promote innovation and economic growth and, 
then, a positive estimated coefficient for this variable is expected. The success of 
manufacturing and agricultural activities is settled by infrastructure. Moreover, 
investments in water, sanitation, energy, housing and transport improve lives and 
contribute to decrease poverty. Finally, new information and communication 
technologies stimulate growth, help the supply of health and other services, enlarge the 
range of education and reinforce both social and cultural advances (World Bank, 
2013).
37
 Hudson and Minea (2013) find neither clear results for the sign of this 
coefficient nor results statistically significant. Data for these two variables is gathered 
from the World Bank,
38
 and the electric power consumption is in logarithm. 
 
Funding available for R&D expenditures 
Initial funding available for R&D expenditures is measured by a proxy used, for 
example, by Kanwar and Evenson (2003): the gross domestic savings (as a percentage 
of GDP) lagged one period, GDS. Kanwar and Evenson (2003) choose this proxy 
because they consider that R&D investment is essentially financed by internal funds 
                                                   
 
37 http://data.worldbank.org/topic/infrastructure, accessed in January, 2013. 
38 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/, accessed in October, 2013. 
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(e.g., Hall, 1992; Himmelberg and Petersen, 1994) and conclude that savings have a 
positive and significant effect on R&D. As R&D is considered to be an important 
engine for promoting innovation and, in turn, for economic growth, we expect a positive 
estimated coefficient for this variable. The data is from the World Bank.
39
 
 
Government consumption 
Government consumption is the general government final consumption expenditure 
(percentage of GDP), GOVCONS, and the data is from the World Bank.
40
 This variable, 
which we compute in logarithm, is used by Gould and Gruben (1996) and Apergis et al. 
(2007). Gould and Gruben (1996) find a negative and significant effect of government 
spending on economic growth, while Apergis et al. (2007) conclude that, for OECD 
countries, the effect is positive and statistically significant but, for non-OECD countries, 
the effect is negative and significant. According to Apergis et al. (2007), the sign for the 
estimated coefficient associated with this variable is not clear because government 
consumption can have a positive or a negative result, depending mostly on the nature of 
expenditures. For instance, if we consider productive expenditures (e.g., on education 
and infrastructures), we should expect a positive effect, but if we consider non-
productive expenditures, these may block economic growth (e.g., Barro and Sala-i-
Martin, 2004). 
 
Education 
According to the World Bank (2013),
41
 education is a crucial instrument to reduce both 
poverty and inequality and is a fundamental basis for sustained economic growth. Lucas 
(1988) develops a modelling framework where human capital is the main engine of 
growth. Several published studies use education as a control variable (e.g., Park and 
Ginarte, 1997; Apergis et al., 2007; Groizard, 2009; Kim at al., 2012; Hudson and 
Minea, 2013). Apergis et al. (2007) expect and obtain a positive estimated sign 
concerning the impact of education (secondary schooling) on economic growth. Also, 
Park and Ginarte (1997) and Hudson and Minea (2013) find a positive effect of 
                                                   
 
39 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/, accessed in October, 2013. 
40 http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/, accessed in October, 2013. 
41 http://data.worldbank.org/topic/education, accessed in January, 2013. 
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education on growth. As a proxy of education, we consider the index of human capital 
per capita based on years of schooling and returns to education, EDUC, in logarithm. 
Data is from the Penn World Table, version 8.0.
42
 
 
Economic freedom  
In line with the Heritage Foundation, economic freedom is defined as the fundamental 
right that every person has to control its own labour and poverty. Furthermore, 
individuals are considered to be in an economically free society when they are allowed 
to work, produce, consume and invest whenever they wish and when the state protects 
that freedom. In these societies, labour, capital and goods are able to move openly and 
the state avoids any constraint of liberty. Data on economic freedom index, EF, from 
The Heritage Foundation,
43
 is used in logarithm and as a moving average of two years. 
This index covers ten types of freedom but they can be grouped in four main 
classes: Rule of Law (property rights and freedom for corruption), Limited Government 
(fiscal freedom and government spending), Regulatory Efficiency (business freedom, 
labour freedom and monetary freedom) and Open Markets (trade freedom, investment 
freedom and financial freedom). Each one of these types of freedoms is individually 
classified on a scale of 0 to 100 and the overall economic freedom score is calculated by 
the average of the ten individual scores. The use of economic freedom as a control 
variable is common in the literature: Park and Ginarte (1997) use the market freedom 
index and Chen and Puttitanun (2005) use the economic freedom index. The former 
article finds a positive effect of market freedom on the growth rate. The latter expects a 
positive relation for the impact of economic freedom on IPR and also for the effect of 
economic freedom on innovation. However, the authors conclude for a positive but 
insignificant effect for the first relationship and a negative but insignificant effect for 
the second one in developing countries. Therefore, according to the literature, we expect 
to get a positive estimation for the coefficient associated to economic freedom.  
A systematization of the information on the used variables is proposed in Table 
4.1. 
                                                   
 
42http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table, accessed in October, 2013. 
43 http://www.heritage.org/index/, accessed in October, 2013. 
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Table 4.1: Variables and Sources 
Variable Description Source 
Growth rate ( ) GDP annual growth rate 
World Bank Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/ 
Technological gap ( ̃   or 
l( ̃   ) when it is in 
logarithm) 
High-technology exports 
World Bank Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/ 
Labour (L) 
Total labour participation 
rate 
World Bank Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/ 
Governance (GOV or lGOV 
when it is in logarithm) 
Governance index  
Worldwide Governance Indicators – World Bank 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#home 
Openness (OPEN) 
The sum of exports and 
imports of goods and 
services (% GDP) 
World Bank Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/ 
Investment 1 (GCF) 
Gross capital formation (% 
GDP) 
World Bank Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/ 
Investment 2 (INFRA or 
lINFRA when it is in 
logarithm) 
Infrastructure (electric power 
consumption per capita) 
World Bank Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/ 
Funding available for R&D 
expenditures 
(GDS) 
Gross domestic savings (% 
GDP) 
World Bank Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/ 
Government consumption 
(GOVCONS) 
Government final 
consumption expenditure 
World Bank Indicators 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/all/ 
Education (EDUC or lEDUC 
when it is in logarithm) 
Index of human capital per 
capita (years of schooling 
and returns to education)  
Penn World Table, version 8.0 
http://www.rug.nl/research/ggdc/data/penn-world-table 
Economic freedom (EF or lEF 
when it is in logarithm) 
Economic freedom index 
The Heritage Foundation, 2013 Index of Economic Freedom 
http://www.heritage.org/index/ 
 
4.4. Estimation results 
4.4.1. First stage 
We propose, using data for two samples, a large one from 1997 to 2011 and a smaller 
one from 2002 to 2011 (both with 34 countries),
44
 a panel data econometric model of 
the type:  
        ( ̃  )
  
                       
(4.28) 
where     represents the set of control variables and the other variables correspond to 
the main explanatory variables as identified in equation (4.27). 
For our estimation, we have run both random effects (RE) and fixed effects (FE). 
The Hausman test allows us to conclude in favour of the fixed effects model (FEM) for 
all specifications. Since some of the proposed variables are significantly correlated (for 
example, governance and economic freedom; governance and infrastructure; education 
                                                   
 
44 For the large sample, we use linear extrapolation in order to compute some values since, before 2002, 
data is available only in a two-year basis. 
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and infrastructure), we test different specifications of our model. For all of them, test 
results sustain the choice for both cross-section and period fixed-effects estimation as 
shown in Tables 4.2 and 4.3: both    and F tests clearly allow rejecting the null 
hypothesis that the cross-section and period effects are redundant. 
Tables 4.2 and 4.3 offer a systematization of the FEM estimation results for 
distinct specifications: for the samples 1997-2011 and 2002 -2011, respectively. 
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Table 4.2: Estimation results for alternative specifications (1997-2011) 
 
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VII) (VIII) 
Developed 
1997-2011 
Developing 
1997-2011 
L -0.198** 
(0.039) 
-0.202** 
(0.040) 
-0.159* 
(0.062) 
-0.162* 
(0.059) 
-0.204** 
(0.041) 
-0.189** 
(0.049) 
-0.185* 
(0.057) 
-0.188** 
(0.018) 
-0.570*** 
(0.008) 
-0.147* 
(0.095) 
lGOV 9.501*** 
(0.003) 
9.821*** 
(0.003) 
8.653** 
(0.034) 
8.990** 
(0.034) 
   8.788* 
(0.073) 
13.138 
(0.250) 
11.788** 
(0.031) 
l( ̃   ) 0.193 
(0.687) 
0.198 
(0.689) 
-0.258 
(0.652) 
-0.254 
(0.664) 
0.329 
(0.478) 
0.488 
(0.307) 
0.515 
(0.280) 
-0.222 
(0.649) 
1.023 
(0.574) 
-0.491 
(0.273) 
OPEN 0.047*** 
(0.003) 
0.047*** 
(0.003) 
0.045*** 
(0.009) 
0.045*** 
(0.008) 
0.046*** 
(0.001) 
0.051*** 
(0.000) 
0.052*** 
(0.000) 
0.049*** 
(0.002) 
0.034** 
(0.049) 
0 .099** 
(0.030) 
GCF 0.335*** 
(0.000) 
0.326*** 
(0.000) 
0.297*** 
(0.000) 
0.288*** 
(0.000) 
0.340*** 
(0.000) 
0.342*** 
(0.000) 
0.346*** 
(0.000) 
0.271*** 
(0.000) 
0.276 
(0.180) 
0 .193** 
(0.028) 
GDS -0.142** 
(0.046) 
-0.146** 
(0.045) 
-0.096 
(0.228) 
-0.010 
(0.221) 
-0.146* 
(0.054) 
-0.141* 
(0.064) 
-0.138* 
(0.059) 
   
GOVCONS -0.417*** 
(0.008) 
-0.417*** 
(0.009) 
-0.316* 
(0.061) 
-0.316* 
(0.066) 
-0.422*** 
(0.010) 
-0.398** 
(0.014) 
-0.393** 
(0.014) 
-0.263* 
(0.090) 
-0.723** 
(0.012) 
-0.107 
(0.528) 
lEDUC 13.471** 
(0.015) 
9.823** 
(0.049) 
13.395 
(0.170) 
9.551 
(0.256) 
9.315 
(0.108) 
     
lEF -16.566*** 
(0.000) 
-16.583*** 
(0.000) 
  -16.280*** 
(0.000) 
-16.248*** 
(0.000) 
-16.239*** 
(0.000) 
   
lINFRA -1.193 
(0.496) 
 -1.258 
(0.544) 
  0.492 
(0.758) 
    
Constant 84.299*** 
(0.001) 
79.263*** 
(0.000) 
11.007 
(0.400) 
5.623 
(0.495) 
72.616*** 
(0.000) 
76.061*** 
(0.001) 
79.313*** 
(0.000) 
13.551*** 
(0.009) 
43.500*** 
(0.004) 
11.482* 
(0.060) 
Summary of statistics           
R-squared 0.25507718 0.25403691 0.1988328 0.19767748 0.24186105 0.23650986 0.23618131 0.18447653 0 .28203571 0 .18388346 
Adjusted R-squared  0.24014887 0.24060958 0.18441179 0.18486594 0.22975504 0.2243184 0.22553046 0.17474861 0.25912196 0 .16798509 
F-stat (p-value) 8.44 (0.0000) 9.09 (0.0000) 8.41 (0.0000) 9.02 (0.0000) 8.74 (0.0000) 8.69 (0.0000) 9.35 (0.0000) 11.42 (0.0000) 23.90 (0.0000) 12.29 (0.0000) 
Hausman test:   (p-value) 89.72 (0.0000) 88.67 (0.0000) 62.00 (0.0000) 61.54 (0.0000) 80.08 (0.0000) 79.37 (0.0000) 72.32 (0.0000) 50.39 (0.0000) 58.46 (0.0000) 34.87 (0.0000) 
 
Notes: (1) significance level at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*); p-values in parenthesis. (2)To avoid problems such as heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we estimate 
the robust standard errors.  
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Table 4.3: Estimation results for alternative specifications (2002-2011) 
 
 
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V) (VI) (VI.I) (VII) (VII.I) (VIII) (VIII.I) 
Developed 
2002-2011 
Developing 
2002-2011 
L 0.110 
(0.529) 
0.075 
(0.662) 
0.063 
(0.702) 
0.026 
(0.875) 
0.066 
(0.680) 
0.105 
(0.521) 
0.058 
(0.713) 
0.048 
(0.774) 
0.009 
(0.954) 
-0.029 
(0.861) 
0.023 
(0.893) 
-0.833* 
(0.056) 
-0.025 
(0.848) 
lGOV 11.367** 
(0.012) 
11.905** 
(0.015) 
11.265** 
(0.017) 
11.830** 
(0.021) 
     12.109** 
(0.027) 
11.067* 
(0.060) 
30.394* 
(0.056) 
15.428*** 
(0.007) 
l( ̃   ) -0.076 
(0.928) 
0.046 
(0.958) 
-0.647 
(0.521) 
-0.524 
(0.617) 
0.237 
(0.787) 
0.184 
(0.816) 
-0.338 
(0.722) 
0.029 
(0.972) 
-0.991 
(0.206) 
-0.958 
(0.312) 
-1.188 
(0.123) 
2.098 
(0.457) 
-1.589* 
(0.071) 
OPEN 0.036* 
(0.086) 
0.040* 
(0.075) 
0.041* 
(0.085) 
0.0451* 
(0.074) 
0.038* 
(0.074) 
0.035* 
(0.090) 
0.041* 
(0.082) 
0.035* 
(0.095) 
0.046** 
(0.048) 
0.040* 
(0.099) 
0.049** 
(0.045) 
-0.010 
(0.670) 
0 .138*** 
(0.004) 
GCF 0.341*** 
(0.001) 
0.312*** 
(0.003) 
0.294*** 
(0.004) 
0.263*** 
(0.009) 
0.347*** 
(0.001) 
0.376*** 
(0.000) 
0.327*** 
(0.001) 
0.336*** 
(0.001) 
0.288*** 
(0.003) 
0.231*** 
(0.006) 
0.258** 
(0.011) 
0 .222 
(0.335) 
0 .060 
(0.391) 
GDS -0.126 
(0.192) 
-0.143 
(0.147) 
-0.080 
(0.430) 
-0.097 
(0.353) 
-0.153 
(0.142) 
-0.136 
(0.190) 
-0.091 
(0.406) 
-0.155 
(0.135) 
     
GOVCONS -0.424** 
(0.036) 
-0.399** 
(0.050) 
-0.376 
(0.113) 
-0.350 
(0.145) 
-0.379* 
(0.059) 
-0.396** 
(0.044) 
-0.342 
(0.143) 
-0.400* 
(0.056) 
 -0.341 
(0.155) 
 -1.308** 
(0.017) 
-0.054 
(0.785) 
lEDUC 2.870 
(0.813) 
-10.733 
(0.388) 
6.143 
(0.657) 
-8.156 
(0.542) 
-9.509 
(0.497) 
        
lEF -18.931*** 
(0.002) 
-19.103*** 
(0.002) 
  -19.059*** 
(0.003) 
-19.001*** 
(0.002) 
 -18.747*** 
(0.005) 
     
lINFRA -4.155 
(0.103) 
 -4.375 
(0.104) 
  -3.864 
(0.124) 
-3.661 
(0.155) 
      
Constant 111.125*** 
(0.002) 
95.317*** 
(0.003) 
31.826* 
(0.095) 
14.409 
(0.341) 
86.735*** 
(0.005) 
104.735*** 
(0.002) 
25.033 
(0.222) 
77.692*** 
(0.006) 
-8.630 
(0.321) 
8.263 
(0.366) 
-2.491 
(0.787) 
82.054** 
(0.045) 
5.006 
(0.478) 
Summary of statistics 
R-squared 0.23321417 0.22519473 0.18676501 0.1778699 0.20756617 0.2166936 0 .16969818 0 .20470566 0.13210738 0 .16822058 0.14754664 0 .33938349 0 .2083324 
Adjusted R-
squared  
0.2099076 0.20406368 0.16458587 0.15799968 0.18841369 0.19776173 0 .15219181 0 .18793741 0.12174448 0 .15323356 0.13478536 0 .30715829 0 .18493335 
F-stat (p-
value) 
6.23 
(0.0000) 
5.94 
(0.0001) 
6.38 
(0.0000) 
6.68 
(0.0000) 
5.07 
(0.0004) 
5.95 
(0.0001) 
3.89 
(0.0034) 
5.32 
(0.0004) 
6.06 
(0.0009) 
6.17 
(0.0002) 
6.69 
(0.0002) 
114.21 
(0.0000) 
7.13 
(0.0004) 
Hausman 
test:   (p-
value) 
40.42 
(0.0000) 
36.58 
(0.0000) 
33.13 
(0.0001) 
30.41 
(0.0002) 
30.20 
(0.0002) 
36.36 
(0.0000) 
24.89 
(0.0008) 
28.59 
(0.0002) 
8.83 
(0.0655) 
24.79 
(0.0004) 
19.10 
(0.0018) 
45.20 
(0.0000) 
28.42 
(0.0001) 
 
Notes: (1) significance level at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*); p-values in parenthesis. (2)To avoid problems such as heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we estimate 
the robust standard errors.  
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For the specifications I, with all control variables, we obtain interesting results: 
for the period between 1997 and 2011, all variables are statistically significant except  
technological-knowledge gap and  infrastructure; for the period from2002 to 2011, 
labour, initial funds available for R&D expenditures and education have statistically 
insignificant estimated coefficients. Moreover, initial funds available for R&D 
expenditures, economic freedom and infrastructure appear with estimated signs not in 
line with the literature for both samples. For the larger sample, technological-knowledge 
gap also does not have the expected sign. 
There is strong correlation between some variables (see Tables 4.B.1.1 and 
4.B.2.2 in the Appendix B.2.). For the large sample, we verify that the variables 
economic freedom and infrastructure are strongly correlated with governance; the same 
situation occurs between education and infrastructure. In the other sample, beyond these 
two correlations, there is also a strong correlation between economic freedom and 
infrastructure. In this sense, it is necessary to define further specifications.  
For the larger sample (Table 4.2) we define different specifications, for different 
sets of variables.  
As specification II shows, in the absence of the variable infrastructure, only the 
estimated coefficient of technological-knowledge gap is not statistically significant. 
Moreover, this last variable is statistically significant only in the specification for 
developing countries in the period between 2002 and 2011. Concerning the expected 
sign of the variables, the results show that several variables have estimated signs 
different from which we would expect from the literature: technological-knowledge 
gap, initial funds available for R&D expenditures and economic freedom. 
 If we exclude economic freedom (specification III), the results are worse because 
initial funds available for R&D expenditures, education and infrastructure become 
statistically insignificant.  
We continue to test the model by estimating different specifications (eliminating 
some variables and adding others, especially in order to eliminate the presence of 
correlation between control variables) and we get better and worse results. For instance, 
while if we drop governance and infrastructure (specification V), only the variables 
technological gap and education remain not statistically significant, although the sign 
estimated for economic freedom is negative, in specification VI, with no governance 
 
 
93 
 
and no education, both technological-knowledge gap and education are statistically not 
significant, and initial funds available for R&D expenditures and economic freedom 
have signs different from the expected.  
To maintain governance (one of our main variables), we test the model without 
economic freedom, infrastructure, initial funds available for R&D expenditures and 
education (specification VIII). In this specification, technological-knowledge gap is the 
only statistically insignificant variable and all variables reveal the expected sign. 
In a similar way, for the period from2002 to 2011 (Table 4.3), we proposed distict 
specifications in order to solve the problems of correlations between the explanatory 
variables. We start by estimating the model without infrastructure (specification II). In 
this case, technological-knowledge gap, initial funds available for R&D expenditures, 
labour and education are not statically significant and economic freedom has an 
estimated sign in opposition with expected.  
Alternatively, if, for instance, we estimate the model without governance and 
education (specification VI), labour, technological-knowledge gap, initial funds 
available for R&D and infrastructure are statistically insignificant and the estimations 
associated with the variables openness and gross capital formation are as expected. 
However, as compared with the result obtained for the larger sample, for the smaller 
sample this estimation does not remove the correlation between the variables, such as 
we stated above. Hence, we estimate the model without governance, education and 
economic freedom (specification VI.I). Results show that only openness and gross 
capital formation are statistically significant. 
Moreover, implementing an estimation by excluding infrastructure, economic 
freedom, initial funds available for R&D and education (specification VIII), we obtain 
the expected sign for all variables although labour and technological-knowledge gap are 
not statistically significant. Instead, by estimating the model without infrastructure, 
economic freedom, initial funds available for R&D, governance consumption and 
education (specification VIII.I), we also get the expected sign for all variables (labour 
changes to a positive sign which is suitable, too) but both labour and technological-
knowledge gap remain statistically insignificant.  
We can also verify that infrastructure is never statistically significant, 
technological-knowledge gap is significant only in the specification for developing 
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countries in the period 2002-2011 and for the smaller sample, labour is only statistically 
significant for the sample of developed countries, initial funds available for R&D 
expenditures and education are never statistically significant. 
According to the related literature, and relatively to the variable infrastructure, 
Hudson and Minea (2013) also do not find a statistically significant result and they 
argument this is rather common in the literature, also in line with Schneider (2005). 
However, while they find a positive estimated effect of infrastructure on innovation, we 
only find for one of the specifications a positive influence on growth. In respect to the 
variable education, Chen and Puttitanun (2005) conclude that it has a positive impact on 
IPR but it is insignificant as in Park and Ginarte (1997) and Maskus (2000). In general, 
we also obtain a positive (despite being statistically insignificant for some 
specifications) estimated effect of education on growth. Regarding the variable 
economic freedom, the same authors state that it does not have a perceptible effect on 
innovation because the estimated sign is always negative and insignificant. However, in 
our specifications we obtain a significant negative effect of economic freedom on 
growth, which is at odds with the literature. 
On the other hand, we obtain better results for some other variables. For example, 
governance, openness and gross capital formation emerge, in general, with positive and 
significant sign associated. In addition, government consumption has a negative and 
statistically significant estimation in all specifications except for developing countries, 
for the period between 1997 and 2011.  
Summing up, based on the all the above results, we construct the specifications 
Mb, the ‘better specifications’, presented in Table 4.4 and which corresponds to the 
specification VIII in the Tables 4.2 and 4.3. All variables have the expected sign, 
despite the technological-knowledge gap continues to be statistically insignificant in 
both samples. Labour and governance consumption are also statistically insignificant for 
the smaller sample. We can conclude that, as a whole, the results are better for the wide 
sample. 
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Table 4.4: Better specifications 
 Mb 
1997-2011 
Mb 
2002-2011 
L -0.188** 
(0.018) 
-0.029 
(0.861) 
lGOV 8.788* 
(0.073) 
12.109** 
(0.027) 
l ̃ -0.222 
 
-0.958 
(0.312) 
OPEN 0.049*** 
(0.002) 
0.040* 
(0.099) 
GCF 0.2705*** 
(0.000) 
0.231*** 
(0.006) 
GOVCONS -0.263* 
(0.090) 
-0.341 
(0.155) 
Constant  13.551*** 
(0.009) 
8.2634133 
(0.366) 
Summary Statistics   
R-squared 0.18447653 0 .16822058 
Adjusted R-squared  0.17474861 0 .15323356 
F-stat (p-value) 11.42 (0.0000) 6.17 (0.0002) 
Hausman test:   (p-value) 50.39 (0.0000) 24.79 (0.0004) 
Notes: (1) significance level at 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*); p-values in parenthesis. (2)To avoid 
problems such as heteroskedasticity and serial correlation, we estimate the robust standard errors. 
  
Using the ‘better specifications’,45 we estimate the regression, in both periods, 
distinguishing developed and developing countries, in order to study whether there are 
significant differences.  
As it is possible to state from the Tables 4.2 and 4.3, when we estimate the sample 
of developed countries, only three variables emerge with statistically significant 
estimated coefficients: labour, openness and government consumption in the case of the 
period 1997-2011, and labour, governance and government consumption for the 
smallest sample. For the former, we gather the expected sign for governance, openness 
and gross capital formation. Labour and government consumption have negative 
estimated signs which, as stated above, is in line with some strands in the literature. The 
estimated coefficient of the technological-knowledge gap presents a positive sign, in 
line with what might be expected from convergence theories: when a country is near of 
the technological frontier, its technological-knowledge gap is lower but its economic 
growth rate will be also lower (e.g., Fagerberg, 1987; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, 
                                                   
 
45 Note that when we obtain the correlation matrix for the developed countries’ samples (see Tables 
4.B.2.3. and 4.B.2.4. in the Appendix B.2.), some correlations appear, namely: for the period between 
1997 and 2011, labour is correlated with governance and governance is correlated with government 
consumption; for the period between 2002 and 2011, labour is correlated with governance, governance 
and openness are correlated with government consumption.  
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chap. 8). Relatively to the latter sample, only the estimated sign of the openness 
coefficient changes to a negative sign (which is not unusual in the literature). 
When we consider only the developing countries, we obtain the expected sign for 
all coefficients, labour, governance, openness and gross capital formation, which are 
statistically significant in the larger sample while governance, technological-knowledge 
gap and openness are significant in the smaller sample. Note that, only in this last 
specification the variable technological-knowledge gap emerges as statistically 
significant.  
 
4.4.2. Second stage 
In this section, we obtain the estimated value of the IPR parameter,  . We achieve this 
value residually, that is, from the values of the coefficients estimated in Section 4.4.1. 
and the descriptive statistics (Tables in Appendix B.1.), namely, the average. We use 
this alternative procedure in two stages rather than using a certain measure of IPR and 
finding, through an econometric causality approach, the IPR effect on the growth rate. 
By using this procedure, we overcome some limitations associated with the divergence 
of IPR measures used in related empirical literature that can induce some bias in the 
analysis (e.g., Chu, 2009b).  
Firstly, by using the coefficients found with the “better specifications” (ignoring 
the residual term due to the absence of data) and the averages of the variables, we obtain 
a growth rate of about 3.67 for the period from1997 to 2011 and around 4.01 for the 
period between 2002 and 2011. Then, by considering these values and those presented 
in Connolly and Valderrama (2005) and Afonso (2012)
46
 – Table 4.B.3.1 in the 
Appendixex B.3. – into the expression (4.26), we obtain the following results: with a 
growth rate of 3.67, the value of the IPR parameter is about 0.41 and with a growth rate 
of 4.01,   is aproximately 0.39. Therefore, these results seem to sustain that economic 
growth rate is higher for a lower IPR degree. 
Furthermore, we implement the same procedure for the groups of developed and 
developing countries. For the period between 1997 and 2011, we obtain a growth rate 
                                                   
 
46 We use values of Afonso (2012) for variables/parameters for which Connolly and Valderrama (2005) 
do not present values:    and  ̃.  
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about 2.85 and an IPR parameter about 0.49 for developed countries, and an economic 
growth rate about 4.19 and a   about 0.38 for developing countries. For the smaller 
period, we find a growth rate about 2.56 and an IPR value about 0.52 for developed 
countries and a growth rate about 4.91 and an IPR parameter about 0.33 for developing 
countries. Therefore, we can conclude that developed countries have a higher degree of 
IPR protection but a lower growth rate. This result is according to the literature which 
defends that developed countries generally have higher levels of IPR protection (e.g., 
Lai and Qiu, 2003; Grossman and Lai, 2004; Naghavi, 2007; Dinopoulos and 
Segerstrom, 2010). Moreover, developed countries have smaller estimated growth rates 
because these countries are near the technological-knowledge frontier and, in line with 
convergence theories, poor economies grow faster than richer ones (e.g., Fagerberg, 
1987; Barro and Sala-i-Martin, 2004, chap. 8).     
 
4.5. Concluding remarks 
This chapter has conveyed an empirical analysis to verify the effect of IPR on economic 
growth. Since the IPR effect on growth is not unambiguous and a great part of the 
existing literature does not study this effect directly, we evaluate empirically the 
theoretical results achieved in Azevedo et al. (forthcoming) by using a panel dataset of 
34 developed and developing countries, over the 1997-2011 and 2002-2011 periods. 
Moreover, given that there is an IPR measure commonly used among the existing 
studies, but which can constitute a bias in the investigation, we use an alternative 
procedure: we estimate the IPR value residually.  
 In order to do this study, we divide the analysis in two stages: firstly, we estimate 
a model to test the main determinants of economic growth within the specific theoretical 
model proposed in Azevedo et al. (forthcoming); secondly, and by using the results 
obtained in the first stage, we obtain the estimated value of the growth rate and, since 
we have the values for all parameters and variables of our model except for the IPR 
parameter, we compute this parameter in residual terms. 
 In the first stage of this procedure, we obtain some interesting results. We can 
conclude that, while some variables did not present an estimated coefficient with the 
expected sign and/or they were not statistically significant, others are in line with the 
literature. For instance, labour, which is acceptable in the literature as potentially 
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impinging positively or negatively on growth, for the period from 1997 to 2011 has 
always statistically significant, with a positive estimated sign; for the period between 
2002 and 2011 the estimated impact was, in general, negative, despite being statistically 
insignificant. The technological-knowledge gap variable only observes an estimated 
significant coefficient for the sample composed by developing countries in the period 
2002-2011. According to the existing literature, it is possible to obtain a positive or a 
negative impact of openness on growth and we find that, except for developed countries 
in the period between 2002 and 2011, openness has a positive and significant estimated 
effect on growth. Moreover, our results point to a negative estimated impact, although 
insignificant in some specifications, of government consumption on growth. Relatively 
to education, our results are not very good because it was expected a positive sign for 
this coefficient and, for some specifications, it reveals a negative one, and appears 
frequently has not statistically significant. The variable infrastructure has not a clear 
expected sign and we also find both positive and negative estimated coefficients (in 
spite of prevailing the negative ones). In what regards economic freedom, although we 
do not obtain the expected sign, the estimated coefficient is statistically significant in 
our specifications. The same does not occur for initial funding available for R&D 
expenditures.  
 This analysis allowed us to choose some specifications which we then used in the 
second stage of our procedure. On the basis of the results obtained from the diverse 
specifications (and taking into account the correlations between the control variables), 
we have chosen the control variables to use in the final specifications and we have 
arrived to what we denominated as ‘better specifications’. In these specifications, we 
have used the three main variables (labour, technological-knowledge gap and 
governance) plus three control variables (openness, government consumption and gross 
capital formation). Note that governance has not only estimated coefficients with the 
expected positive sign but also emerges as statistically significant and gross capital 
formation is, in general, associated with positive – according to expected – and 
significant estimated coefficients.  
 In the second stage, and by using the results from the first one and some 
additional calculations, we found the value of IPR for different samples, and computed 
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estimated different growth rates, which allowed us to conclude in favour of a negative 
effect of IPR protection on growth. 
 In sum, this work confirms the theoretical model which constitutes the basis of 
this work and presents an alternative approach to the most common approaches for 
analysing the effect of IPR on growth. Our finding suggests that by increasing the level 
of IPR protection, the growth rate may decrease. Moreover, we find that developed 
countries, with higher levels of IPR protection, also have a lower growth rate.  
 Further research on this issue is necessary. Other IPR measures and other models 
should be used in order to investigate the IPR effect on growth. This study is just 
another contribution to try to understand this effect and finds the opposite sign to that 
found by the majority of the empirical literature. Then, much more work must be done 
so that we can conclude the true sign of the effect in analysis. We separate countries 
into two samples according with their stage of development (developed or developing 
countries) and it can be useful to make a more detailed study in order to allow us to 
verify whether the IPR effect on growth relies on the countries’ level of development. 
Another interesting point for future research is to analyse the inverse effect, that is, to 
understand the effect of economic growth on IPR level.  
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Appendix B  
B.1. Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.B.1.1: Descriptive statistics (1997-2011) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
g 510 3.673742 3.786218 -14.8 14.76322 
 ̃ 510 0.616604 0.5564539 0.0041965 2.610868 
L 510 61.68059 8.089055 41 80.2 
GOV  510 0.5681598 0.1664209 0.2934967 0.8657532 
OPEN 510 96.3597 80.36573 18.75639 460.4711 
EDUC 510 2.728484 0.4433331 1.701512 3.618748 
EF 510 65.03392 10.63625 40.6 90.5 
GDS 510 22.70171 10.9816 -15.7957 53.1975 
INFRA 510 4212.767 3806.334 250.6307 17319.23 
GCF 510 22.66436 5.949575 10.21567 48.31465 
GOVCONS 510 15.06725 4.762215 4.997301 28.58926 
lGOV  510 -0.6092874 0.2987948 -1.225889 -0.1441554 
l ̃ 510 -0.9551553 1.113195 -5.473502 0.9596828 
lEF 510 4.161723 0.1624186 3.703768 4.50535 
lEDUC  510 0.9894346 0.1733228 0.531517 1.286128 
lINFRA 510 7.892178 1.033089 5.523981 9.759573 
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Table 4.B.1.2: Descriptive statistics (2002-2011) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
g 340 4.01172 3.745092       -14.8    14.76322 
 ̃ 340 0.6393346 0.5744231    0.0069841    2.610868 
L 340 61.65 8.169583                 41 80.1 
GOV 340 0.5677581 0.1661159    0.3012039    0.8596657 
OPEN 340 100.0407     85.00567    21.16393    460.4711 
EDUC 340 2.770244 0.4345213    1.707196    3.618748 
EF  340 65.43515 10.58809        47.6        89.9 
GDS 340 23.00692 11.30302    -15.7957     53.1975 
INFRA 340 4359.588     3819.988     376.687    17319.23 
GCF 340 22.91686     6.193413     11.0217    48.31465 
GOVCONS 340 15.27431     4.655923    6.313539    28.58926 
lGOV 340 -0.6097436 0.2978306 -1.199968 -0.1512117 
l ̃ 340 -0.8953886 1.059876 -4.964116 0.9596828 
lEF 340 4.168387     0.1584782    3.862833    4.498698 
lEDUC 340 1.005578     0.1676385    0.5348523    1.286128 
lINFRA 340 7.952117     1.002226    5.931415    9.759573 
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Table 4.B.1.3: Descriptive Statistics (1997-2011, developed countries) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
g 195 2.847615     3.381145   -14.07228    14.76322 
 ̃ 195 0.8634897    0.5414338    0.2083888    2.610868 
L 195 59.70051     6.548318        47.2        68.3 
GOV 195 0.7455198     0.0735799    0.5889007    0.8657532 
OPEN 195 125.4406      114.323    18.75639    460.4711 
EDUC 195 3.060762     0.2773383    2.470783    3.618748 
EF  195 73.87513     9.130828        55.8        90.5 
GDS 195 24.26939      8.86375    11.29243     53.1975 
INFRA 195 7837.536     3606.923    3188.382    17319.23 
GCF 195 22.20062     4.671904    12.16775    38.69689 
GOVCONS 195 17.63167     4.736474    8.043869    28.58926 
lGOV 195 -0.2987091     0.1016224   -0.5294977   -0.1441554 
l ̃ 195 -0.3216852     0.5901649   -1.568349    0.9596828 
lEF 195 4.294669     0.1250057    4.021774     4.50535 
lEDUC 195 1.114554     0.0910726    0.9045349    1.286128 
lINFRA 195 8.875444     0.4173701    8.067268    9.759573 
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Table 4.B.1.4: Descriptive Statistics (2002-2011, developed countries) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
g 130 2.558483     3.529498   -14.07228    14.76322 
 ̃ 130 0.8875917     0.5648435    0.2083888    2.610868 
L 130 59.83923     6.463655        48.3        68.3 
GOV 130 0.7446407     0.0737624    0.5889007    0.8596657 
OPEN 130 131.0608     122.8263    21.16393    460.4711 
EDUC 130 3.095711     0.2696302    2.600136    3.618748 
EF  130 74.93038     8.642805        60.6        89.9 
GDS 130 24.12942     8.945888    11.29243     53.1975 
INFRA 130 8019.341     3558.345    3545.171    17319.23 
GCF 130 21.45144     4.606044    12.16775    38.69689 
GOVCONS 130 17.85326     4.710555    8.418385    28.58926 
lGOV 130 -0.2999494     0.1025477   -0.5294977   -0.1512117 
l ̃ 130 -0.3013061     0.6053532   -1.568349    0.9596828 
lEF 130 4.309898     0.1161837    4.104295    4.498698 
lEDUC 130 1.126235     0.0874531    0.9555637    1.286128 
lINFRA 130 8.904984     0.4021486    8.173342    9.759573 
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Table 4.B.1.5: Descriptive Statistics (1997-2011, developing countries) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
g 315 4.185154     3.935563       -14.8    14.24365 
 ̃ 315 0.46377     0.5094409    0.0041965    2.398365 
L 315 62.90635     8.696706          41        80.2 
GOV 315 0.4583655      0.099611    0.2934967    0.7498185 
OPEN 315 78.35721     39.29807    22.22955    220.4068 
EDUC 315 2.522789     0.4000866    1.701512    3.244556 
EF  315 59.56079      7.29944        40.6       78.45 
GDS 315 21.73125     12.01981    -15.7957    52.65314 
INFRA 315 1968.863     1495.652    250.6307      6485.8 
GCF 315 22.95144     6.608965    10.21567    48.31465 
GOVCONS 315 13.47975     4.036063    4.997301    27.39892 
lGOV 315 -0.8015501     0.2033616   -1.225889   -0.2879241 
l ̃ 315 -1.347303     1.179028   -5.473502    0.8747873 
lEF 315 4.079422     0.1238399    3.703768    4.362462 
lEDUC 315 0.9119799     0.1668291     0.531517    1.176978 
lINFRA 315 7.283489     0.8064458    5.523981     8.77737 
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Table 4.B.1.6: Descriptive Statistics (2002-2011, developing countries) 
Variable Observations Mean Standard deviation Minimum Maximum 
g 210 4.911343     3.596392       -14.8    14.24365 
 ̃ 210 0.4856516     0.5255567    0.0069841    2.398365 
L 210 62.77095     8.897603          41        80.1 
GOV 210 0.4582593     0.0994577    0.3012039    0.7498185 
OPEN 210 80.83781     37.94599      29.065    210.3743 
EDUC 210 2.568765     0.3933194    1.707196    3.244556 
EF  210 59.55714     6.703573        47.6       78.45 
GDS 210 22.31203     12.51241    -15.7957    52.65314 
INFRA 210 2094.027     1537.949     376.687      6485.8 
GCF 210 23.82402     6.852752     11.0217    48.31465 
GOVCONS 210 13.67783      3.84286    6.313539    23.76387 
lGOV 210 -0.801521     0.2018318   -1.199968   -0.2879241 
l ̃ 210 -1.263154     1.113756   -4.964116    0.8747873 
lEF 210 4.080785     0.1106295    3.862833    4.362462 
lEDUC 210 0.9308865     0.1618687    0.5348523    1.176978 
lINFRA 210 7.362247     0.7842514    5.931415     8.77737 
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B.2. Correlation matrixes  
 
Table 4.B.2.1: Correlation matrix (1997-2011) 
 L      lGOV l ̃  OPEN  GCF      GDS lEF   GOVCONS  lEDUC    lINFRA 
L 1.0000          
lGOV -0.2211 1.0000         
 ̃ 0.0982    0.4946 1.0000        
OPEN -0.0721    0.3076    0.3475 1.0000       
GCF 0.1259   -0.0193    0.1428 0.1089 1.0000      
GDS 0.3293    0.1664 0.4321 0.3870 0.4258 1.0000     
lEF 0.1126 0.7566 0.4248 0.3926 -0.0703 0.1984 1.0000    
GOVCONS -0.3829 0.2721 0.1398 -0.1659 -0.1271 -0.2600 -0.0387 1.0000   
lEDUC -0.2408 0.5708 0.3373 0.1287 -0.0548 0.0368 0.3362 0.5288 1.0000  
lINFRA -0.2926 0.7777 0.4106 0.2434 -0.0097 0.1871 0.5180 0.4714 0.8144 1.0000 
 
Table 4.B.2.2: Correlation matrix (2002-2011) 
 
 
L      lGOV l ̃  OPEN  GCF      GDS lEF   GOVCONS     lEDUC    lINFRA 
L 1.0000          
lGOV -0.2109 1.0000         
 ̃ 0.0954    0.5027 1.0000        
OPEN -0.0246    0.3314    0.3706 1.0000       
GCF 0.1179      -0.1296 0.0587   -0.0131 1.0000      
GDS 0.4015    0.1345    0.4180    0.4367 0.3462 1.0000     
lEF 0.0555    0.8324    0.4132    0.4335 -0.1998    0.1387 1.0000    
GOVCONS -0.3769    0.2899    0.1167   -0.2126 -0.1584   -0.3238    0.0382 1.0000   
lEDUC -0.2481    0.5764    0.3398    0.1195 -0.1380    0.0159    0.4204    0.5209 1.0000  
lINFRA -0.2840    0.7848    0.4292    0.2461 -0.0802    0.1517    0.6073    0.4695    0.8058 1.0000 
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Table 4.B.2.3: Correlation matrix (1997-2011, developed countries) 
 L      lGOV l ̃  OPEN  GCF      GDS lEF   GOVCONS     lEDUC    lINFRA 
L 1.0000          
lGOV 0.7684 1.0000         
 ̃ 0.1100    0.2908 1.0000        
OPEN 0.0309 0.1380    0.3683 1.0000       
GCF 0.1498    0.0484   -0.2615    0.2395 1.0000      
GDS 0.3678    0.3080    0.1786    0.7034    0.4903 1.0000     
lEF 0.7815    0.6531    0.1730    0.4536    0.2087    0.5348 1.0000    
GOVCONS -0.5397   -0.6065   -0.2177   -0.5546   -0.2952   -0.6655   -0.7248 1.0000   
lEDUC 0.1592   -0.0679   -0.2222   -0.4687    0.0443   -0.4042   -0.0896    0.3444 1.0000  
lINFRA 0.7600    0.5336   -0.0763   -0.2836   -0.0831    0.0632    0.4262   -0.1999    0.4384 1.0000 
 
Table 4.B.2.4: Correlation matrix (2002-2011, developed countries) 
 L      lGOV l ̃  OPEN  GCF      GDS lEF   GOVCONS     lEDUC    lINFRA 
L 1.0000          
lGOV 0.7704 1.0000         
 ̃ 0.0854    0.3034 1.0000        
OPEN 0.0378    0.1788    0.3317 1.0000       
GCF 0.1639    0.0903   -0.4208    0.1227 1.0000      
GDS 0.3827    0.3405    0.1581       0.7302 0.4119 1.0000     
lEF 0.7845    0.7224    0.1467    0.4930    0.2033    0.5396 1.0000    
GOVCONS -0.5273   -0.6118   -0.1936   -0.6146   -0.2452   -0.6944   -0.7495 1.0000   
lEDUC 0.1538   -0.0589   -0.2237   -0.4773    0.2046   -0.3921   -0.0958    0.3176 1.0000  
lINFRA 0.7717    0.5076   -0.0862   -0.2809    0.0279    0.0652    0.4220   -0.1989    0.4468 1.0000 
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Table 4.B.2.5: Correlation matrix (1997-2011, developing countries) 
 L      lGOV l ̃  OPEN  GCF      GDS lEF   GOVCONS     lEDUC    lINFRA 
L 1.0000          
lGOV -0.3188 1.0000         
 ̃ 0.2371    0.2423 1.0000        
OPEN -0.0949    0.2380    0.3566 1.0000       
GCF 0.1056    0.0558    0.2918    0.0730 1.0000      
GDS 0.3572    0.0917    0.4930    0.1428    0.4190 1.0000     
lEF 0.1014    0.5113    0.2187    0.0852   -0.1508   -0.0014 1.0000    
GOVCONS -0.2411    0.0089   -0.0118    0.0483   -0.0228   -0.1819   -0.2525 1.0000   
lEDUC -0.2460    0.2722    0.1687    0.3449   -0.0407    0.0588   -0.0363    0.4353 1.0000  
lINFRA -0.4690    0.4154    0.1586    0.3902    0.0866    0.1802   -0.0429    0.4512    0.7610 1.0000 
 
Table 4.B.2.6: Correlation matrix (2002-2011, developing countries) 
 L      lGOV l ̃  OPEN  GCF      GDS lEF   GOVCONS     lEDUC    lINFRA 
L 1.0000          
lGOV -0.3245 1.0000         
 ̃ 0.2237 0.2687 1.0000        
OPEN -0.1221 0.2471 0.3720 1.0000       
GCF 0.0655 0.0313 0.2916 0.0292 1.0000      
GDS 0.4359    0.0757    0.4968    0.0449    0.3556 1.0000     
lEF 0.0112    0.6391    0.1749    0.1051   -0.2326   -0.0745 1.0000    
GOVCONS -0.2528    0.0386   -0.0625    0.0899   -0.0120   -0.2598   -0.1613 1.0000   
lEDUC -0.2671    0.2866    0.1834    0.3291   -0.0948    0.0502    0.0849    0.4265 1.0000  
lINFRA -0.4690    0.4409    0.2088    0.3626    0.1055    0.1594    0.0979    0.4351    0.7414 1.0000 
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B.3. Parameters and variables 
 
Table 4.B.3.1: Values of parameters and variables 
Parameter Value  Parameter  Value  Variable Value  
  0.7   1.5    3.5 
  3.5     0.01    3 
  0.00000025*    0.6    5 
  2    2    6.25 
  0.02     1  ̃ 0.35 
  3     0.8   
*From Connolly and Valderrama (2005) we know that     and which   (
 
  
)
 
. As the Northern aggregate quality index,   , is considered to be huge, the ratio will be 
small, it will be higher than zero but relatively close, then, we consider the ratio equal to 0.0005 and obtain             . In the graph below we can state that the value 
of the IPR parameter is not much sensitive to changes in the ratio (the graph is done with data of all countries in the period between 1997 and 2011 and data from the ‘better 
specification’ for this sample). 
Graph 4.B.3.1: The value of the ratio  
 
  
 
 
Figure 4.B.3.1. IPR parameter sensibility to (M/QN)
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5.1. Overview 
Population ageing, especially in the most developed countries, has become an important 
matter in the economic and social debate. In this sense, and according to, for example, 
Prettner (2009, 2013), this topic has been discussed both in academic approaches and in 
public forums (see, for instance, Bloom et al. 2008, 2010a, 2011; The Economist 2009, 
2011).  
In accordance with Nagarajan et al. (2013), although the increase of longevity and 
the decrease of mortality rates can be seen as important outcomes of medical science 
advances, these two facts and the decrease of fertility rates can represent a serious 
economic problem because they are synonymous of ageing populations in many 
developed countries (see, for example, Harper and Leeson, 2009). The diminution of 
population growth is also a reality in several countries and it is mainly justified by the 
adult working-age population surpassing the child population (see, for instance, Mason 
and Lee, 2011).  
Several works have studied the impact of ageing on economic growth (e.g., Lindh 
and Malmberg, 2009; Bloom et al., 2010b; Eiras and Niepelt, 2012; Prettner, 2009, 
2013). Groezen et al. (2005) show that, while in a closed country, the effect of rising 
longevity on growth can rely on the substitutability of labour and capital, in a small 
open country ageing unequivocally declines long-run growth. Bloom et al. (2010b) state 
that population ageing decreases labour force participation and saving rates; therefore, 
the concerns about an eventual reducing of economic growth associated with this 
phenomenon are increasing. Nevertheless, the authors conclude that this effect may 
have a discreet impact regarding the decrease of the economic growth rate in OECD 
countries, but not a devastating effect. Relatively to non-OECD countries, they express 
that population ageing will not significantly inhibit the economic growth speed in 
developing countries.  
Narciso (2010) also finds a negative relationship between population ageing and 
economic growth because, according to his study, ageing leads to a decrease in the 
human capital stock, which, in turn, will impact negatively on economic growth. Also, 
Eiras and Niepelt (2012), Lisenkova et al. (2012) and Walder and Döring (2012) 
support the negative relationship between population ageing and economic growth, even 
indirectly. However, this negative relationship is not always advocated. For example, 
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Hazan and Zoabi (2006) show how health and longevity can play an important role in 
the transition process from stagnation to growth of a certain country. According to Lee 
et al. (2011), a positive effect of ageing on growth is possible when the share of active 
working age population is higher than the non-working population share (see, also, 
Cervellati and Sunde, 2005; Prettner, 2009, 2013).  
Our main motivation with the present work is to address the impact of ageing on 
economic growth, by extending Azevedo et al. (forthcoming) with the introduction of 
ageing population (in line with Blanchard, 1985) and, to study whether this change has 
significant impact on the effect of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) on economic 
growth. Moreover, we also extend the model in Azevedo et al. (2014) by analysing its 
functioning in the presence of an additional sector: the health care sector – in line with 
Kuhn and Prettner (2012).   
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. After these introductory remarks, 
Section 5.2 presents the setup of the model. Section 5.3 analyses the equilibrium and 
Section 5.4 concludes.  
 
5.2. Setup of the model 
The framework of this study is similar to Azevedo et al. (forthcoming) and is also based 
on Kuhn and Prettner (2012). Bearing in mind these contributions, we describe the 
fundamental considerations about the model’s structure, emphasising the main 
differences: the changes introduced by considering ageing population and an additional 
sector, the health care sector. 
Following Kuhn and Prettner (2012), we use an overlapping generations structure 
in the spirit of Blanchard (1985) into a model similar to Romer’s (1990), where the 
R&D investments are the main engine of endogenous economic growth. The economy 
is constituted by four sectors: final goods sector, intermediate goods sector, R&D sector 
and health care sector. The sector of final goods, the R&D sector and the health care 
sector are supposed to operate under perfect competition, while the intermediate goods 
sector produces under monopolistically competition. Moreover, taking into account 
Kuhn and Prettner (2012), it is assumed perfect labour mobility in the sectors that use 
labour: final goods and health care. 
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Relatively to demographic properties, we consider, such as in Romer’s (1990) 
model, a stationary population which is comprised by several groups of people, 
identified by their date of birth,   . In line with this, we assume that the birth rate (being 
comparable to the period fertility rate in a certain context) is equal to the mortality rate, 
 . At a given moment     , each of these cohorts is composed by an amount of 
 (    ) agents. Bearing in mind Blanchard (1985) and according to Kuhn and Prettner 
(2012), we consider that agents face a constant risk of death at each instant,  , which 
equals the fraction of the population dying at each moment due to the law of large 
numbers. 
Additionally, it is important to highlight that, although we assume increases in the 
health care level lead to decreases in the mortality rate which, in turn, mean 
proportional decreases in the birth rate, this is not consistent with changes in fertility 
decisions but just with an ‘accounting effect’. That is, such as Kuhn and Prettner (2012), 
we consider that for a constant cohort fertility rate, a reduction in mortality must lead to 
a one-to-one reduction in period fertility. Moreover, with rising longevity, agents extend 
a constant number of births through a longer lifespan which implies, statistically, that 
there are less newborn children at each moment in time and consequently the birth rate 
is inferior. In fact, this is in line with the evidence which suggests that the decrease in 
period fertility rates detected over the past years cannot imply a decrease in cohort 
fertility but can be caused by the postponement of fertility through a lifespan of 
increasing duration (see, for instance, Bongaarts and Sobotka, 2012). 
 
5.2.1. Consumers 
Following Prettner (2009) and Kuhn and Prettner (2012), we assume that the Northern 
consumer makes consumption and saving decisions in order to maximize the present 
value lifetime: 
  ∫  (  ̅) 
 (    )(    )
 
  
   (5.1) 
where, 
 (  ̅)  (
  ̅
     
   
), (5.2) 
  ̅    
   
    . (5.3) 
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s.t. 
 ̇  (       )   (   )                       (5.4) 
where, 
               
 
  
 
. (5.5) 
 
We use a constant intertemporal elasticity of substitution (CIES) instantaneous 
utility function,  (  ̅), where   ̅ denotes the Northern composite good,   refers to the 
inverse intertemporal elasticity of substitution and     represents the homogeneous 
subjective discount rate. Equation (5.3) is a Cobb-Douglas aggregator that defines the 
Northern composite good,   ̅, in terms of Northern and Southern final goods,    and 
  
 
, respectively, both consumed in the North (  means foreign or exports). In the same 
equation, parameter   corresponds to domestic expenditure-share.  
The set of expressions (5.1)-(5.5) present the modified individual’s lifetime utility 
and the modified budget constraint (the path of the value of assets) where    
corresponds to the date of birth of a given generational group and     refers to the 
mortality rate. This last rate increases the discount rate of agents because individuals 
face the risk of death and, hence, they postpone consumption lesser than in the case of 
lifetime certainty. Similarly to Prettner (2009, 2013), we assume that, within a given 
cohort, the wealth of dead agents is redistributed by those who survived. Consequently, 
the real rate of return is increased by the mortality rate. We also consider that there is a 
tax on labour income similar to contributions for social security applied by the 
government. Below, when describing the health care sector, we stress how the public 
share of health care is supported by this tax.  
According to Kuhn and Prettner (2012), in the consumers’ problem we assume 
that the agents expend their earnings both on consumption and on private health care. In 
the wealth constraint, expression (5.4),   denotes the individual assets stock,    is the 
return of the assets and     refers to the rate depreciation;    represents the agent’s 
(yearly) wage income, where   is the wage rate and   is the agent’s inelastic yearly 
labour supply (similarly to Papageorgiou, 2002, with the human capital, we establish 
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        where    and    are the fractions of workers allocated to the production of 
the final good and to the health sector);   [   ] denotes the tax on labour income;   is 
the earnings from dividends (net of new investments);         refers to Northern 
consumption expenditures (which can be defined as           ̅ ̅  as it is possible 
to deduce through the equations presented in Connolly and Valderrama, 2005 – see 
Appendix C.1.); and      represents the private health care payments, where    is the 
unit price,   denotes the total amount of health care and   [   ] refers to the private 
finance share.  
Solving the maximization problem, we obtain the following individual Euler 
equation: 
 ̇ 
  
  ̂̅   
 
 
(     
 ̇ 
  
  )  (5.6) 
 
which allows us to conclude that the consumption only grows when the rate of return on 
assets surpasses the sum of the capital depreciation rate, the price growth and the 
subjective time discount rate.   
In the South, the problem is symmetric. 
 
5.2.2. Aggregate capital stock and aggregate consumption 
The individual Euler equation presented in equation (5.6) is similar to the one that 
emerged in the case with no lifetime uncertainty as in Azevedo et al. (forthcoming). 
Nevertheless, in the present setting we assume, not just a representative agent, but rather 
individuals are considered to be heterogeneous relatively to age and wealth 
accumulation because elderly people has more time to accumulate positive capital. 
Then, we employ some aggregation rules (following Prettner, 2009, 2013 and Kuhn and 
Prettner, 2012; see also Heijdra and van der Ploeg, 2002) to obtain the law of motion for 
the aggregate capital and to the economy-wide (“aggregate”) Euler equation: 
 ( )  ∫  (    ) (    )   
 
  
  (5.7) 
  ( )  ∫   (    ) (    )   
 
  
, (5.8) 
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where ( ) refers to the aggregate capital. Considering that, with a constant population, 
each generational group has the size     (    )  at a given point of time     , and 
that, at time  , total population size is given by ∫     (    )   
 
  
, we obtain: 
 ( )    ∫  (    ) 
 (    )   
 
  
, (5.9) 
  ( )    ∫   (    ) 
 (    )   
 
  
. (5.10) 
After some mathematical operations (see Appendix C.2.), and similarly to Kuhn 
and Prettner (2012), we arrive at the expressions for the Northern law of motion of the 
aggregate capital and for the Northern aggregate Euler equation: 
 ̇  (    ) ( )    ( )  (   )  ( )    ( )          (5.11) 
 ̇ 
  
  ̂̅  
 
 
(     
 ̇ 
  
  )      , (5.12) 
where   ( ) ,   ( ) ,   ( )  and    refers to Northern aggregate expenditures, 
aggregate labour income, aggregate (net) dividends and aggregate health care 
consumption, respectively;    
  ( )   (   )
  ( )
 [   ] . By observing the above 
expression, we can verify that the aggregate Euler equation differs from the individual 
Euler equation in the term    
  ( )   (   ) 
  ( )
 [    ].  
As the consumption of the newborns,   (   ), is always lower than aggregate 
consumption,   ( ) , individual consumption growth will be higher than aggregate 
consumption growth. A possible explanation for this is that, at each moment, a 
proportion   of elder and richer agents die and are substituted by poorer newborns. 
Since these individuals can barely afford consumption comparing with the eldest, the 
aggregate consumption growth, as compared to individual consumption growth, is 
slowed by the replacement of generations (see also Heijdra and van der Ploeg, 2002). 
Moreover, such as Kuhn and Prettner (2012), we assume the term   is constant over 
time because it can be written as  
   (    )
  ( )
  ( )  
 (5.13) 
(see Appendix C.2.), which is constant when the aggregate financial wealth,   ( ), 
grows at the same rate as the aggregate Northern consumption expenditures, 
  ( )     ( ). 
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5.2.3. Health care sector 
Bearing in mind Kuhn and Prettner (2012), we consider that, in the health care sector, 
health care is obtained from labour according to the following production function:   
     , (5.14) 
in which   denotes the per capita health care,   is the size of the population and    
represents the aggregate employment in the health care sector. Equivalently, we can 
write   
  
 
 and so, we can state that per capita consumption of health care is 
increasing when employment in the health care sector also rises. In this sense, an upper 
bound on the consumption of health care per capita appears for the constraints    
   , here   is the size of the available labour force:      
 
 
  . The idea behind 
the constraints is intuitive and easy to understand: the supply of health care cannot 
exceed a degree at which the health care sector uses total labour force.  
We also assume that the mortality rate is diminishing in the per capita annual 
level of health care,  , and thus we write the mortality rate as  ( ). In line with this, we 
consider: 
 ( )    (   )  (    )    [   ), (5.15) 
                 , (5.16) 
which suggests that, by increasing the health care, the mortality rate can decrease from a 
maximum   to a minimum    . The minimum is achieved when we are in the 
presence of the maximum attainable level of health care,     , that is, where the health 
care sector uses total available labour.
47
 We also consider that health care is subject to 
diminishing returns though in a weak way. We assume that health care reduces not only 
the mortality rate but also the rate of incidence of a disease, which enables agents to rise 
their annual effective labour supply,  ( )  In particular, we consider that: 
   ( )   (    )          (5.17) 
                 . (5.18) 
                                                   
 
47  The effect of health care on mortality or on longevity is empirically supported by, for example, 
Lichtenberg (2004) and Cutler et al. (2006).   
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According to the above considerations, the supply of labour per capita rises with 
the health care degree at weakly decreasing returns. Moreover, if we consider that 
agents provide the same quantity of labour in spite of their age
48
 we can express the 
total supply of labour as:
49
 
   ( )   (5.19) 
Now, it is simple to state that the constraint        entails    ( )  
 (    )        .
50
 
Another feature of this sector is the funding of health care. Continuing in the line 
of Kuhn and Prettner (2012), we consider   [   ] as the private finance share in the 
health care sector and (   )as the public share which is financed by a tax on labour 
income that is equivalent to a social security contribution. Hence, the aggregate health 
expenditure, denoted by  , is given by 
             . (5.20) 
The left hand side of the above equation describes the health care expenditure, 
       . The right hand side presents the composition of funding in health care, 
where            denotes the amount of private finance and       ( )  is 
the public finance. Following Kuhn and Prettner (2012), we assume that the public 
health care budget is balanced at each moment. Once we consider that the health care 
sector works under perfect competition,      which allows us to rewrite the 
expression (20) as        ( ) , and solving it for the tax rate we obtain   
(   ) 
 ( )
 [   ]. Observing this expression, we conclude that the per capita supply of 
health care,  , and the public share, (   ), affect positively the tax while the per 
capita provision of labour have a negative impact. According to Kuhn and Prettner 
(2012), by assuming a competitive health care sector and a non-distortionary tax, 
economic growth is not affected by the mode of health care funding, that is, economic 
                                                   
 
48 The mortality rate is independent of age. 
49 Similarly to Kuhn and Prettner (2012), at the aggregate level, we can denote  ( ) as the percentage of 
population that can work full time or as the average time at work, where agents may differ in their 
provision of labour relying on whether or not they are healthy or ill.  
50 If  ( ) is not a measure of participation but of productivity, it is understandable that  (    )       
 . However, Kuhn and Prettner (2012) ignore this case without loss of generality. 
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growth is determined by the size of the health care sector, measured by  , but not by 
how health care is financed as we can verify on onward. 
 
5.2.4. Final goods sector 
We assume that the final good,  , is produced under perfect competition and it can be 
produced in the North and in the South according to  
  ( )        
 ∑ (   (   )  (   ))
    
   ,   {   }, (5.21) 
where    is an exogenous productivity level which relies on the country’s institutions 
(we consider      );      denotes the labour input used in the final goods production 
and   [   ]  refers to the share of labour;    (   )  (   )  represents the quality 
adjusted intermediate good   in the moment  ,     is a constant fixed exogenously, 
which expresses the size of each quality improvement reached by each successful R&D 
activity,   denotes the steps of the quality ladder (a higher quality is indicated by a 
higher  ),   (   ) refers to the quantity of intermediate good used in the final good 
production; and (   ) is the aggregate factor share of the intermediate goods. 
In both countries, given the price of the final good  ,   ( ), and the price of the 
intermediate good  ,  (   ), the implicit demand for each intermediate good by the 
representative final good producer is: 
  (   )     [  (   )
  ( )
 (   )
]
 
 
   (   )
[
   
 
]
. (5.22) 
Putting this expression into the equation (5.21), replacing   ( ) by the marginal 
cost,   , and  (   ) by the limit prices reported in the next subsection, the final goods 
supply in the North and in the South is, respectively:  
  ( )    
 
 (
   
 
)
   
 
     [       (     )
   
    
   
     
   
 ],    (5.23) 
  ( )    
 
 (
   
 
)
   
 
      [   (
   
     
)
   
 
        
   
 (
   
     
)
   
 
]   (5.24) 
   ∑  
  (   )(   )
 
 
   . 
(5.25) 
From the expressions above, we can verify that the aggregate production in both 
economies depends on    (the Northern aggregate quality index) because the limit 
pricing with free trade ensures that only the highest technology will be used. Therefore, 
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even in the case in which an intermediate good is produced in the North, its quality 
degree is the same as the top Northern quality level. 
As we consider that the final good is produced under perfect competition, that is, 
its price is equivalent to its marginal cost, the marginal cost of producing an 
intermediate good is independent on its stage of quality and is comparable among all 
internal sectors. Normalizing the Northern marginal cost to one (     ), we assume 
that       . 
 
5.2.5. Intermediate goods sector 
In line with Azevedo et al. (forthcoming), we consider that both the technological level 
and the trade barriers of each country define which one produces the intermediate goods 
used in the final goods production. Since the North is assumed as the most 
technologically advanced economy, it is expected to innovate, promoting world 
technological frontier. Regarding the South, we consider that, by imitating the Northern 
technology, it can raise its domestic technology level (this may occur until the gap in 
technological levels is abolished). Moreover, we assume that when a country knows 
how to produce an intermediate good, it can be produced using the production function 
of the final goods. In this sense, the marginal cost of producing an intermediate good 
and the marginal cost of producing the final good,   , are equal and we assume that 
           , allowing the Southern economy to produce the same quality 
degree,  , but at a price lower than that charged by its competitor (Northern country). 
Thus, it is possible for a successfully imitating Southern firm to capture the world 
market. 
We also suppose that the knowledge of how to produce a good is domestically 
free and that the domestic IPR are protected (the innovator is internally protected by a 
system of domestic IPR). In our model we are particularly focused on international IPR 
which protect the innovator economy from foreign imitation; then, when we refer to 
IPR protection we mean international IPR protection. 
Bearing in mind Azevedo et al. (forthcoming) and the demand equation (5.22), 
the profits of monopolist intermediate goods firms are maximized throughout the 
optimal price, given by the following mark-up: 
 
 
123 
 
 (     )   (   )    
 
   
  (5.26) 
which is constant over time, across firms and for all quality levels. The mark-up 
becomes lower when   is nearer to zero and, hence, less opportunity there is for 
monopoly pricing. 
 The expected profits are influenced by how the firms compete. Besides, there are 
three types of firms: Northern firms challenging Northern competition,      , Northern 
firms facing Southern competition,    , and Southern imitation firms (which always 
face Northern competition),   . By assumption, there are   sectors and the sum of these 
percentages is equal to   (  ) . As each type of firm can have both national and 
international sales, we find six limit prices. Northern firms facing Northern rivalry fix a 
limit price slightly below q times the lowest price at which the former innovator could 
sell, because the good is q times more productive than the previous. As MCN=1 is the 
lowest price at which the precursor innovator could sell in the North and (     ) is 
the lowest price at which the good could be sold in the South, since it is subject to 
Southern tariffs on intermediates goods and ad-valorem transportation costs,    , 
Northern firms challenging Northern competition,    , select two limit prices:     
        for internal sales and    
 
  (     )  for Southern sales.
51
 At these 
prices, world sales of all obsolete technologies will disappear. In the same way, 
Northern firms facing Southern competition,    , choose limit prices     
    (     ) for national sales and    
 
      internationally. Southern firms,   , 
always challenge Northern competition and fix limit prices   
 
   for foreign countries 
and          for national sales.  
 
5.2.6. R&D sector 
Similar to the framework of Azevedo et al. (forthcoming), the R&D sector assumes a 
central role in the analysis. We consider that firms choose the quantity of resources to 
                                                   
 
51 “This holds if  (   )   . If instead,  (   )   , then Northern firms will use monopoly pricing” 
(Connolly and Valderrama, 2005: 13). 
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employ, according to the expected present value of profits from successful research, 
which relies on the probabilities of innovation and imitation. From Northern R&D 
activities emerge innovative blueprints for manufacturing intermediate goods, 
improving their quality. In an intermediate goods sector j, presently at quality degree 
  (   ),   (   ) denotes the probability at moment t that the (  (   )   )
th
 innovation 
will occur and will follow a Poisson process. In the same way, we also assume that IPR 
protect domestically these designs and that the top firm in each j (that is, the one 
producing according to the latest patent) applies limit pricing to ensure monopoly. The 
probabilities of successful innovation and imitation are crucial for R&D, as the income 
from profits during each moment t to the monopolist and the duration of the monopoly 
power provide to the value of the top patent. These probabilities creatively remove 
either the existing lead design (e.g., Aghion and Howitt, 1992) or the Northern 
production (e.g., Grossman and Helpman, 1991a, Ch. 12) affecting the monopoly 
duration. For simplicity, an important feature of our model is associated with R&D 
technology: we assume that there is a positive effect of a healthy population on labour 
supply, which positively impacts on the probability functions of innovation and 
imitation      (for example, Bloom et al., 2004 show a positive effect of health on 
economic growth). In this line, we present the following probabilities of innovation and 
imitation, respectively: 
  (   )    (   )   
  (   )  
     
    (   )   
 
, (5.27) 
  (   )     (   )   
  (   )
  
   ̃
  
 
  (   )
  
 
 
(
 
 ̃
)
   
    
 
, (5.28) 
where   (   ) is the flow of final good resources in the country   allocated to R&D in  , 
which defines our setup as a lab equipment model (e.g., Rivera-Batiz and Romer, 1991); 
   
  (   )denotes the learning by previous domestic R&D as a favourable learning effect 
because of the accumulated public knowledge from previous successful R&D (e.g., 
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Grossman and Helpman, 1991a, Ch. 12; Connolly, 2003) and we assume that    
     and      , that is, we consider that the effect of learning-by-past innovations 
is higher than the one associated with learning-by-past imitations;   
     
    (   ) 
describes the adverse effect caused by the increasing complexity of quality 
improvements (or the complexity cost) and it is supposed that       , that is, the 
innovation cost is higher than the fixed cost of imitation (Mansfield et al., 1981); and, 
finally,      denotes employment in the final goods sector in the country  , with    
but close to zero. In the probability of imitation, besides the fixed cost of imitation,   , 
the imitation cost also depends on the sector   South/North ratio,  ̃  
   (   )  
   (   )  
 
  
  
 
 ̂  (    refers to how fast the cost of imitation rises as the technology gap decreases) 
and on the interaction between the two countries, with   (   revealing lower costs of 
collecting information about goods from abroad with more interaction between the two 
economies, whereas the interaction is measured by the ratio between Southern openness 
to intermediate goods imports, , and the aggregate Northern technology level,   ). 
Moreover,   [   ] measures the degree of Southern IPR protection and in accordance 
to Azevedo et al. (forthcoming), we introduce the IPR effect in two ways: 
(i) we fix a negative relationship between the IPR parameter,  , and the probability of 
imitation,   (   ): the higher  , the higher the level of Southern IPR enforcement and 
the lower the probability of successful imitation; 
(ii) we consider that the lower the distance from the technological frontier (the greater 
 ̃), more IPR laws will be applied by these countries and, then, the lower the probability 
of imitation (because, generally, developed countries have higher levels of IPR 
protection: Lai and Qiu, 2003; Grossman and Lai, 2004; Naghavi, 2007; Dinopoulos 
and Segerstrom, 2010).  
Assuming that              and knowing that      (  )   and          , 
we obtain        (  )       . Now, we can rewrite the probability functions of 
successful innovation and imitation, respectively, as: 
  (   )    (   )   
  (   )  
     
    (   )(  [  (  )    ])
  (5.29) 
  (   )     (   )   
  (   )
  
   ̃ 
  
  (   )
  
 
 
(
 
 ̃
)
   
(  [  (  )    ])
  (5.30) 
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5.3. Equilibrium 
The equilibrium conditions, namely in the equilibrium R&D, are similar to those 
described in Azevedo et al. (forthcoming). Consequently, in this section, we underline 
essentially the main differences.   
 
5.3.1. Equilibrium R&D 
Bearing in mind the probabilities of successful R&D, which depend on the resources 
(composite final goods) allocated to it, entry equilibrium is described by the equality 
between the expected return and the consumption of resources. In the case of imitation, 
this equality is represented by: 
  (     )  (     )    (   ) (5.31) 
where  (     )52 is the expected current value of the flow of profits to the producer of j, 
which relies on the profits at t,   (     ), on the equilibrium interest rate and on the 
expected duration of the flow (i.e. expected duration of research leadership).   (     ) 
relies on     ,   ,    ( ),    ( ),    (     ) and   (     ) and, hence, on trade. 
For instance,   (     ), which is the potential competitor, depends on the expected 
duration of the imitator’s technological-knowledge leadership, as the Southern entrant 
competes with a Northern incumbent. Consequently,   (     ) is: 
  (    ̅  )  ∫   (    ̅  )
 
 
   [ ∫(  ( )      (    ̅  ))  
 
 
]    (5.32) 
where   (     ) using an imitation of the quality k is represented by: 
                                                   
 
52 I.e., V(k, j, t) is the market value of the patent or the value of the monopolist firm, owned by consumers. 
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  (    ̅  )  (   )
      (   )(   ) 
  
 ( ) (5.33) 
where   ( )  (     )   ( )  
    (         )    ( ) (  
   
     
)
   
. 
Differentiating equation (5.32) by applying Leibniz’s rule, we achieve the 
dynamic arbitrage equation: 
  ( )      (    ̅  )  
 ̇ (    ̅  )
  (    ̅  )
 
  (    ̅  )
  (    ̅  )
  ̇(  ̅  ) (
   
 
)     (5.34) 
If we insert equation (31) into the free entry R&D equilibrium condition, 
  (   )  (   )    (   ), and if we solve it for   , we get the equilibrium probability of 
successful innovation. As the probability of successful innovation determines the 
technological knowledge progress, equilibrium can be translated into the path of 
Northern technological knowledge, from which free trade in intermediate goods allows 
the South to benefit, as well. The relationship ends up to generate the expression, where 
   is included, for the equilibrium growth rate of the aggregate Northern technological 
level,   : 
 ̂    ( 
(   )     ). (5.35) 
 
5.3.2. Steady state  
The steady state growth rate must be the same in both countries because, by assumption, 
both economies access through free trade to the same state-of-the art intermediate goods 
and have the same technology of final goods production, which suggests, through the 
Euler equation (5.12), that interest rate as well as the term    are also equalized 
between economies in steady state,            
   .53 Moreover, as in Afonso 
                                                   
 
53 We state above that   is constant if the aggregate capital grows at the same rate as the aggregate 
Northern consumption expenditures. Then, as the mortality rate is supposed to be higher in the South 
(developing countries),       , the constant   (    )
 ( )
  ( )  
 must be higher in the North (and as   
also depends positively on   ,       implies that 
  ( )
  ( )  
 
  ( )
  ( )  
). 
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(2012), we define, generically, the instantaneous aggregate resources constraint as 
  ( )    ̅( )       ( )    ( ) , where:   ( )  denotes total resources, the 
composite final good;   ̅( ) is aggregate consumption;    refers to aggregate health 
care consumption;   ( )  represents aggregate intermediate goods;   ( )  is total 
resources employed in R&D. That is, we assume that, each aggregate final good can be 
consumed or saved (and used for purchase health care, for R&D or transformed into 
intermediate goods). This implies that steady state growth rate of these variables will be 
equal to the growth rate of Northern technological knowledge. Therefore, there is a 
growth rate constant and shared by both countries,   , 
    ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̂ 
   ̅̂ 
   ̅̂ 
  
 
 
(      )      .  (5.36) 
In particular 0
~ˆ* Q and sector shares,    ,     and   , are constant. 
Thus the steady state growth rates of both countries rely only on Northern technological 
progress, while the North stays the leading innovator. Furthermore, international trade 
and the risk of losing the market for a particular intermediate good to Southern imitation 
infers that the Northern rate of innovation relies on the Southern rate of imitation. 
In steady state, 
 ̇ (   ̅  )
  (   ̅  )
  ̇(  ̅  ) (
   
 
)     and thus, taking into account equation 
(30), equation (34) becomes: 
  
    
  
   
 ̃ 
   
(   ) 
  
  (  [  (  )    ])
       (5.37) 
Equation (5.37) demonstrates that the available (or Northern) technological 
knowledge progress: 
(i) relies on innovation earnings which, in turn, depend on    and   
  
   
 ̃ 
   
, through 
inter country competition in intermediate goods. That is, the positive level effect from 
North to South (the access to the lead quality intermediate goods rises production and, 
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therefore, the resources to imitative R&D) feeds back into North, influencing    by 
creative destruction; 
 (ii) does not depend on its scale, as it is not influenced by the stage of quality k. 
Actually, the positive effect of the quality stage on profits and on the learning effect is 
precisely compensated by the negative effect on the complexity cost;
54
 
(iii) relies on market size effects; 
(iv) depends on the labour employed in the Southern final goods production,       
  (  )       , which, in turn, relies on the consumption of health care per capita, 
  . That is, the higher the health care in the South, the more healthy population is 
available to produce final goods. This will have a positive impact on the resources to 
imitative R&D, which will affect the Northern R&D activity. 
As far as equations (5.35), (5.36) and (5.37) are concerned, we can obtain the 
steady state interest rate: firstly, we consider equation (5.37) into equation (5.35) 
substituting   , then we use equation (5.36) into the resulting expression substituting  ̂ 
  
and, finally, we solve this in order to   . Actually, as steady state prices of non-tradable 
and tradable goods are constant as well as the growth rate of available technological 
knowledge, see (5.35) and (5.37), the steady state interest rate shared by both countries, 
  , is obtained: 
 
   
{  
  
   
 ̃ 
   
(   ) 
  
    } ( (   ) 
  
  ) 
 
 
(   )
 (   ) 
  
   
 
 
, (5.38) 
                                                   
 
54 This is crucial for a symmetric equilibrium (on asymmetric equilibrium in quality ladder models and its 
growth consequences, see Cozzi et al., 2007). 
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where   (  [  (  )    ])
 . Considering this expression in the Euler equation, we 
obtain the equilibrium growth rate in the presence of population ageing: 
   
 
 
[
{  
  
   
 ̃ 
   
(   ) 
  
    } ( (   ) 
  
  ) 
 
 
(   )
 (   ) 
  
   
 
 
    ]      . (5.39) 
. 
Now, differentiating the previous expression in order to  , the IPR parameter, we 
obtain the same sign which we obtained in the absence of population ageing. Moreover,  
the magnitude of the IPR effect on the growth rate remains almost the same  because, 
despite of the fact that now it depends on the term   , which relies on   ,   ,    and  , 
as the parameter   is, by assumption, higher but close to zero,    will be approximately 
one.  
If we differentiate the steady state growth rate with respect to   , the mortality 
rate, we obtain       As stated above,       [     ], so we can show that     
[    ] or, alternatively,   [   ] and, thus we conclude that when the mortality rate 
decreases (due to, for instance, an increase in health care per capita), the steady state 
growth rate increases, that is, there is a negative relationship between the mortality rate 
and the steady state growth rate. In other words, as a decrease in the mortality rate 
means an increase in longevity, we achieve a positive effect of population ageing on 
steady state growth rate. According to Prettner (2009), the intuition behind this result 
suggests that a reduction in mortality rate allows an expansion of the planning horizon 
of the agents. Therefore, individuals have more time to pay off the investments in new 
technologies which leads the agents to apply less of their income to current 
consumption and more to investment in new technologies. However, as this 
demographic change has a positive effect on growth, the rise in lifetime consumption 
overcompensates individuals for the initial sacrifice.  
Moreover, differentiating the expression of the steady state growth rate in order to 
 , the health care per capita, remembering that the mortality rate relies on the degree of 
health care per capita and is fixed as  ( ), we obtain the following expression: 
   
  
 
 
 
[
{  
  
   
 ̃ 
   
(   ) 
  
 ( )} ( (   ) 
  
  )  
 
 
(   )
 (   ) 
  
   
 
 
 (  [  (  )    ])
     (  
   )       ] (5.40) 
 
which will be definitely positive if   ( )    (given that, as  mentioned above      
and     , that is, the effective labour supply increases in the presence of health care 
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improvements and the mortality rate decreases when the health care is well provided). 
That is,   ( )    is a sufficient condition for enhancing growth. This result is in line 
with Kuhn and Prettner (2012) since these authors point out that the growth rate raises 
in the presence of good health care in the case in which the further supplies do not 
create a decline in the effective labour supply.    
 
5.4. Concluding remarks 
The consequences of population ageing have been widely discussed on several fields of 
society. In particular, ageing can have some impacts in several economic matters. 
Nevertheless, the effect of this demographic reality on growth is not clear. 
In this chapter, we developed a North-South endogenous growth model in order to 
understand the impact of population ageing on growth. Moreover, we aimed to 
understand whether, in the presence of population ageing, there is any change in the IPR 
effect on growth. Using a brief account of the literature on population ageing (and 
growth) as motivation, we concluded that there is no consensus about this effect. Our 
model also provides an explanation for the relationship between health care and 
economic growth based both on the allocation of labour across two sectors (final goods 
and health care sector) and by reflecting on R&D sector the health care effect on 
effective labour supply, given that it is expected that healthy population is more 
available to work, which, in turn, has a positive impact on the probability of successful 
R&D. 
One of our findings is that, relatively to Azevedo et al. (forthcoming), population 
ageing do not affect the IPR effect on growth, at least in terms of sign because the 
amplitude of the effect can change, although weakly.  
We also found that, regarding mortality rate, it has a negative impact on growth. 
In other words, there is a positive effect of longevity on growth, which in turn, means 
that population ageing affects growth positively. This result is not in line with those 
which advocate that population ageing is negative for economic growth, but it is in line 
with those that show it is possible a positive effect of ageing on growth.  
We also analysed the health care effect on growth and we found that the health 
care level has a positive impact on growth when additional provisions of health do not 
 
 
132 
 
cause a decrease in the effective labour supply but increase it in the same or higher 
magnitude.  
In this sense, from the model assumptions and the two last findings, we can 
conclude that although health care raises longevity and labour supply, increases in 
health care level will enhance definitively growth when lead to increases in labour 
supply in the same or higher amplitude.  
We are not able to conclude anything concrete whether the steady state growth 
rate is lower or higher when mortality is present, compared to the standard case of no 
mortality and infinite planning horizons, because now it depends negatively on the 
mortality rate (more precisely, on   ), but it is also affected by other variables whose 
value is unknown and it can be negative or positive. 
This analysis leaves a number of open questions. Although it allows us to 
conclude a positive effect of both ageing population and health care on growth, it occurs 
under some conditions. Moreover, we only study the steady state and our conclusions 
are very much based on comparative statics so it will be useful to study the transitional 
dynamics. Another interesting matter to future research is to understand the effect of 
growth on health care provisions. For instance, we theoretically assume that Northern 
(developed) countries have higher levels of health care but these countries may not have 
necessarily higher growth rates. Moreover, it would be useful not only to introduce 
health care effects by other means (besides or instead of labour) but also to make health 
care provisions depend on R&D (and IPR) because higher health care provisions are 
associated with medical and scientific developments (as well as new drugs are 
oftentimes protected by IPR).   
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Appendix C 
C.1. Proof that          ̅  ̅  
To verify that          ̅   ̅ , we can use the expression (5.5) and the 
expressions which define    and   
 
. Similarly to Azevedo et al. (forthcoming), we can 
assume     
 ̅ 
  
  ̅  and   
 
 (   )
 ̅ 
  
   ̅ , respectively. Then, by using the last 
equations into the expression (5.5), we have: 
               
 
  
 
 
( )          ( 
 ̅ 
  
  ̅)    
 ((   )
 ̅ 
  
   ̅) 
( )          ̅   ̅  (   ) ̅   ̅ 
( )          ̅   ̅   ̅   ̅    ̅   ̅ 
( )         ̅   ̅  
C.2. Aggregate capital and aggregate consumption 
Differentiating expressions (5.9) and (5.10) with respect to time, we obtain: 
 
  
̇ ( )      (∫   ̇̅(    ) 
  (    )
 
  
      ∫   (    ) 
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   )        (   )    
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̇ ( )        (   )      ( )      ∫   ̇̅(    ) 
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    (5.41) 
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      ∫   (    ) 
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( ) ̇ ( )        (   )      ( )      ∫  ̇ (    ) 
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( ) ̇ ( )       ( )      ∫  ̇ (    ) 
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   . (5.42) 
 
Using the wealth constraint (5.4) and the equation (5.42) yields: 
 ̇ ( )       ( )      ∫ [(       )  (    )  (   )  ( )     ( )    ̅(    ) ̅        ] 
   (    )
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( ) ̇ ( )  (    )  ( )  (   )  ( )    ( )   ̅  ̅ ( )     ( )   . 
The above expression denotes the aggregate law of motion for capital where 
  ( )    ( )     is the aggregate wage income,   ( )    ( )   represents the 
aggregate dividend payments and   ( )       denotes the aggregate health 
consumption. Rewriting the individual’s optimization problem subject to its lifetime 
budget constraint yields the following optimization problem: 
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(5.43) 
The first order condition (FOC) is 
(   )  ̅(    )
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In the period (   )yields: 
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( ) ( )  
  ̅(    )
  
 ̅ 
  
And, then, we can write: 
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   . 
If we integrate the previous expression, and by using the budget constraint given 
in the optimization problem (5.43), we have: 
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Additionally, if we consider:  
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  , 
we can rewrite the expression as, 
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or, equivalently, 
  ̅(    ) ̅  (    )[  (    )    ( )] 
( )       (    )  (    )[  (    )    ( )]  
  ( ) denotes the human wealth of agents which depends on wages lifetime 
income and dividends net of taxes and private health payments. According to Kuhn and 
Prettner (2012), the human wealth does not depend on the date of birth because lump-
sum dividends are assumed and productivity is supposed to be age independent. Hence, 
in our case, optimal consumption expenditure in the planning period is proportional to 
total wealth with a marginal propensity to expend of (    ). Bearing in mind this and 
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the expression (5.10), it is possible to find an expression for the evolution of the 
aggregate consumption: 
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  (    )   
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or, equivalently, 
  ( ) ̅  (    )(  (    )    ( )) 
( )  ( )  (    )(  (    )    ( )), 
where   ( ) denotes the Northern aggregate human wealth. As newborns do not own 
capital because there are not bequests, 
  ̅(   )  
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 ̅ 
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holds for each newborn individual and each newborn cohort, respectively. By putting 
equations (5.6), (5.41), (5.45), (5.46) and (5.47) together, we obtain: 
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rearranging, 
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which is the aggregate Euler equation. This equation is different from the individual 
Euler equation due to the term    (
  ̅( )   (   )
  ̅( )
)  [     ]  
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Chapter 6 
Conclusions 
This chapter contains the main conclusions of the thesis and also some proposals for 
future research. 
 The most part of the thesis was devoted to the study of the theoretical literature on 
the IPR impact on economic growth. While in the Chapter 2 a study of theoretical (and 
empirical) literature about IPR (namely about the effect of IPR on 
growth/innovation/welfare) was offered, in the Chapter 3 an endogenous growth model 
was proposed to check the sign of the IPR effect on the growth rate. Moreover, in the 
Chapter 5, the model developed previously was extended by considering population 
ageing and health care sector in the formal setting. In this case, we intended not only to 
verify whether population ageing has some effect on the IPR impact on growth but also 
to analyse the effect of population ageing on the growth rate. The main goal in these 
chapters was to understand the IPR effect on growth.  
 The part of the Chapter 2 related to the theoretical literature on the main topic of 
research did not allow us to find a clear and prevailing effect of IPR protection on 
growth. Inversely, we systematized the related literature and showed evidence of all 
kind of possible results. Another interesting finding was that there were some gaps in 
this research. We stressed two in particular. First, there is a relative scarcity on studies 
about the direct effect of IPR protection on economic growth. Studies about the 
relationship between IPR and economic indicators as innovation, welfare or FDI are 
more common, and so, the specific relationship we intended to study, demanded to 
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establish a relationship between these economic variables and IPR and, only then, 
between IPR and growth, which can produce some bias in the analysis. Additionally, it 
is also more common to find studies about the relationship between IPR-induced factors 
and growth. Second, the fact that the patent is used in a disproportional way as a 
measure of IPR enforcement, which may also bring some bias to the gathered results.  
 Chapter 3 aimed to fill some of the gaps in the research agenda. On the one hand, 
the model developed in this chapter analysed the direct effect of IPR on economic 
growth. On the other hand, we defined IPR as a decrease in the probability of imitation 
because it is common to find that IPR protection becomes imitation more difficult. In 
this chapter we found a negative relationship between IPR enforcement and the growth 
rate. This result is not definitive because, as we have referred, there is no consensus 
about the signal of the IPR effect on growth. However, it is according with those who 
argue that a strong IPR enforcement is not always suitable to economic growth. 
Moreover, we can explain the obtained impact, which also constitutes a way in which 
trade influences negatively the steady state growth rate, by the following: a rise in IPR 
protection becomes imitation harder in the South (because the imitation cost increases 
and consequently the probability of imitation diminishes) and there is also a feedback 
effect which leads to a negative impact on the steady state probability of innovation. 
 In the Chapter 5, by extending the model developed in the Chapter 3, we found 
that in a scenario of population ageing, the effect of IPR on growth remains negative 
although its  amplitude can change. Moreover, we concluded that if there is a decrease 
in the mortality rate, which is synonymous of population ageing, the steady state growth 
rate increases. This effect on growth happens due to the expansion of the planning 
horizon of the people (caused by the increase in the longevity) because as they have 
more time to liquidate the investments, they spend more money to invest in new 
technologies and less in current consumption. That is, the agents’ initial sacrifice is 
overcompensated by the increase in the lifetime consumption (which is proportionated 
by the rise in the longevity). Finally, we found that when the increases in labour supply 
are in the same or higher amplitude than in the health care level, there is, definitely, a 
positive effect of additional provisions of health care on growth.  
 The other part of the thesis – the rest of the Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 – was clearly 
devoted to the empirical literature. The rest of the Chapter 2 revised the empirical 
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literature about the relationship between IPR and growth, while the Chapter 4 tested 
empirically the model developed in the Chapter 3. 
 In the part of the Chapter 2 dedicated to empirical literature, we found that several 
studies observe a positive effect of IPR on economic growth. A possible explanation for 
this can be the fact that the negative effects of IPR protection are offset by the positive 
ones. Another possible justification for the predominance of the positive results can be 
the IPR measure commonly used: patent protection, namely the index of Park and 
Ginarte (e.g., Xu and Chiang, 2005; Groizard, 2009; Falvey at al., 2009). This can 
create a bias given that this index comprises a sum of different categories of patent 
rights and it does not allow us to understand the effect of each one on growth. 
Furthermore, we can also identify a possible, additional bias in the analysis: the sample 
used. Some of the studies in analysis use only a certain kind of countries or they present 
estimated results that dependent on the country development level. In line with this, we 
cannot undoubtedly conclude what is the effect of IPR protection on growth. Therefore, 
we can add another gap to the two presented about theoretical review: there is an 
insufficient number of studies about this field of research.  
 Chapter 4 presented an empirical study, which examines the IPR effect on 
economic growth. Using a panel dataset of 34 countries in two periods (1997-2011 and 
2002-2011) and a two-stage estimation procedure, the analysis showed that IPR 
protection influences economic growth in robust terms. To avoid some bias created by 
the IPR measure, we achieved the IPR value residually and then we found that higher 
levels of IPR protection are associated to lower economic growth rates. Thus, this 
analysis supports a negative effect of IPR protection on economic growth. 
 At last, we can state that this work leaves a number of open questions which 
suggests there is much more work to be done in this research field. Namely, we consider 
that more research on this specific topic is crucial in order to advance our understanding 
of the relationship between IPR and economic growth on a worldwide scale, and to be 
clearly able to go beyond the strict modelling frame. Therefore, for future research, it 
would be interesting to analyse, for instance, the nature of the sign found by 
differentiating the expression of the steady state growth rate with respect to IPR 
parameter ( ) bearing in mind the specificities of each country according to its stage of 
development. Another possible research is to solve the models for transitional 
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dynamics, using calibration and simulation, in order to understand the behaviour of the 
main variables along the transition paths. Finally, in our analysis, we verified the effect 
of IPR, health care and longevity on growth but it would be interesting to study the 
effect of the growth rate on each one of these variables(the reverse causality) and to test 
all cases empirically.  
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